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Abstract
This Report analyzes two cases in which TNC activities have had an impact on Bolivian citi-
zens’ enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights (“ESC rights”). In so doing, it analyzes
not only corporate conduct but also the Bolivian government’s role in protecting ESC rights from
violation. The cases involve an oil spill by Transredes, a TNC partly owned by Enron and Shell, in
Bolivia’s Desaguadero River, which affected over one hundred indigenous communities; and the
water war that took place in the city of Cochabamba over the privatization of Cochabamba’s water
system and its operation by the consortium Aguas del Tunari, partly owned by Bechtel. The first
section of this Report provides background information on the issue of TNC violations of ESC
rights, and describes the international legal framework within which we are working. Sections
II and III deal with the oil spill and water war cases respectively. These sections document the
salient facts of each case, analyze them under international human rights law, describing both the
TNCs’ and the Bolivian government’s responsibilities for alleged violations, and present recom-
mendations to the Bolivian State and TNCs. In both cases, we find violations of ESC rights, such
as the rights to water and health, environmental rights, and indigenous peoples’ rights. However,
as previously noted, we find that the most significant rights violations were committed by the Bo-
livian State in its failure to create or implement procedures for the protection and enforcement
of substantive ESC rights. Finally, Section IV offers general observations and recommendations
to international institutions and monitoring bodies regarding the protection of ESC rights from
violation by TNCs.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 17, 2003, after a month of protests throughout
the country and as many as eighty people killed in confronta-
tions between protestors and the military, Bolivian President
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada resigned. Although triggered by
the approaching consummation of a deal to export gas through
Chile, the protests had been building for many months, even
years, as Bolivians became increasingly disenchanted with nearly
two decades of neoliberal economic policies that appeared to do
little to help the country's poor and marginalized majorities. In-
deed, starting in the mid-1980s, Bolivia embarked on a process
of economic reform that has been described as "the most text-
book application of neo-liberalism yet to appear in the Ameri-
cas."1 Following the prescriptions of international financial insti-
tutions ("IFIs") such as the World Bank and International Mone-
tary Fund, Bolivia opened its markets to foreign products,
privatized many State-owned enterprises, and took strong mea-
sures to attract foreign investors, among other reforms.2 Al-
* Fellow, Crowley Program in International Human Rights, 2002-2003; J.D., New
York University School of Law, 2001; B.A., The University of Texas at Austin, 1998.
** Professor of Law, Fordham Law School; Co-Director, Crowley Program in Inter-
national Human Rights; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1990; B.A., Princeton University,
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1. See KEVIN HRALY, LLAMAs, WEAVINGS AND ORGANIC CHOCOLATE: MULTICULTURAL
GRASSROOTS DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANDES AND AMAZON OF BOLIVIA 51 (2001).
2. See generally Juan Antonio Morales, Economic Vulnerability in Bolivia, in TowARSs
DEMOCRATIC VIABILITy 41, 49-50 (John Crabtree & Laurence Whitehead eds., 2001). As
described by Herbert Klein, the initial reasons for Bolivia's adoption of economic liber-
alism and rejection of the State capitalism that had predominated until the 1980s are
twofold:
First was the impact of hyper-inflation for the second time in modern Bolivian
history, a crisis that virtually destroyed the functioning of the national econ-
omy; and second the total collapse of the expensive State mining system which
had been constructed on the basis of a tin industry which was rapidly going
out of existence. These two irreducible events ... meant that a radical solu-
tion had to be adopted. With the help of external experts, [President] Paz
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though these measures initially stabilized Bolivia's economy and
controlled rampant inflation,3 poverty rates in Bolivia have not
decreased since 1997,4 and many Bolivians complain that for-
eign investment and free trade have brought more problems
than they have solved.5
The assumption by transnational corporations ("TNCs") of
functions previously performed by the State has been a particu-
larly contentious topic. Over the past decade, TNCs have taken
on a much larger and more visible role in the country, con-
ducting oil and gas exploration and distribution, managing pub-
lic utilities, and employing large numbers of citizens. IFIs and
the Bolivian government intended that the entry of TNCs bring
much needed capital and expertise to Bolivia, thereby contribut-
ing to the country's economic development. TNCs have never-
theless become the focus of much anger and frustration among
Bolivians, many of whom assert that these companies are mis-
treating, stealing from, or taking advantage of them. Indeed, in
some cases, Bolivians have accused TNCs of human rights viola-
tions. Not surprisingly; therefore, TNCs and government actions
supporting them have become the subject of popular protest.
This Report analyzes two cases in which TNC activities have
had an impact on Bolivian citizens' enjoyment of economic, so-
cial, and cultural rights ("ESC rights"). In so doing, it analyzes
not only corporate conduct but also the Bolivian government's
role in protecting ESC rights from violation. The cases involve
an oil spill by Transredes, a TNC partly owned by Enron and
Shell, in Bolivia's Desaguadero River, which affected over one
hundred indigenous communities; and the water war that took
place in the city of Cochabamba over the privatization of Cocha-
Estenssoro in a matter of a few months carried out a classical orthodox eco-
nomic shock the likes of which were a textbook model of conservative eco-
nomic policy.
HERBERT KLEIN, BOLIVIA: THE EVOLUTION OF A MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETY 275 (2d ed.
1992).
3. See Morales, supra note 2, at 49-50.
4. See Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Panorama So-
cial de America Latina 2002-2003, available at http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/
DesarrolloSocial/9/LCG2209PE/PSE_2003_Sintesis.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
5. See, e.g., Interview with Father Gregorio Iriarte, in Bolivia (May 21, 2003) (criti-
cizing the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and arguing that economic liberalism has
deepened the economic divide between rich and poor in Bolivia and worldwide).
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bamba's water system and its operation by the consortium Aguas
del Tunari, partly owned by Bechtel.
Although the Report highlights a number of ESC rights vio-
lated by the corporate actors or by the State, we argue that the
central problem raised by both cases is Bolivia's failure to de-
velop effective procedures to prevent and remedy violations of
ESC rights by TNCs. Put differently, the core problem involves
Bolivia's failure to guarantee the procedural rights that are nec-
essary for the effective protection of substantive ESC rights. This
observation has important implications not only for Bolivia but
also for international institutions and monitoring bodies. Al-
though these bodies have paid increasing attention to the issues
of ESC rights and TNC responsibility for human rights viola-
tions, they have focused relatively little attention on the problem
of how States should protect ESC rights from violation by TNCs.
On one hand, in the area of TNC responsibility, most recent
work has emphasized the development of international rather
than domestic norms and enforcement mechanisms. This is
true despite the obligation of State parties to protect ESC rights
against interference by private parties. On the other hand, al-
though significant progress has occurred in defining and elabo-
rating ESC norms, the role of the State in enforcing these rights
against third parties, including TNCs, has too often been ig-
nored. This Report therefore attempts to address a gap in inter-
national human rights law by suggesting ways in which interna-
tional human rights institutions and monitoring bodies can en-
courage States to develop and improve domestic processes for
the protection of ESC rights against TNCs.
We wish to emphasize that this Report does not aim to an-
swer the large questions of economic policy with which Bolivians
are currently wrestling. We have not analyzed the potential ben-
efits that foreign direct investment and TNCs can bring to poor
countries, and are consequently not in a position to weigh such
benefits against the particular costs that are described herein.
As a result, this Report should not be used to justify any particu-
lar view regarding such investment or Bolivia's economic rela-
tionship to the rest of the world. This Report does offer a cau-
tionary tale about the dangers that poorly regulated, unchecked,
TNC activity can pose to human rights. Assuming that TNCs
continue operating in Bolivia, we hope that the Bolivian govern-
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ment will follow our recommendations regarding the develop-
ment of procedures to protect ESC rights from TNC activity.
This Report represents the culmination of a year-long pro-
ject undertaken by the Joseph R. Crowley Program in Interna-
tional Human Rights at Fordham Law School. The Fordham
delegation was led by Professor Tracy Higgins, co-director of the
Crowley Program, and Maria McFarland, the 2002-2003 Crowley
Fellow. The delegation included Fordham Law Professor Rachel
Vorspan; Marcela Llanque Vargas, Vice-President of the Perma-
nent Assembly of Human Rights of Bolivia's La Paz office; and
the seven Fordham Law School students selected as 2002-2003
Crowley Scholars, Leena Khandwala, Margarita Melikjanian,
Danitra Oliver, Marny Requa, Seema Saifee, Nycole Thompson,
and Christina Wilson.6 Following the practice established in pre-
vious missions, the Crowley delegation participated in an intense
program of study throughout the academic year preceding the
mission.7 This program included a seminar specifically address-
ing the issues of Bolivian history, law, and society; corporate so-
cial responsibility for human rights violations; and international
law on economic, social, and cultural rights.
The delegation spent two weeks in Bolivia, from May 18 to
May 31, 2003, conducting interviews and collecting documenta-
tion in the cities of Cochabamba, Oruro, and La Paz, as well as
eleven isolated communities along the Desaguadero River. Dur-
ing this period, the delegation met with a broad range of individ-
uals: Bolivian citizens affected by the water wars and oil spill,
political activists, lawyers, academics, representatives of non-gov-
ernmental organizations ("NGOs"), political analysts, local and
national government officials, including legislators and repre-
6. We were also fortunate to enjoy the company and assistance of two interns:
Hannah Grey andJessica Purcell. The analysis and recommendations contained in this
Report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of other delega-
tion members, or of the Permanent Assembly of Human Rights of Bolivia.
7. See Crowley Program in Int'l Human Rights & Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, Justice on Trial: State Security Court, Police Impunity, and the Intimidation of Human
Rights Defenders in Turkey, 22 FORDAM INT'L L.J. 2129 (1999); Crowley Program in Int'l
Human Rights, One Country, Two Legal Systems, 23 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 1 (1999); Crowley
Program in Int'l Human Rights & Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustin Pro
Judrez, Presumed Guilty?: Criminal Justice and Human Rights In Mexico, 24 FoRDAM IN'r'L
L.J. 801 (2001); Jeanmarie Fenrich & Tracy E. Higgins, Promise Unfulfilled: Law, Culture
and Women's Inheritance Rights in Ghana, Report of the Joseph R. Crowley Program in Interna-
tional Human Rights, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259 (2001); Nicole Fritz & Martin Flaherty,
Unjust Order: Malaysia's Internal Security Act, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1345 (2003).
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sentatives of various Ministries and Superintendencies, and cor-
porate officials from both Transredes and Aguas del Tunari.8
Additional interviews were subsequently conducted in Washing-
ton, D.C. in August 2003.
The first section of this Report provides background infor-
mation on the issue of TNC violations of ESC rights, and de-
scribes the international legal framework within which we are
working. Sections II and III deal with the oil spill and water war
cases respectively. These sections document the salient facts of
each case, analyze them under international human rights law,
describing both the TNCs' and the Bolivian government's re-
sponsibilities for alleged violations, and present recommenda-
tions to the Bolivian State and TNCs. In both cases, we find vio-
lations of ESC rights, such as the rights to water and health, envi-
ronmental rights, and indigenous peoples' rights. However, as
previously noted, we find that the most significant rights viola-
tions were committed by the Bolivian State in its failure to create
or implement procedures for the protection and enforcement of
substantive ESC rights. Finally, Section IV offers general obser-
vations and recommendations to international institutions and
monitoring bodies regarding the protection of ESC rights from
violation by TNCs.
8. The Crowley Program wishes to thank everyone who met with our delegation
and who gave their time, assistance, and documentation. We are especially indebted to
the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights in Bolivia, which assisted and advised us in
the scheduling of interviews, and to Marcela Llanque Vargas, who was a full member of
our delegation and whose perspective as a Bolivian lawyer and human rights activist
greatly enriched our understanding of the country and the cases. We would also like to
thank the many local guides and NGO representatives in Oruro who assisted us in
reaching the affected communities surrounding the Desaguadero, as well as Lee Crid-
land and Javier Molina of Voluntarios Bolivia for their logistical assistance, and our
excellent translators Angelica Fernandez, Amparo Burgos, Gabriela Yafiez, Pedro Rojas,
Roman Crespo, and Daniel Qotari.
We are grateful to the many individuals who advised us before the mission, includ-
ing in particular Professors Cynthia Williams and Chantal Thomas, both of whom were
unfortunately unable to join us on the ground, but whose thoughts influenced our
planning. Finally, we wish to emphasize our gratitude to the individuals in communi-
ties along the Desaguadero River who in many cases went to a great deal of trouble and
expense to talk with us and provide us with copies of documentation regarding their
situation. The stories and opinions they shared with us were invaluable to our under-
standing of the oil spill, and essential to this Report.
16672004]
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I. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, AD CULTURAL RIGHTS: BACKGROUND
AND APPLICABLE LAW
This Section first provides a brief description of the impact
of TNC activity on economic, social, and cultural rights, explain-
ing the obstacles to effective national protection and enforce-
ment of ESC rights against TNCs. It then offers an overview of
international law on economic, social, and cultural rights, and
international law governing corporate responsibility with respect
to human rights.
A. The Impact of TNC Activities on ESC Rights
In recent decades, TNCs have become increasingly impor-
tant actors in developing countries, expanding their activities
throughout the world and, in some cases, assuming functions
that had been performed by the public sector. Along with this
change in TNCs' functions and profile, TNCs' ability to affect
human rights has also increased. To be sure, TNCs' presence
may have an overall positive effect on human rights in a given
country;9 however, TNCs are also capable of committing large-
scale human rights abuses and supporting governments in the
commission of such abuses. And TNCs are now regularly ac-
cused of human rights violations, particularly violations of citi-
zens' ESC rights. For example, TNCs engaged in natural re-
source exploitation are frequently accused of affecting people's
enjoyment of a healthy environment or the rights of indigenous
peoples,1 ° and TNCs who employ local laborers in countries with
weak labor protections are often criticized for failing to respect
workers' rights."' At the same time, governments in developing
countries are poorly positioned to prevent or punish human
rights violations by TNCs, particularly violations of ESC rights.
Indeed, governments are often facilitators or collaborators in
the violations. This is true for several reasons. First, the domes-
tic laws, contracts, and rules regulating TNCs are often shaped
9. Some scholars have argued that overall increased foreign direct investment and
transnational corporations ("TNC") activity in any given country has positive effects on
human rights. See, e.g., William H. Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs: Theory Versus Quan-
titative Analysis, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 368 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Jota v. Texaco, 157 F.3d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1998).
11. See generally Clean Clothes Campaign, at http://www.cleanclothes.org/ (last
visited Feb. 11, 2004).
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by countries' desire to attract investment, and may reflect pres-
sure from multinational institutions or TNCs themselves. 12 The
water war case discussed in this Report presents an example of a
contract and law that provided inadequate protections for citi-
zens' water rights because of real or perceived pressures on the
government to attract investment. Second, due to their fear of
losing foreign investment, governments are often unwilling to
enforce fully their laws and regulations against TNCs. Govern-
ment officials face pressure from both foreign governments and
TNCs themselves to treat investors favorably. In the oil spill case,
discussed in the next section, the former Vice-Minister for the
Environment reported that Transredes repeatedly pressured her
through her acquaintances and relatives to treat the company
favorably. 3 She and another official told us that visits from rep-
resentatives from the U.S. Embassy to the Vice-Ministry for Envi-
ronment added to this pressure.14
Third, a power imbalance between TNCs and the ordinary
citizens who are affected by TNC activities may prevent adequate
12. See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Global-
ization, 35 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 705, 738-39 (2002).
It is well known that companies in the United States are actively involved in
lobbying both Congress and administrative agencies in the United States to
protect and advance their regulatory interests .... An analogous process oc-
curs internationally as well, with companies negotiating with host countries
about taxes, subsidies, rule of law issues, wages, and other parameters prior to
investing - including negotiations to forestall enhanced labor protection as a
condition of investment. Moreover, some important economic intermediaries
such as the World Bank also engage in similar discussions, with a goal of pro-
tecting investors from enhanced host-country labor protections as part of a
complex of conditions for lending. For their part, countries recognize that
they are competing for foreign investment; and this competition can shape
and constrain domestic regulation. The major implication of these interna-
tional discussions for corporate social responsibility issues is that the 'rules of
the game' are not always neutral arbiters of the public good, according to
which corporate enterprise can confidently act. Rather, in significant in-
stances those rules have been shaped by transnational enterprises' interests or
even presumed interests.
Id.
13. See Telephone Interview with Neisa Roca, Former Vice-Minister for the Envi-
ronment, in Bolivia (May 27, 2003) [hereinafter Neisa Roca Telephone Interview].
14. According to Patricia Garcia, representatives from the embassies of the United
States and United Kingdom (and possibly the Netherlands) visited the Vice-Ministry
after the oil spill to urge the Vice-Ministry to take into account the importance of Trans-
redes's investment in Bolivia in making decisions about the spill. See Interview with
Patricia Garcia, Legal Advisor to Ministry of Sustainable Development, in Bolivia (May
28, 2003) [hereinafter Interview with Patricia Garcia].
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enforcement of national laws and regulations for protection of
ESC rights. Often, the people whose rights are affected by TNC
activities belong to vulnerable populations, lacking both knowl-
edge about their rights and the resources to defend them. The
relationship between Transredes and the communities along the
Desaguadero River who were affected by the oil spill provides a
typical example of this power imbalance and its consequences.
Finally, secrecy is often emphasized in dealings between
governments and TNCs. In some cases, this is the result of out-
right corruption, government officials taking bribes from TNCs
or otherwise making bad decisions for their personal benefit. 5
In other cases, TNCs themselves demand that negotiations be
conducted behind closed doors, as may have occurred in the
case of the water wars.16 In addition, if government officials are
sacrificing ESC rights in negotiations with TNCs, or otherwise
making trade-offs that are likely to be unpopular, they are likely
to hide this decision-making process from the public. In the
water war case, several factors appear to have motivated the se-
crecy of the negotiations, but among them was the fact that the
government feared that the public would object to specific provi-
sions of the contract and new law.
Given these obstacles to domestic protection and enforce-
ment of ESC rights against TNCs, one might reasonably ask
whether international enforcement of human rights law might
be more effective at responding to TNC violations of ESC rights.
This Report endeavors to answer this question. By way of back-
ground, the next subsections provide an overview of the two
main areas of international law relevant to TNC violations of
ESC rights.
15. In commenting on Transparency International's 2002 Bribe Payers' Index,
Transparency International Chairman Peter Eigen stated:
The laws are not being properly enforced. Our new survey leaves no doubt
that large numbers of multinational corporations from the richest nations are
pursuing a criminal course to win contracts in the leading emerging market
economies of the world .... The governments of the richest nations continue
to fail to recognize the rampant undermining of fair global trade by bribe-
paying multinational enterprises.
Press Release on the Bribe Payers Index 2002, available at http://www.transparency.
org/pressreleases archive/2002/2002.05.14.bpi.en.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
16. The concession agreement included a confidentiality clause forbidding gov-
ernment officials from disclosing several details about the negotiations between the
government and the company. Details about the clause are discussed in the section on
the Water Wars.
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B. Overview: International Law on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights
All of the rights addressed in this Report fall within the cate-
gory of economic, social, and cultural rights as opposed to civil
and political rights. Although ESC rights are fully a part of inter-
national law, and have been established and described in numer-
ous international and regional treaties, 17 in practice they have
received far less attention from States, NGOs, and international
institutions than have civil and political rights. As noted by the
United Nations ("U.N.") Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights ("ESCR Committee"):
[T] he international community as a whole continue [s] to tol-
erate all too often breaches of economic, social and cultural
rights which, if they occurred in relation to civil and political
rights, would provoke expressions of horror and outrage and
would lead to concerted calls for immediate remedial action.
In effect, despite the rhetoric, violations of civil and political
rights continue to be treated as though they were far more
serious, and more patently intolerable, than massive and di-
rect denials of economic, social, and cultural rights.""8
An important reason for the relative neglect of this category
of rights is the manner in which the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights describes State obligations
regarding ESC rights. Each State is obligated to "take steps... to
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particu-
larly the adoption of legislative measures."19 The notion of pro-
17. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) [hereinafter ICESCR]; American
Convention on Human RightsJuly 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Organization of Amer-
ican States: Additional Protocol to the American Convention of Human Rights in the
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights "Protocol of San Salvador," Nov. 17, 1988,
28 I.L.M. 156 [hereinafter Protocol of San Salvador]; Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.
21, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/Res/34/180, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980) [hereinafter CEDAW]; Inter-
national Labor Organization: Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 [hereinafter ILO Convention
No. 169].
18. United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, State-
ment to the World Conference, U.N. Doc. E/1993/22/, at 83, 5.
19. ICESCR, supra note 17, art. 2(1). In addition, the ICESCR forbids discrimina-
tion in the protection of ESC rights on the basis of "race, colour, sex, language, relig-
16712004]
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gressive realization of ESC rights recognizes that financial con-
straints often prevent States from immediately guaranteeing the
full exercise of ESC rights. However, the standard is also impre-
cise, leaving open to question the types of steps that would con-
tribute to progressive realization, and the timetable within which
those steps should be taken.
A second factor, both cause and effect of the neglect of ESC
rights, is the lack of enforcement mechanisms for these rights.
An important tool in the protection of civil and political rights is
the existence of domestic and international legal mechanisms
allowing for individual petition and adjudication of claims.
Through adjudication, tribunals clarify the meaning of rights in
the context of specific cases, and over time, establish authorita-
tive interpretations. In contrast, most countries treat economic
and social rights as non-justiciable even where the rights are in-
cluded in the constitution. 20 Moreover, although some interna-
tional mechanisms have been created to monitor the implemen-
tation of treaties concerning ESC rights, 21 the provision of reme-
ion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other sta-
tus." Id. art. 2(2).
20. As noted by Craven:
In the majority of States, economic, social and cultural rights are almost en-
tirely absent from the common discourse on human rights. Even in those
States where economic and social rights are constitutionally enacted or where
the ICESCR forms part of domestic law, national courts have relied upon the
oversimplified characterization of economic and social rights as 'nonjusticia-
ble' rights, with the result that they have rarely given them full effect. In turn,
the lack of national case law directly related to economic, social, and cultural
rights has itself perpetuated the idea that those rights are not capable ofjudi-
cial enforcement.
MATrHEW C. R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CUi-
TURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 10 (1995).
21. Such mechanisms include reporting systems under the ICESCR, and under the
Protocol of San Salvador. However, at least in the case of Bolivia, these appear to have
had only a limited impact. Bolivia has yet to ratify the Protocol of San Salvador, al-
though it has been a signatory to it since 1988. And while it is a party to the ICESCR, it
has only submitted one report to the ESCR Committee, and it did so seventeen years
late. That report lacked
specific information on the practical application of the legal framework, which
is necessary for the Committee's evaluation of the implementation of eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights in Bolivia [and] many of the questions put by
the members of the Committee were left unanswered or were answered by
statements of a general nature.
Concluding Observations of the ESCR Committee: Bolivia, E/C.12/1/Add.60 (May 21,
2001).
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dies for violations of ESC rights is generally left to State Parties. 22
Thus, whereas in the area of civil and political rights substantial
precedent exists from domestic and international bodies regard-
ing the interpretation of those rights in specific cases, no corre-
sponding body of case law exists with respect to ESC rights.
In turn, the generality of the standard of progressive realiza-
tion and the lack of case law regarding ESC rights impede effec-
tive monitoring of the rights by NGOs or other international
bodies. To be effective, human rights monitoring groups re-
quire clear norms that allow for the identification of violations.
But for the most part, the substantive content of ESC rights is
too vague and broadly defined to lend itself to the identification
of violations. Indeed, in both cases discussed in this Report, citi-
zens raised serious and colorable claims that their rights to
water, property, health, or as indigenous peoples were violated.
But in both cases, the generality of the relevant standards made
it very difficult to determine conclusively when or even whether
violations occurred.
Despite these difficulties, increased attention from scholars,
NGOs, and international bodies has yielded some progress to-
wards elaborating the meaning of ESC rights. Although leading
human rights NGOs have tended in the past to focus almost ex-
clusively on violations of civil and political rights, 23 several orga-
nizations have started to look more closely at ESC rights issues
and invoke the economic, social, and cultural rights ("ESCR")
framework in their work.24 For its part, the U.N. system for
22. As stated by the ESCR Committee:
[i] n general, legally binding international human rights standards should op-
erate directly and immediately within the domestic legal system of each State
party, thereby enabling individuals to seek enforcement of their rights before
national courts and tribunals. The rule requiring the exhaustion of domestic
remedies reinforces the primacy of national remedies in this respect. The ex-
istence and further development of international procedures for the pursuit
of individual claims is important, but such procedures are ultimately only sup-
plementary to effective national remedies.
ESCR Committee, General Comment 9, The Domestic Application of the Covenant,
art. 4, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24 (1998). The Protocol of San Salvador allows for the
use of the individual petitions system in cases of direct violations by States Parties of the
right to education and the right to form unions. See Protocol of San Salvador, supra
note 17 art. 19(6), 28 I.L.M. at 168.
23. See KATERINA ToMAsEvsKI, DEVELOPMENT AID AND HUMAN RIGHTS 113-16
(1989).
24. Several advocacy groups have started to look at ESC rights issiues, and to use
the international norms on ESC rights as a basis on which to criticize governments and
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human rights protection has also paid increasing attention to
ESC rights in recent years. 5
Scholars, as well as the ESCR Committee, have begun to
elaborate the underlying structure of State obligations with re-
spect to ESC rights. Thus, it is now generally accepted that all
human rights impose three types of obligations on a State: the
negative obligation to respect the right, i.e., to refrain from ac-
tions that would interfere with enjoyment of the right; and the
positive obligations to protect and to fulfill the right, i.e., to pre-
vent third parties from infringing on the right, and to take ac-
tions to strengthen people's ability to enjoy the right.26 In addi-
demand policy changes. Examples include organizations focused specifically on ESC
rights, such as the Center for Economic and Social Rights, which looks at a variety of
ESC rights issues, general human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch
that are starting to look at ESC rights issues, and issue-specific advocacy groups, such as
Earthjustice, which uses ESC rights, among other tools, to address environmental jus-
tice questions.
25. Audrey Chapman and Sage Russell note that:
Economic, social, and cultural rights are no longer as neglected as they once
were in relation to civil and political rights. Wider agreement on the core
elements of these rights, development of international standards, and some
guides to monitoring and evaluating them now exist. Since 1999 the [ESCR]
Committee has once again begun adopting general comments on the individ-
ual rights in the Covenant, including general comments on the rights to food
and health and two general comments on education. In her role as U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson has sought to elevate the
status of economic and social rights. In recent years the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights have appointed Special Rapporteurs to investigate and report
on the implementation and violation of some economic and social rights
around the world .... Although not official United Nations documents, the
1986 Limburg Principles on the Implementation of Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights and the 1997 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights... have achieved wide currency interna-
tionally and de facto status within the Committee ....
Audrey Chapman & Sage Russell, Introduction, CoRa OBUGA-IONS: BUILDING A FRAME-
WORK FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 3-4 (Audrey Chapman & Sage Rus-
sell eds., 2002).
26. As has been recognized by the ESCR Committee in its General Comment on
the Right to Adequate Food:
[A]ny . .. human right... imposes three types or levels of obligations on
States parties: the obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfill. In turn, the
obligation to fulfill incorporates both an obligation to facilitate and an obliga-
tion to provide. The obligation to respect existing access to adequate food re-
quires States parties not to take any measures that result in preventing such
access. The obligation to protect requires measures by the State to ensure that
enterprises or individuals do not deprive individuals of their access to ade-
quate food. The obligation to fulfill (facilitate) means the State must pro-ac-
NO RECOURSE
tion, the ESCR Committee has described three procedural rights
that are necessary to make ESC rights meaningful in practice
and are therefore implicit in the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") framework.
These rights are: the right to information, the right to participa-
tion, and the right to effective remedies for violations of ESC
rights.
Although the issue of TNC involvement in ESCR violations
has not been addressed systematically from the perspective of
international law on ESC rights, some of the developments de-
scribed above are relevant to the issue of TNCs' impact on ESC
rights. In particular, States' obligation to protect ESC rights
from violations by a third party implies that States have an obli-
gation under international law to protect ESC rights from viola-
tions by TNCs.2 7 And, as our two cases will illustrate, the proce-
dural rights described above are of tremendous importance in
cases involving TNCs. Given the pressures on developing coun-
tries to treat TNCs favorably, issues such as transparency in deci-
sion-making and the existence of effective remedies against vio-
lations by TNCs are critical.
This Report takes the position that Bolivia's obligations with
respect to ESC rights include all three levels described above:
respect, protect, and fulfill. In addition, the Report analyzes not
only the alleged violations of substantive ESC rights, but also vio-
lations of corresponding procedural rights. Throughout, we
draw upon a variety of instruments dealing with ESC rights that
are binding on Bolivia, such as the ICESCR, the American Con-
vention on Human Rights, and the International Labor Organi-
zation ("ILO") Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and
tively engage in activities intended to strengthen people's access to and utiliza-
tion of resources and means to ensure their livelihood, including food secur-
ity. Finally, whenever an individual or group is unable, for reasons beyond
their control, to enjoy the right to adequate food by the means at their dispo-
sal, States have the obligation to fulfill (provide) that right directly. This obliga-
tion also applies for persons who are victims of natural or other disasters.
ESCR Committee, General Comment No. 12, The Right to Adequate Food, para. 15,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999).
27. Cf Scott Leckie, Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE MAAS-
TRICHT GUIDELINES ON VIOLATIONS OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, SIM
SPECIAL No. 20, 114 (Theo C. Van Boven et al. eds., Netherlands Institute of Human
Rights 1998) ("While it is legally possible to reach TNCs indirectly through a State's
obligation to 'protect' human rights, the immense influence that these mammoth enti-
ties exert often makes such options futile.").
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Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries ("ILO Convention No.
169"). We also rely on General Comments by the ESCR Commit-
tee, as guides to the interpretation of the rights contained in the
ICESCR.
C. International Law on Corporate Responsibilities with Respect to
Human Rights
A separate strand of international human rights law has, in
recent years, begun to address the scope of corporate responsi-
bility with respect to human rights. Traditionally, human rights
law was thought to apply almost exclusively to States, and, in lim-
ited cases, to individuals.2" Yet, in view of the increasing power
wielded by TNCs and their capacity to affect the enjoyment of
human rights, scholars have argued that corporate actors should
be bound (or at least guided) by international human rights
norms. Very recently, this scholarly debate coupled with mount-
ing evidence of human rights abuses by TNCs has led to the de-
velopment of new legal norms. Perhaps most significantly, the
U.N. Subcommission for the Protection and Promotion of
Human Rights (the "U.N. Subcommission") has approved the
Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corpora-
tions and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights ("Draft Norms for TNCs").29 The Draft Norms list a series
of obligations that TNCs and other businesses have with regard
to human rights, including ESC rights, making clear that human
rights obligations bind not only governments and individuals,
but corporations as well. Although a formal permanent en-
forcement mechanism has yet to be created for these norms, the
U.N. Subcommission established a temporary mechanism for
monitoring violations.30 The U.N. Subcommission requested
the Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of
Transnational Corporations, which drafted the norms, to receive
28. See Steven Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibil-
ity, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 466 (2001) ("[T]he unstated understanding during the growth of
the human rights movement was that the duties [with respect to human rights] were
still those of [S]tates.").
29. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Busi-
ness Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/
Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003), approved by the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, Res. 2003/16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L.11 at 52
(Aug. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Draft Norms for TNCs].
30. See id.
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submissions from governments, NGOs, and other groups regard-
ing TNC activities that affect human rights; to invite the TNCs
involved to comment on the submissions; and to transmit the
Working Group's own comments to the TNC.3" This is a promis-
ing development that may lead in the future to more effective
monitoring of human rights violations by TNCs.
A second avenue for establishing rules to govern TNC be-
havior with respect to human rights is the development of volun-
tary codes and guidelines for conduct. By adopting voluntary
codes of corporate conduct, corporations undertake to conduct
their operations in accordance with various principles, including
human rights standards. A wide variety of such codes has been
created, and corporations are increasingly signing on to them. 2
Due to their voluntary character, their effectiveness is somewhat
questionable; however, insofar as they establish obligations that
corporations have accepted, they can be used as standards
against which to measure corporate actions. Intergovernmental
organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, have also been developing guidelines
describing principles that apply to transnational corporations.
Although these guidelines are similarly described as voluntary by
the authoring organizations, they do provide for limited dispute
resolution and complaint procedures.3
14
31. See id.
32. Such codes include the U.N. Global Compact, which lists nine principles to
which all businesses can subscribe, as well as industry or issue-specific codes, such as the
Fair Labor Association's Workplace Code of Conduct. See U.N. Global Compact, availa-
ble at http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Feb. 11, 2004); Fair Labor Associa-
tion Workplace Code of Conduct, available at http://www.fairlabor.org/all/code/in-
dex.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
33. See, e.g., International Labor Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, available at http://
www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/sources/mne.htm (last visited Feb. 11,
2004); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Guidelines for Mul-
tinational Enterprises (revised in 2000), in The OECD Declaration and Decisions on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: Basic Texts, available at http:/
/www.oecd.org/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2004) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises].
34. For example, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises allow a vari-
ety of actors (governments, businesses, employee organizations, NGOs, and the public)
to raise complaints about the conduct of companies with respect to the Guidelines. See
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, supra note 33, at 25. These complaints
are then resolved through consultation, or as a final recourse, through clarifications or
recommendations issued by the Committee. Id. at 28-29.
Another interesting development is the increase in litigation against TNCs under
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II. THE TRANSREDES OIL SPILL IN THE
DESAGUADERO PJVER
The Desaguadero River water system originates in Lake Titi-
caca, one of the world's highest major lakes,35 and flows across
the arid Bolivian altiplano for 400 kilometers, 36 eventually feed-
ing into lakes Uru Uru and Poopo in the center of the alti-
plano. 7 Because the Desaguadero River water system is at such
high altitude, the climate is very cold and dry, and few plants
grow in the area. Nonetheless, it is home to several species of
fish, and Lakes Uru Uru and Poopo are nesting sites for numer-
ous waterfowl species, including Andean flamingos and some en-
dangered species.38
Many indigenous communities have lived on the altiplano
for centuries. The Aymaras and Quechuas in the region have
scratched out a living based primarily on ranching - raising
camelids like alpacas and vicufias, and more recently, cattle and
sheep.39 Their animals feed primarily off totora reeds and other
native plants around the Desaguadero.4 °  Another highly
marginalized indigenous group, the Uru Morato people, has
lived off the water since before the Spanish conquest of the
Americas.4 1 Until around 1930, the Uru Moratos lived on Lake
U.S. law for human rights abuses allegedly committed abroad. See Beth Stephens, The
Amorality of Profit: Transnational Coporations and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEVJ. INr'L L.
45, 87 (2002) (discussing recent litigation against corporations under the Alien Tort
Claims Act and Torture Victim Protection Act). However, while lawsuits are potentially
a very effective way of holding corporations responsible for abuses, there are numerous
obstacles, both procedural and substantive, to successfully pursuing these cases. See Wil-
liams, supra note 12, at 750-75 (2002).
35. Lake Titicaca is 3820 meters above sea level and has a surface area of over 9000
square kilometers. See DEANNA SwANEY, LONELY PLANET GUIDE TO BOLmA 233 (4th ed.
2001).
36. See UNESCO World Water Assessment Program, Lake Titicaca Basin, available
at http://mirror.eschina.bnu.edu.cn/Mirror2/unesco/www.unesco.org/water/wwap/
casestudies/titicaca lake/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2004). The altiplano is a vast flat area at
very high altitude in the Bolivian Andes.
37. See Lago Poop6 y Uru-Uru, at http://www.agualtiplano.net/humedales/
humedales/poopo-uru.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2004); Cuenca del Poop6, at http://
www.agualtiplano.net/cuencas/poopo.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2004). Both lakes are
over 3600 meters above sea level. Lake Poopo is very large, with a surface of 1337
square kilometers. Id.
38. Id.
39. See JUAN CARLOS MONTOYA ET AL., EFEcros AMBIENTALES V SOCIOECONOMICOS
POR EL DERRAME DE PETROLEO EN EL Rio DESAGUADERO 99 (2002).
40. See id. at 101-03.
41. See RAMIRO MOLINA & ROSSANA BARRAGAN, ETHNICITY AND MARGINALrTY. THE
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Poopo, inhabiting "huts ... built on top of the totorales (reeds)
and islands, and they had little contact with the outside world. 4 2
While the Uru Moratos now live on land, they continue to base
their survival and economy primarily on fishing on Lake Poopo,
hunting waterfowl along the shores of the lake, and in recent
years, some agriculture.43 "Thus Lake Poopo constitutes the
main reservoir of their subsistence."" All the indigenous com-
munities in the region depend on the Desaguadero water system
for drinking water for themselves and their animals as well as for
irrigation. Because some of the communities live several miles
away from the river itself, in many cases they have built artisan
canals, directing water to their crops or towns.45 They have also
built wells that tap into the Desaguadero's water underground.46
Poverty along the Desaguadero River is widespread and se-
vere. In twenty-eight of thirty-four regions in the department of
Oruro, which is traversed by the Desaguadero, at least eighty-five
percent of the population lives below the poverty line, defined as
U.S. $35 per month. In ten of these, the percentage of people in
poverty is even higher: over 98%." 7 The economic plight of
these people is reflected in simple yet compelling demographic
statistics: a 1985 study of the Uru Moratos found that almost one
out of every four children died before the age of five, and life
expectancy was an average of forty-eight years.48
URU MORATOS AND AvMARAs OF LAKE PooPo 15-37 (1985) (this report was prepared for
UNICEF) (on file with Crowley Program). The Uru Moratos are a subgroup of the
broader Uru population, which includes the Uru Chipayas and the Iru-Itu. Id. at 7. In
describing this group, Molina and Barragan state:
The outstanding characteristic of this group is that they are doubly
margina[lized]. First, in relation[ ] to the other villagers of the region and
second in their relationship to the "national" society. This margina[lization]
which has profound historical roots, is the basis for their very poor living con-
ditions. It has also resulted in the almost total extin[c]tion of one of the most
important groups of the Andean Region.
Id. at 66.
42. Id. at 67.
43. See id. at 73-94.
44. Id. at 73.
45. See MONTOYA ET AL., supra note 39, at 90.
46. See id. at 90.
47. See UDAPE Mapa de Pobreza, Oruro, 2001, available at http://
www.udape.gov.bo/mapaPobreza200l/id8.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2004). For rural ar-
eas (which predominate in Oruro), the poverty line is currently defined as a monthly
income of 268 bolivianos (approximately U.S. $35) a month. See also UDAPE, Crisis,
Crecimiento y Pobreza 1999-2002 (Jan. 2003), available at www.udape.gov.bo.
48. See MOLINA & BARRAGAN, supra note 41, at 72.
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For a number of years, the communities dependent on the
Desaguadero water system have complained that their ability to
survive has been affected by contamination of the river, most
likely caused by environmentally irresponsible mining activities.
In interviews, they reported that, as early as the 1980s, they no-
ticed a change in the quality of their water, and that it became
"salty" or "spicy."49 Studies by environmental experts associated
with NGOs confirm high levels of salinity in the water, which
damage the vegetation along the Desaguadero and lakes Uru
Uru and Poopo, as well as cyanide contamination and high levels
of heavy metals, which render the water inadequate for human
consumption.50 They attribute much of this contamination to
companies engaged in gold mining along the river, including
the company Inti Raymi whose majority shareholder is Newmont
Mining Corporation,5 ' a TNC headquartered in Denver, Colo-
rado.5 2 The government has recently agreed to conduct an au-
dit of environmental damage that may have been caused by Inti
Raymi. 53
On or before January 31, 2000, a sudden and massive oil
spill in the Desaguadero River added to the contamination of
the river, creating new difficulties for the communities in the
region. The spill originated in the OSSA-2 pipeline owned by
Transredes, S.A., a transnational corporation jointly owned by
Shell and Enron. It is commonly estimated to have consisted of
49. Interview with Community of San Pedro de Challacollo, in Bolivia (May 23,
2003) [hereinafter Community of San Pedro de Challacollo Interview].
50. See FELIPE CORONADO ET AL., SANTO Toatms: EVALUACION AMBIENTAL DE LA
COMUNIDAD (LAGo URU URU-ORURO) 20-26, 64-67 (2003); FELIPE CORONADO, SOL, SAL Y
OLVIDO: EVALUACION AMBIENTAL DE LA COMUNIDAD DE TomA ToMA 39-62 (2003).
51. See CORONADO ET AL., supra note 50, at 27-37, 63. See also Newmont, The Gold
Company: Kori Kollo, Bolivia, available at http://www.newmont.com/en/ourbusiness/
operations/sthamerica/korikollo/index.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2004). Juan Carlos
Montoya has pointed out that there are several sources of contamination affecting the
Desaguadero water system: naturally present minerals and metals such as arsenic, as
well as operating and abandoned mines in the area. See MONTOYA FT AL., supra note 39,
at 61. Mr. Montoya notes the presence of arsenic, copper, cadmium, zinc, and lead in
the Desaguadero system at levels higher than permissible for drinking water; similarly,
excessively high concentrations of these metals were found in fish. Id. at 62-63. In
addition, he notes that the level of salinity in the water is too high for human consump-
tion. Id. at 62.
52. See Newmont, The Gold Company: Profile, available at http://
www.newmont.com/en/about/profile/index.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
53. See Message from Gilberto Pauwels, director of Centro de Ecologia y Pueblos
Andinos ("CEPA") (Mar. 31, 2004).
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29,000 barrels of oil and affected approximately 127 peasant and
indigenous communities that depend on the Desaguadero for
drinking water for humans and animals, irrigation, and fishing.
In the months and years following the spill, Transredes pro-
vided emergency assistance to the communities surrounding the
Desaguadero, cleaned up the spill, and compensated affected in-
dividuals for their losses. It distributed a total of U.S. $3.7 mil-
lion in direct compensation to affected communities; that is ap-
proximately U.S. $800 per family54 or U.S. $200 - U.S. $300 per
individual.55
Bolivia's Constitution recognizes the rights to "life, health,
and security,"56 as well as the "social, economic and cultural
rights of the indigenous peoples that inhabit the national terri-
tory, especially those related to their original community lands,
guaranteeing the use and sustainable utilization of the natural
resources. ... "" Since 1992, Bolivia has had a Law of the Envi-
ronment ("Ley del Medio Ambiente")," which specifically rec-
ognizes the human right to a healthy environment, establishing
that it "is the duty of the State and of society to guarantee the
right that every person and living being has to enjoy a healthy
and pleasant environment in the development and exercise of
their activities."59 The Law establishes a number of principles
and an institutional framework for protection of the environ-
ment in a manner consistent with sustainable development.60
Despite these legal guarantees, the Bolivian government did
virtually nothing in the immediate post-spill period either to
54. According to the government-ordered Environmental Audit of the Oil Spill,
the total number of families affected by the spill was 4,608. See Environmental and
Energy Development Solutions (ENSR) International, 4 Auditoria Ambiental del Der-
rame de Hidrocarburos en el Rio Desaguadero, 17 (Apr. 2001) [hereinafter Environ-
mental Audit].
55. According to data used in the Environmental Audit, the average number of
individuals in a household is three to four. Id. at 15, Table IV.2.1.2.1.
56. CONSTITUCION POUTICA DE BOLMA DE 1967 art. 7(1) (amended 1994) [herein-
after BOL. CONST.].
57. BOL. CONST. art 171(I).
58. Ley del Medio Ambiente, Ley No. 1333, Apr. 27, 1992 [hereinafter Law of the
Environment].
59. Id. art. 17.
60. The Law describes its own objective as "the protection and conservation of the
environment and natural resources, regulating the actions of man in relation to nature,
and promoting sustainable development with the end of improving the quality of life of
the population." Id. art. 1.
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minimize damage or to protect the interests of the affected com-
munities. Without a governmental presence to defend the inter-
ests of affected communities and the Bolivian State, or to medi-
ate between those interests and the interests of Transredes, the
response to the spill reflects the imbalance between the affected
communities and the company. Whereas the company had sub-
stantial resources and know-how regarding legal, financial, and
technical issues, community members tended to be very poorly
educated and inexperienced with the outside world. Most were
confused both as to the long-term impact of the spill and their
legal rights. As a result, the communities, for the most part,
went along with what Transredes told them to do and waited for
the company to deliver on its promises of compensation, clean-
up, and emergency assistance. When these promises were not
fully kept, the communities were left unhappy, but with little re-
course.
The following sections provide an account of the circum-
stances surrounding the spill. We begin with a brief description
of Transredes itself, then proceed to explain the causes of the
spill. Next, the Report discusses both Transredes' and the Boliv-
ian government's actions in response to the spill, particularly
with respect to the clean-up process, emergency assistance, the
compensation process, the Environmental Audit of the spill, and
the sanctions imposed on Transredes by the Bolivian govern-
ment. Finally, we analyze the spill from the perspective of inter-
national human rights law.
A. Facts
1. Transredes' Composition
Transredes S.A. is a multinational company formed in 1997
to take over Bolivia's then- publicly owned oil and gas transporta-
tion system through Bolivia's process of "capitalization". 6' Fifty
61. See Testimonio de Protocolizacion de Documento Relativo a: Contrato de Sus-
cripcion de Acciones otorgado por el Ministerio Sin Cartera Responsable de la Capital-
izacion y Transredes - Transporte de Hidrocarburos Sociedad de Economia Mixta
(Transredes S.A.M.) en Favor de: TR Holdings Ltda. (May 16, 1997); Escritura sobre
conversion de una Sociedad de Economia Mixta a una Sociedad Anomina Que Hace
Transredes - Transporte de Hidrocarburos Sociedad de Economia Mixta (Transredes
S.A.M.) (May 27, 1997).
The basic idea of capitalization was to convert [former State-owned] compa-
nies into joint stock companies and to increase their capital by selling new
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per cent of the company is owned by TR Holdings, which in turn
is owned entirely and in equal parts by Enron and Shell.62 An-
other 34% is owned by Bolivian pension funds, in accordance
with the capitalization process, and 16% is owned by other share-
holders.63 As of May 2003, the board of directors was composed
of seven directors: four named by TR Holdings, and three
named by the Bolivian pension funds.6 4
2. Causes of the Spill
a. The Condition of the Pipeline
In August of 1999, according to Transredes officials, a
Transredes employee reported that the section of the pipeline
that extended over the Desaguadero River had fallen off its sup-
ports and was under water.65 Transredes officials concede that
no one was sent to check on the condition of the pipe. 66 Never-
theless, they claim that the company had been planning for sev-
eral months to replace the pipes in that section of the pipeline
because of their poor condition; by September of 1999 they al-
ready had the new pipes awaiting installation.6"
That same year, the Superintendency of Hydrocarbons of
Bolivia contracted with the company COINGAS to conduct a
routine inspection of the Transredes oil pipeline to determine
whether any repairs were needed. In its report to the Superin-
tendency, COINGAS informed the Superintendency that a
thirty-meter long portion of the Transredes pipeline that went
over the Desaguadero was off its supports and under water, and
asserted that they had found corrosion and pitting in that por-
shares (equivalent to the existing share capital) to private investors or 'strate-
gic partners.' The new investors automatically would assume management
functions. Once capitalized, the original share capital would be distributed
amongst all adult Bolivians. This capital was to be administrated by pension
funds, with the benefits accruing in annuities to the elderly in the form of
annual pension payments ....
Juan Antonio Morales, supra note 2, at 53-54.
62. See Transredes S.A. Memoria Annual 2001 (Annual Report 2001), at 10.
63. See id.
64. See Statement by Fernando Gonzalez, Interview with Transredes Legal Team,
in Bolivia (May 29, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Fernando Gonzalez State-
ment].
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
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tion of the pipeline.68 COINGAS qualified the problem as one
of "first priority" and recommended maintenance or, if neces-
sary, changing the pipeline, and placing it back on its supports.69
The Superintendency of Hydrocarbons presented this report to
Transredes on December 1, 1999.70
According to Transredes officials, once the company re-
ceived the COINGAS report, it confirmed the condition of the
pipeline; however, because of the holidays, the company post-
poned any repairs. 71 Transredes did not repair the pipeline in
January either. Company officials now say that they feared that it
would be dangerous to repair the pipeline due to the rainy sea-
son. v2 Nonetheless, despite the condition of the pipeline, the
company continued to pump oil through it. When asked why
they did not stop pumping, Transredes' representatives told us
that "that was considered .. .but [the company] didn't realize
that the pipeline was in imminent danger... It takes ... time to
replace pipes.
73
b. Proximate Cause
According to Transredes representatives, during the days
prior to the spill, unusually heavy rainfall caused the submerged
portion of the pipeline to rub against the supports off of which it
had fallen.7 4 The constant rubbing resulted in a perforation of
68. See Construccion & Instalacion de Gas Consultoria y Servicios Petroleros ("CO-
INGAS"), Inspecci6n Tecnico Operativa de Oleoductos en Operacion: Resumen Ejecu-
tivo 1544-45 (Oct. 1999) (on file with author).
69. Id. The report states that "first priority" problems must be corrected "as soon
as possible." Id.
70. See Letter from Ing. Guillermo Torres, Superintendent of Hydrocarbons, to
the Crowley Program (Sept. 26, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Guillermo
Torres Letter].
71. See Fernando Gonzalez Statement, supra note 64.
72. See id.
73. Id. Jorge Reynolds, an attorney with the Superintendency of Hydrocarbons,
explained that, because oil transportation is a public service, Transredes is generally
expected to provide continuous oil transportation services; however, in situations where
such operations could be dangerous (i.e., where there is "operative danger"), the com-
pany can ask the Superintendency of Hydrocarbons for authorization to suspend opera-
tions. See Interview with Jorge Reynolds, Attorney, Superintendency of Hydrocarbons,
in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 30, 2003) (on file with author).
74. See Statement by Brigitte Herrera, Interview with Transredes Legal Team, in
Bolivia (May 29, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Brigitte Herrera Statement].
However, other studies indicate that the increase in water in the river was moderate and
normal for that time of year. See also RENE GOMEZ-GARCIA, INFORME PRELIMINAR: DESAS-
TRE DEL DERRAME DE PETROLEO OSSA 2 OPERADO POR TRANSREDES S.A. 2 (2000).
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the pipeline, which "gradually grew to the size of a boliviano,
and that's where the oil came out of."75
Transredes has asserted that approximately 29,000 barrels
of oil spilled. The company based this calculation on the report
that the refinery in Arica had lost 29,780 barrels of oil.76 TR
explained that such a large amount of oil could spill through the
small perforation because of the high pressure at which the oil
was traveling. 7 The company could not estimate for how long
the oil had been spilling before the problem was discovered.7 s
c. Delay in Detecting the Spill
The oil spill was discovered by a hydrobiologist, Jean
Gabriel Wasson, who was conducting studies in the Desaguadero
at the time. He informed police of the fact that there was oil in
the river on Sunday, January 30, 2000, but the police failed to
transmit this information to anyone else.79 According to Trans-
redes representatives, that Sunday they noticed a drop in pres-
sure in the pipeline.80 In order to respond, however, they had to
locate the source of the drop in pressure over 500 km of pipe-
line; they claim that on Monday morning they sent out "patrols"
to do this.8" Transredes closed the valves around the origin of
the spill, thereby stopping the flow of oil to the river, on Monday
January 31, 2000 at 6:00 p.m.82
The government has criticized this slow response. Accord-
ing to the Environmental Audit, "the control instruments ex-
isting in the pumping stations for OSSA II at the time of the spill
were old, of poor resolution, and were working partially. Be-
cause of this, it was impossible to detect and respond to the con-
75. Brigitte Herrera Statement, supra note 74.
76. See Fernando Gonzalez Statement, supra note 64; MONTOYA ET AL., supra note
39, at 154-55; E.H. OWENS, DERRAME DE PETROLEO EN EL RIO DESAGUADERO: DESTINO Y
PERSISTENCIA DEL PETROLEO DERRAMADO I (June 8, 2000) (Report prepared for Trans-
redes by Polaris Applied Sciences) [hereinafter Polaris Report]. However, according to
Rene Gomez-Garcia Palau, who has conducted an independent study of the oil spill, the
volume of oil spilled is actually between 43,000 and 61,000 barrels, depending on the
amount of time it was spilling (two or three days). See GOMEZ-GARciA, supra note 74, at
2.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See 2 Environmental Audit, supra note 54, at 75.
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tingency of the spill in an opportune manner on the basis of the
data available in the stations. The instrumentation that Trans-
redes relied upon did not fit within the framework of best inter-
national practices[.] ''8
3. Responses to the Oil Spill
In view of the vulnerability of the pipeline and the environ-
mental and cultural sensitivity of the Desaguadero region, Trans-
redes was remarkably poorly prepared for the possibility of a
spill. Indeed, Transredes's immediate response to the crisis did
not follow any preset plan. Although required by environmental
law, the contingency plan included in the company's environ-
mental manifest filed with the Bolivian government did not even
contemplate the possibility of a spill in the Desaguadero.84 As a
result, the initial actions taken by the company were ad hoc and
somewhat ineffective.
The bulk of this section analyzes in greater detail the com-
pany's response and the problems associated with it. Yet it
should be noted at the outset that the problems created by
Transredes' inadequate preparation were exacerbated by the
government's lack of oversight. The main governmental entity
83. Id. at 6.
84. The Environmental Audit notes that:
The contingency plan describes the strategies in case of hydrocarbons spills in
waterways.... However, the measures and strategies ... are of a general char-
acter and do not indicate specific emergency procedures in cases of spills of
large volume (like that which occurred in the Desaguadero), in which the
containment techniques mentioned in the plan would not be sufficient and/
or applicable.
Id. at 56. Worse yet, the Audit notes:
the most relevant deficiency... in the Contingency Plan is the incorrect iden-
tification of priority vulnerable areas. The identified areas are ... [ten rivers],
which correspond to the OSSA-I, not the OSSA-II [pipeline]. Having failed to
consider any river in the area of the Altiplano or the Occidental Cordillera,
the [Contingency Plan omits] the Desaguadero River, which is the principal
waterway of the Altiplano, and on which the hydrocarbons spill of the OSSA-II
occurred ....
Id. at 56. It is not clear why the Vice-Ministry of Environment approved the Environ-
mental Manifest despite these deficiencies. One official of the Vice-Ministry, currently
in charge of issues related to the oil spill, told us that the Vice-Ministry had to assume
the truth of the facts included in the environmental manifest, given that it was a sworn
statement. See Interview with Maria Cristina Arellano, Head of the General Manage-
ment of Impact, Quality and Environmental Services in the Vice-Ministry for the Envi-
ronment (May 28, 2003). Another told us that the problem was lack of expertise within
the Vice-Ministry. See Interview with Patricia Garcia, supra note 14.
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that should have directed the response to the crisis was the Min-
istry of Sustainable Development, through the Vice-Ministry of
Environment.85 But for the most part, the Vice-Ministry's actions
consisted of demanding that Transredes submit reports regard-
ing its plans to respond to the spill. In fact, the Vice-Ministry's
first action was to demand that Transredes submit an Action
Plan for approval.86 Subsequently, through a number of "notes"
from late February to early April, the Vice-Ministry of Environ-
ment and Natural Resources instructed that Transredes take the
following actions: present an Integral Plan for the processing of
contaminated material collected from the river; carry out clean-
up actions in certain zones affected by the spill; provide water to
the affected communities; speed up the clean-up and mitigation
actions; provide permanent health and veterinary attention in
the areas affected by the spill and carry out autopsies and lab
analyses; and collaborate with peasant communities to avoid a
drop in the prices of meat.87 Notwithstanding these directives,
the Vice-Ministry apparently did nothing to ensure that Trans-
redes complied. Moreover, the Vice-Ministry failed to provide
any more detailed instructions to the company regarding the ac-
tions it should take. Finally, the Vice-Ministry failed to under-
take any thorough, independent analysis of the extent of the
damage caused by the spill, depending primarily on the reports
of the local government and Transredes' experts. According to
a lawyer for the Vice-Ministry of Environment and Natural Re-
sources, the Vice-Ministry's failure to take more concrete actions
immediately after the spill was the result of lack of experience:
"The environment is a new [issue to us] and we don't have much
experience [with it]. There was a group of technicians and a
lawyer who did not know how to apply laws. They started issuing
technical instructions for the company to fulfill, but without an
environmental focus. It looked as though they were working for
the company. "88
85. MONTOYA ET AL. supra note 39, at 150.
86. The plan was required to specify, among other points, the company's plans for
containment, recovery, and cleanup, as well as a program for remediation and restora-
tion, a program for compensation and community relations, and a monitoring plan.
See 2 Environmental Audit, supra note 54, at 74.
87. See Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Planificaci6n, Resumen Cronol6gico:
Derrame de Petroleo en el Rio Desaguadero, para. 2.3 [hereinafter Resumen Crono-
16gico].
88. See Interview with Patricia Garcia, supra note 14.
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During the first few months after the spill, the Prefecture of
Oruro monitored the spill's impact and the company's response,
but its power was limited.89 As an initial matter, on February 3,
2000, the Prefecture submitted a report to the Vice-Ministry of
the Environment, noting the contamination of the river, the ur-
gent need for cleanup, and Transredes' lack of a contingency
plan, and requesting that the Vice-Ministry order Transredes to
respond more efficiently.9 ° On February 10, 2000, the Ministry
of Sustainable Development issued a resolution stating that, be-
cause the regional governments are charged with coordinating
actions to prevent contamination of affected areas,91 the Oruro
Prefecture was authorized to monitor the oil spill.9 2 The Prefect
would be required to submit reports regarding its actions to the
competent environmental authority at the national level, pre-
sumably the Vice-Ministry of Environment.93 The Prefecture
conducted some monitoring of the environmental impact of the
spill, including tests of the contamination of water and soil dur-
ing and after cleanup operations.94 Also, the Prefecture moni-
tored and reported on Transredes's fulfillment of obligations it
undertook in framework agreements with affected communi-
ties.95 Nevertheless, although the Prefecture's reports described
and critiqued the company's response, and recommended ac-
tions that the Vice-Ministry should demand of Transredes, the
Prefecture did not have the authority to direct the response to
the spill.
The Bolivian government also failed to act to protect the
interests of the communities living along the Desaguadero.
Whether at the local or national level, government officials
neither advised communities of their rights nor intervened to
mediate between the company and the communities. The Minis-
89. Bolivia is geographically and politically divided into departments, governed by
Prefects, who are appointed by the national Executive. See BOL. CONST. arts. 108-09.
90. See Letter from Carlos Bohrt, Prefect of Oruro, to Neisa Roca, Vice-Minister of
Environment (Feb. 3, 2000) (on file with author).
91. See Reglamento para la Prevenci6n y Control Ambiental, arts. 4-5.
92. See Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Planificaci6n, Resoluci6n Ministerial
No. 018/2000 (Feb. 10, 2000).
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., Prefectura del Departamento de Oruro, Direcci6n de Recursos
Naturales y Medio Ambiente, Unidad de Medio Ambiente, Informe de Andlisis de
Agua, Sedimento y Suelo (June 15, 2000).
95. See Prefectura del Departamento de Oruro, Informe: Viaje de Inspeccion,
Direcci6n Departamental de Recursos Naturales y Medio Ambiente (Apr. 27, 2000).
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try of Sustainable Development and the Vice-Ministry of the En-
vironment made no effort to provide direct assistance to the
communities even while they criticized Transredes. For its part,
the Prefecture appears to have taken little action to advise af-
fected communities of their rights or mediate between the com-
pany and community members. Other government officials who
arguably had jurisdiction to act to protect the rights of the com-
munity members similarly failed to do so. For example, in inter-
views, officials from the Vice-Ministry of Indigenous Affairs ex-
plained that the Aymara and Quechua people around the Desa-
guadero organize land ownership based on families, rather than
on the traditional "ayllu" scheme; as a result, they are designated
as peasants by the Vice-Ministry, and their issues fall within the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Peasant Affairs. As for the Uru
Moratos, the Vice-Ministry of Indigenous Affairs did not get in-
volved in advising them because:
They haven't been directly impacted, but indirectly as the
flow to Poopo lake, their habitat, [was] contaminated ....
[Moreover, t]he organization system of the Urus has always
made their relating to the States very difficult. They don't
find members of the state with whom they can work well ....
They should be organized through their own structure. They
are few and wield very little political pressure. They have no
land ownership, conflicted relations with their neighbors.
Their work is fishing, commercial trading, laboring in the
city, migrant work. This makes it difficult to make specific
strategies, to have lines of action.96
Ultimately, no government authority took responsibility for
securing the interests of the people, and they were left to deal
with Transredes largely on their own. In the absence of Bolivian
law specifically directing the company's response to the spill, in
the absence of a preset contingency plan, and with limited gui-
dance from the government, Transredes alone determined the
nature and scope of its response.
a. Transredes' Actions in Response to the Spill
Once the spill was detected and the flow of oil stopped, the
company's first actions were to hire the American companies
96. Interview with Felipe Caballero and Jose Ramirez, Officials from the Vice-Min-
istry of Indigenous Affairs, in Bolivia (May 28, 2003).
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PCA and Garner to evaluate the impact of the spill, put in place
barriers to contain the spread of the oil, and set up a supply
system to transport equipment to the site of the spill.9 7 After the
immediate crisis period had passed, the company focused on
three areas of activity: cleanup operations, emergency relief,
and compensation. Again, there was no law specifically dictating
how Transredes should conduct these operations and little inter-
vention by the government. To the extent that the government
did attempt to oversee the cleanup, various government officials
reported that the company resisted any interference with its
plans.98 An attorney for the Ministry of Sustainable Develop-
ment told us:
The company made the mistake of believing that if they
worked with the companies from America and did everything
these companies told them, they were doing everything and
that was it. They believed they did not have to obey any Boliv-
ian law. In the beginning they were very arrogant... when I
first came to work here, once the Transredes attorney came
and all attorneys from Ministry were practically hiding under
their desks .... The same thing happened with technicians.
In our papers we [congratulate] Transredes [for] doing a
great job. Transredes took advantage of their economic
power and relations they had with external companies."99
The following subsections explore in greater detail Trans-
redes' actions with regard to clean-up, emergency assistance, and
compensation.
(1) The Cleanup
Transredes conducted the cleanup operation by hiring
community members to clean the water and soil manually, most
of the time wearing protective gear provided by the company.100
Community members state that they were paid approximately 40
bolivianos, about U.S. $5 per day.10 1 The oil removed from the
river was deposited in plastic bags, and then transported to the
97. See 2 Environmental Audit, supra note 54, at 76-77.
98. See Telephone Interview with Neisa Roca, supra note 13.
99. Interview with Patricia Garcia, supra note 14.
100. See Fernando Gonzalez Statement, supra note 64. According to Mr. Gonzalez,
they hired Garner, a U.S. company, to oversee cleanup operations. See id.
101. See Interview with Community of Santo Tomas, in Bolivia (May 23, 2003)
[hereinafter Community of Santo Tomas Interview]. The Environmental Audit notes
that daily wages ranged between 35 and 40 bolivianos, which was high in relation to the
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Sica-Sica pumping station several miles away. 10 2 Although ac-
cording to the Environmental Audit this process was consistent
with internationally accepted standards, it remains controver-
sial.10 3
First, some have criticized the decision to hire local people
to conduct the cleanup, given their lack of expertise in this
work.1 "4 In addition, although community members who partici-
pated in the cleanup were paid more than the average daily wage
in the region, several sources stated that the hiring of commu-
nity members was very divisive, and perhaps deliberately So.105
Specifically, they insist that Transredes created controversy by
paying people different amounts for the same work. 10 6 They
also noted that hiring local people as supervisors created a con-
flict of interest.10 7 Thus, the Environmental Audit found that,
because community leaders were designated as foremen in the
cleanup, they were "in many cases, strongly questioned by their
bases '. . . for not having demanded that Transredes clean up
everything.'0'
Second, serious questions remain as to the thoroughness of
the cleanup effort. Many community members assert that oil re-
mains in the soil near the river. For example, Saul Apaza, a
leader from the community of Japo, stated in an interview that
"Santo Tomas is in the mouth of the left branch of the Desagua-
dero River. When the oil entered, it covered everything. But
average income of 25 to 30 bolivianos in the region. See 2 Environmental Audit, supra
note 54, at 89.
102. See Interview with Fidel Castro Ponce, Sica-Sica Pumping Station Supervisor,
in Bolivia (May 24, 2003).
103. See 7 Environmental Audit, supra note 54, at 8
104. See MONTOYA ET AL., supra note 39, at 165-66.
105. See id. at 166. The Environmental Audit notes that the population com-
plained about internal conflicts over access to clean-up jobs, as well as lack of training.
See 1 Environmental Audit, supra note 54, at 6.
106. See MONTOVA ET AL., supra note 39, at 166. According to Montoya, differences
in payment to community members "not only caused internal division in the communi-
ties, but also neutralized the attitude of community members in the face of the conflict,
as the economic retribution for their services was a 'positive' facet of the spill that bene-
fited them." Id. at 166.
107. See id. at 166-67.
108. 7 Environmental Audit, supra note 54, at 8. Another allegation by one com-
mentator is that in many cases, Transredes required that people who were hired for
cleanup sign compensation agreements; the wages paid to those engaged in cleanup
were later considered by the company to be part of their "compensation." MONTOYA ET
AL., supra note 39, at 164-67.
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after a week, another wave of water came, which covered all the
oil with sediment. It has been verified that under the earth
there is oil, which remained and which has not been cleaned.
What has been cleaned is on top - the superficial part."10
Community members living on the shores of Lake Poopo
also dispute Transredes' claim that the oil never reached the
lake. For example, members of an Uru Morato community lo-
cated at the southernmost end of Lake Poopo, furthest from the
point at which the Desaguadero enters the lake, insisted to our
delegation that oil was still present under a layer of sediment
near the lake. Indeed, community members led the delegation
to a location near the lake and removed a thin layer of sediment
to reveal a substance they claimed was oil. This substance could
be found under the soil's surface throughout the area, 100 me-
ters in each direction from the starting point.110 When con-
fronted with the community's claims, Transredes representative
Tony Henshaw reiterated the company's position that oil had
never reached the lake.111 In support of his position, he pointed
to a report by Polaris Applied Sciences, which states that "hydro-
carbons were not found in the samples of water and sediment
collected from the areas of lakes Uru Uru and Poopo, so the oil
did not abandon the Desaguadero system. '112 At the same time,
Henshaw conceded that the conclusion was based on only a
small number of samples taken from a lake spanning over 1000
square kilometers. 13 Moreover, Henshaw was unable to explain
why the community members had been included in the compen-
sation process if no oil had reached the lake.1 4
Third, several people within the affected communities al-
leged that the company misled them about the nature of the
contamination. For example, one woman in San Pedro de Chal-
109. Statement by Saul Apaza, Interview with Santo Tomas Community, in Bolivia
(May 23, 2003).
110. Professor Tracy Higgins, to verify the presence of the substance throughout
the area, walked approximately 100 meters in four different directions from the initial
spot, and found the same substance under the surface.
111. See Interview with Anthony Henshaw, in Bolivia (May 28, 2003); Fernando
Gonzalez Statement, supra note 64.
112. See Respuesta a preguntas formuladas por la Universidad de Fordham, en la
reunion sostenida con Transredes el 29 de mayo de 2003 (answers to questions pro-
vided by Transredes), question 3 [hereinafter Transredes Respuesta]. See Polaris Re-
port, supra note 76, at 20.
113. See Interview with Anthony Henshaw, supra note 111.
114. See id.
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lacollo stated that "at the time of cleaning they said it wasn't con-
tamination; it was only crude oil. 11 5 Another man in El Choro
said that "[a] t first the company minimized the damages. Later,
through all means it tried to divide the communities. It even
told us that the crude oil was a fertilizer. There was despera-
tion."116
(2) Emergency Supplies and Medical/Veterinary Care
In the aftermath of the spill, the communities were faced
with serious contamination of their water supply and the food
and water supplies for their livestock. Transredes took a number
of actions to mitigate the spill's impact on the affected commu-
nities on its own, with limited governmental instructions and no
guidance from Bolivian law. Transredes promised to provide
water for to the affected communities, medical and veterinary
care, and in some cases, food for animals.117
In interviews with the Crowley delegation, community mem-
bers complained that Transredes did not provide adequate
water, 118 food, or veterinary care.11  A representative statement
was made by the Vice-President of the Municipal Council of El
Choro:
This sector of the municipality only has ranching activity:
sheep and cattle. We provide meat, cheese, and milk to the
markets of Oruro, Cochabamba, and La Paz. After the oil
spill, the price of products dropped considerably. At the
time, there was a drop in the production of forage because we
115. Interview with President of the Association of Women of Sora Chico, San Pe-
dro de Challacollo, in Bolivia (May 23, 2003).
116. Interview with Representative from Primo Chambi, El Choro, in Bolivia
(May 23, 2003) [hereinafter Representative from Primo Chambi Interview].
117. See Press Release, Transredes S.A., Queda Mucho por Hacer... Pero Estamos
Trabajando Fuerte (Feb. 11, 2000).
118. With regard to water distribution, the Environmental Audit points out that a
large amount of water was distributed. See 7 Environmental Audit, supra note 54, at 10.
However, the company's distribution method (responding to demand) resulted in
some communities receiving more water than they needed, while others received insuf-
ficient water, and a high percentage of communities (48%) did not receive water at all.
See id. at 10.
119. See, e.g., Interview with Community of Pata Pata, in Bolivia (May 23, 2003)
[hereinafter Community of Pata Pata Interview] ("Forage was not brought; water was
not brought. Other communities got water but this one did not."); Interview with Max
Calisaya Apaza, Community of Pufiaca (May 23, 2003) [hereinafter Community of
Pufiaca Interview] ("The company came; they were promising to give the cattle food.
They didn't bring feed for the cattle or drinking water.").
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closed the irrigation channels. We lacked water for our ani-
mals and ourselves. Transredes gave us a little water but not
enough. Due to this and the contamination there were
animal deaths .... From the time of the spill until this date
we have great losses .... Since then, animals are born with
malformations. Forage is very low; this is a consequence until
this date .... We don't have drinking water; we keep drink-
ing the channel's water. Many people are migrating to other
places.1 20
This sentiment was shared by community members through-
out the region. Moreover, the Environmental Audit concluded
that both the medical and veterinary care provided by Trans-
redes were deficient, as the care had a general focus, and did not
address specific health problems that might have resulted from
the oil spill.121
(3) The Compensation Process
Bolivian law establishes that companies engaged in danger-
ous activities or in hydrocarbons activity are obligated to com-
pensate individuals for harms resulting from such activities. 122
Thus, insofar as transporting oil is both a dangerous activity and
a hydrocarbons activity, Bolivian law establishes an obligation for
Transredes to compensate individuals for the harms caused by
the oil spill. In interviews, the head of Transredes' Legal Depart-
ment recognized that the company was subject to strict liability
for the spill. 123
Describing the effects of the spill with precision is difficult,
given that studies of the spill's impact have reached differing
conclusions. Transredes, through contracted experts, produced
some initial studies of the spill's impact which, unsurprisingly,
yielded comparatively low estimates of the damage. 124 For its
part, the government did not conduct broad studies of the spill's
impact until many months later, through the Environmental Au-
dit. Because of the passage of time and resulting loss of evi-
dence, the auditors had to rely on Transredes' studies of the im-
120. Interview with Community of El Choro, in Bolivia (May 23, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter Community of El Choro Interview].
121. See 7 Environmental Audit at 11-14.
122. See CODIGO CML (COD. CIv.) (Bol.), art. 998.
123. See Fernando Gonzalez Statement, supra note 64.
124. See, e.g., Polaris Report, supra note 76.
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mediate impact of the spill. As a result, even the governmental
audit cannot be regarded as fully independent. A few indepen-
dent groups have also conducted studies of the effects of the
spill, again reaching varying conclusions.
125
According to Transredes representatives, their medical
team saw 13,000 human patients and found that none of them
had any health problems related to the oil spill. 126 Similarly,
with respect to animals, Transredes official Tony Henshaw
claimed that the company had approximately 200 autopsies per-
formed on animals and found no hydrocarbons in any of
them. 127  Another Transredes representative stated that "the
only animal that died was a cow that ate a plastic bag that was
going to be used for cleanup."'12' Transredes and others have
argued that, for the most part, the health problems experienced
by humans and animals are unrelated to the oil spill and may
result from other contamination already in the Desaguadero
River or, in the case of animal diseases and deaths, from inbreed-
ing.129  Indeed, questions about the health of the animals
prompted Henshaw to remark simply: "Life is hard in the alti-
plano."130 However, community members generally assert that
the health problems they noticed in animals and humans only
started or increased after the oil spill.' 3 ' They also complained
that Transredes was deceptive. For example, a community mem-
ber from El Choro stated that "the technicians were irresponsi-
125. Of note, the study Efectos Ambientales y Socioeconomicos por el Derrame de
Petroleo en el Rio Desaguadero jointly published by the Technical University of Oruro,
the Center for Ecology and Andean Peoples, and the Program of Strategic Investigation
of Bolivia, is the most comprehensive independent study of the spill's impacts.
126. See Fernando Gonzalez Statement, supra note 64.
127. See Interview with Anthony Henshaw, supra note 111.
128. Brigitte Herrera Statement, supra note 74.
129. See Interview with Pietro Fiorilo, CARE, in Bolivia (May 22, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter Pietro Fiorilo Interview]; Fernando Gonzalez Statement, supra note 65; Brigitte Her-
rera Statement, supra note 74.
130. See Interview with Anthony Henshaw, supra note 111.
131. See Interview with Community of Pata Pata, supra note 119 ("Fifty percent of
animal deaths [were] caused by mining contamination. After the oil spill, the rest of
the animals died."); Interview with Community of Toma Toma, in Bolivia (May 23,
2003) ("Sheep died eating the oil .... It killed a sheep, and causes lambs with deformi-
ties - like the one with 8 legs. People have problems with vision."); Community of
Ulloma Interview, in Bolivia (May 20, 2003) ("In January 30, 2000, the oil spill hap-
pened which caused lots of problems and took us to poverty. Animals drank water from
the river, and grazed around the river or the islands in the river. They ate the grass, got
diarrhea and died. For example, a person who had 200 sheep or over, lost about 40.").
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ble, manifesting that the infections in our sheep were caused by
a mosquito. ' 1 2
At this stage, determining the accuracy of veterinary diagno-
ses is impossible. Moreover, because baseline statistics regarding
mortality and health do not exist for livestock in the region, a
controlled comparison cannot be made. Nonetheless, the Envi-
ronmental Auditors found evidence that "exposure to contami-
nation has generated health problems in the population in the
region during the period analyzed"' 33 and found that out of
ninety-nine cases of dead animals analyzed by Transredes's own
vets, "approximately 40%" presented a "diagnosis related to in-
toxication."' 134
This project does not undertake a substantive evaluation of
these studies. Rather, the delegation focused on documenting
the perceptions of the community members regarding the harm
they suffered and, more importantly, their experiences dealing
with Transredes in the compensation process. With this focus,
the Crowley delegation found that communities believed the ef-
fects of the spill were extremely severe and that many of these
effects persist due to improper cleanup or inadequate compen-
sation and remedial measures. Community members maintain
that consumption of contaminated water and forage resulted in
health problems in animals and humans, and in a drop in the
market prices of their products.135 A statement by a Rancho
Chuquifia community member is illustrative:
Transredes told us not to give forage to animals, but there
was nothing else, so the animals ate and some are blind, some
have coughs, some birth defects. They are still sick .... One
person had 2000 sheep, but now has 200. They still forage
from here, but are very skinny, and we can't sell the sheep
now. Now we have to go to Oruro to earn money .... Now
there isn't life here in the country, Sefiorita.'1 6
Residents of Chuquifia led the Crowley delegation to a
sheep pen, and pointed out a number of deformities or health
132. Representative from Primo Chambi Interview, supra note 116.
133. 7 Environmental Audit, supra note 54, at 11.
134. Id. at 13.
135. See id. at 11-13, 36 ("The oil spill has generated a temporary and generalized
drop in the prices of products from the affected areas .... This drop in prices affected
principally the sale of meat and cheese . . ").
136. Interview with Community of Rancho Chuquifia, in Bolivia (May 23, 2003).
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problems in the animals.1 37 The family claimed that all or most
of the problems were caused by the contamination resulting
from the spill. 138
Whatever the merits of these particular claims, even Trans-
redes concedes that the spill prevented communities from safely
using the Desaguadero's water for months,139 and destroyed for-
age for their animals.140 Such widespread and serious damage
resulting from the spill necessitated an elaborate scheme to eval-
uate and quantify claims brought by individuals and communi-
ties against the company. Despite the importance of an inde-
pendent and objective mechanism to adjudicate the claims, here
again the government failed to act to oversee the process or to
protect the interests of those harmed. Transredes was again left
to deal with the communities on its own.
Under the direction of the company, the compensation pro-
cess took place in two phases. In the first phase, the company
paid community members who had signed compensation agree-
ments an amount determined by evaluators hired by Transredes.
The company paid the compensation in kind or through com-
munity or group development projects rather than cash. The
company contracted with Cooperative for Assistance and Relief
Everywhere-Bolivia ("CARE-Bolivia"), an international humanita-
rian NGO for the purpose of distributing the compensation.
The second phase of compensation took place over a year after
the spill, in accordance with the findings of an audit ordered by
the Ministry of Sustainable Development. Transredes distrib-
uted this remaining compensation in cash.
Transredes considers the compensation process, particu-
larly the first phase, to have been a great success."4 Both Trans-
redes and CARE have touted their affiliation (the "Desaguadero
Program") as a novel and highly positive form of NGO-corporate
137. Among the health problems the group documented there were blindness,
loss of wool, a protruding uterus, a deformed head, eye problems (such as tumors), and
tumors on the face. See Interview with Family on the Outskirts of Chuquifia, in Bolivia
(May 23, 2003).
138. See id.
139. Transredes announced that the river water could be used normally on May
23, 2000. See Environmental Audit, supra note 54, at 24.
140. See id. at 32.
141. The company has challenged some of the audit's findings that supported the
second phase of compensation. See Fernando Gonzalez Statement, supra note 64.
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cooperation. Indeed, in its final report on the Desaguadero Pro-
gram, CARE states that:
The allies Transredes and CARE Bolivia finished the process
satisfied at having been able to fulfill their commitments to
the affected communities, and generate learned lessons that
are not only useful to us, but also to the communities where
we work, the organizations with which we associate, other en-
terprises in the sector, national and international NGOs, and
also the Bolivian State, all of whom could find in [the Desa-
guadero] Program a model of work between communities,
private enterprise, and organizations of civil society. 142
Despite the rosy picture painted by the partners in the Desa-
guadero Program, certain aspects of the compensation process
raise serious concerns. The balance of this section describes the
process in greater detail and explains these concerns.
(a) First phase: Transredes' compensation process
Shortly after the spill occurred, Transredes initiated a com-
pensation process whereby communities and the company
would sign a series of agreements establishing the method for
evaluating damages and the amount of compensation due. This
amount would later be distributed by CARE-Bolivia.143
First, Transredes and affected communities signed standard
framework agreements ("convenios marco"), which established
the process by which individuals' damages would be evalu-
ated.'44 According to these agreements, Transredes would com-
pensate communities for direct losses caused by the spill.14 To
do this, Transredes would distribute claim forms on which fami-
lies would specify any concrete losses for which they could pro-
duce some kind of proof.'4 6 These claim forms would then serve
142. CARE - TRANSREDES, BALANCE DEL PROGRAMA DESAGUADERO: 2 ANOS DE COM-
PENSACI6N PARA EL DESARRoLLo 2000-2002, at 4 (Brigitte Herrera ed., 2003) [hereinaf-
ter BALANCE DEL PROGRAMA DESAGUADERO].
143. See id. at 7.
144. See form Convenio Marco [hereinafter Convenio Marco], in TRANSREDES S.A.,
DERRAME OSSA-2 AL Rio DESAGUADERO: TERCER INFORME INTERMEDIO: CONCLUSI6N DE
LAS OPERACIONERS DE LIMPIEZA Y AcrUALZAC6N DEL PROGRAMA DE COMPENSACION ann.
G (2001) [hereinafter TERCER INFORME INTERMEDIO].
145. Id. at cl. 3.1(b).
146. See 2 Environmental Audit, supra note 54, at 148. The Audit points out that in
communiques from Transredes to the communities, the company established that:
The only instrument that is accepted by the laws to support a just claim, is a
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as the basis for teams of evaluators to calculate each family's
losses. 147 Transredes would pay for several evaluators, one se-
lected by Transredes, and one selected by each community.148
An agreement between Transredes' and each community's
evaluators would determine the final amount of compensation,
and the parties agreed to "recognize and accept without any dis-
cussion the agreed decision at which the independent evaluators
arrive."49 Also in the framework agreements, Transredes com-
mitted itself to carrying out an emergency plan to protect and
preserve the health of the community, its animals, and natural
resources from harms caused by the spill.1 50 The agreement pro-
vided that disputes between the parties would be resolved
through mediation or arbitration.1 5 1
To receive the agreed upon compensation, each community
had to sign a Contrato Transaccional [transactional agreement]
with Transredes, declaring that the compensation amount in-
cluded "all damages direct or indirect, present and future,
caused by the spill .... ,152 The transactional agreements con-
tained language waiving any legal action against Transredes or
its agents, through "arbitral, civil, criminal, or administrative
channels. 1 5' The communities also agreed to distribution of
the compensation by CARE, in kind or through community de-
velopment projects, rather than in cash.' Finally, the commu-
nities that signed the transactional agreements would sign agree-
ments with CARE for the execution of projects or compensation
declaration of the goods, properties and capacities prejudiced by an incident.
This document is the Claim form that is distributed to all heads of families of
the communities that think they are affected by the spill. ... Each claim must
have a backing or proof because it is not possible to calculate on the basis of
desires or aspirations of being compensated, but rather on the basis of evi-
dence of a concrete and direct harm that can be measured and that can be
assigned a value in money.
Id. at 148.
147. See Convenio Marco, supra note 144; Acta, in TERCER INFORME INTERMEDIO,
supra note 144, ann. G [hereinafter Acta].
148. See id. at cl. 2.
149. Id. at cl. 3.
150. See Convenio Marco supra note 144, at cl. 3.1(a).
151. See id. at cl. 4.
152. See form Contrato Transaccional [hereinafter Contrato Transaccional], in
TERCER INFORME INTERMEDIO, supra note 144, ann. G, cl. 4.
153. Id.
154. Id. at cl. 3.
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in kind. 15 5
From the outset, the compensation process was heavily
weighted in favor of the company. First, because of their lack of
experience in negotiation and lack of outside legal advice, the
communities had only a limited understanding of their legal
rights and options. Transredes approached the communities
through Community Liaison Officers ("CLOs"), hired by the
company to explain, among other things, the compensation
agreements. 15 6 No lawyers or other advisors were provided to
the communities by the company or by the government; and
most communities could not afford to hire lawyers to advise
them. One person from an Uru Morato community stated that
Transredes and CARE asked them to find a lawyer, but they
never considered consulting one because they do not trust stran-
gers.1 57 When asked whether Transredes took any action to en-
sure that the communities had independent legal advice, the
head of Transredes' legal department, Fernando Gonzalez,
stated that "we trusted very much in the balance of the agree-
ment itself, because it is very balanced ... We are accepting our
obligations: that's the most important thing."
158
For its part, the government did nothing to obtain legal
counsel for communities; worse yet, it appears that some govern-
mental authorities may have pressured communities to sign com-
pensation agreements. Juan Carlos Montoya, who at the time of
the Mission was in charge of the Prefecture's Environmental
Unit ("Unidad de Medio Ambiente"), notes:
In reality, the only thing the Prefecture was able to do was to
facilitate the meetings between the communities and the
company. It was not able to analyze the agreement proposed
by Transredes to the communities; rather, it accelerated and
applied pressure for the communities to sign and rapidly re-
solve the conflict, forbidding any judicial action against
Transredes: "The Prefect himself threatened the environ-
mental organizations that he was not going to allow lawsuits
against the company Transredes, because those lawsuits made
investments escape.
151
155. See BALANCE DEL PROGRAMA DESAGUADERO, supra note 142, at 7.
156. See 2 Environmental Audit, supra note 54, at 140-41.
157. See Community of Pufiaca Interview, supra note 119.
158. Fernando Gonzalez Statement, supra note 64.
159. MONTOYA ET AL., supra note 39, at 164.
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Local NGOs were similarly unhelpful in providing legal ad-
vice to the affected communities. 6 ° NGO effectiveness was un-
dermined by several factors, including a lack of organization and
internal divisions. 161 For the purposes of this Report, however,
the most troubling issue is the allegation that Transredes may
have attempted deliberately to undermine the effectiveness of
the NGO response. According to Arturo Alessandri, head of the
Oruro departmental office of the Permanent Assembly of
Human Rights, the problem was even more serious: in his view
Transredes's greatest success consisted of "disorganizing" NGOs
and "frustrating [their] capacity to respond as organizations of
civil society" by hiring "civic leaders or from labor or environ-
mental organizations."' 62 If true, these allegations suggest that
Transredes not only failed to provide independent counsel to
the communities but also deprived them of their best opportu-
nity for assistance.
160. Oruro, the largest city in the region affected by the oil spill, has numerous
small NGOs or branches of NGOs that got involved in the events surrounding the oil
spill in one way or another. However, their effectiveness as defenders of citizens' inter-
ests or as protectors of the environment was ultimately limited. For the most part, the
NGOs' role consisted of drawing public attention to the plight of affected communities
through the media and by conducting studies of the impact of the spill. Insofar as they
were able to channel some of the communities' demands, they may have assisted the
communities in pressuring the company to respond to their complaints.
161. NGOs appear to have been initially stunned, and slow to respond to the crisis.
Thus, for example, they did not provide timely advice to affected communities regard-
ing their rights. NGOs also appear to have been confused about how to approach
Transredes; in some cases, NGOs chose to collaborate with the company, or to advise
communities to go along with Transredes' compensation process, while other NGOs
were consistently hostile to the company. See Interview with Arturo Alessandri, Asam-
blea Permanente de Derechos Humanos - Oruro (May 22, 2003). For example, the
environmental organization LIDEMA ("Liga de Defensa del Medio Ambiente") signed
an agreement with Transredes, whereby LIDEMA would administer funds that Trans-
redes was giving to the Prefecture of Oruro to finance the Prefecture's monitoring of
Transredes' actions to mitigate the spill's damage. See Transredes Respuesta, supra note
112, at question 2. According to the company, it gave U.S. $60,310 to LIDEMA, of
which the Prefecture took U.S. $11,793.74 and LIDEMA charged U.S. $9,046.50. Id.
However, eventually the directorate of LIDEMA decided to return the remaining U.S.
$39,460.76 to Transredes, because the Prefecture and the Vice-Ministry of the Environ-
ment were unable to reach an agreement regarding how the money should be spent.
Id. Other NGOs thought LIDEMA should not have agreed to administer the funds,
because Transredes was using the organization to clean up its image. See Interview with
Patricia Molina, FOBOMADE (May 27, 2003). Such differences between groups re-
sulted in infighting within the NGO community, and an inability to present a solid front
to the company, government, and affected communities.
162. Interview with Arturo Alessandri, Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Huma-
nos-Oruro, in Bolivia (May 22, 2003).
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The lack of legal advice undermined communities' ability to
protect their interests in the negotiation process. As the Envi-
ronmental Audit noted:
[The process] in reality is determined in all its central ele-
ments by Transredes. All the documents with legal value that
mark the milestones in the process: Framework Agreement,
Claim Forms, Evaluation of Damages, Transactional Agree-
ments, and Agreements for Execution of Projects or Payment
in Kind, are defined unilaterally by Transredes. The commu-
nities, in contrast, have not had legal advice that would have
allowed them to give these documents a different reading.
Only in situations of extreme rejection of the process in some
communities, these have resorted to legal support. The anal-
ysis of these documents shows that they did not favor the
communities and that even in some cases legal norms have
been transgressed.16
Indeed, some communities seemed not to understand that they
had an alternative to signing the agreements. The comment of a
member of the San Pedro de Challacollo community was typical:
"people from the El Choro municipality said that we had to sign
the compensation agreements because otherwise we would lose
compensation."164 In the end, virtually all the communities
signed framework and compensation agreements without
amendment.
Beyond the decision to sign the agreements, timely and in-
dependent legal advice might also have reduced confusion
within communities over key issues such as what they should de-
clare as a loss. For example, an interviewee in San Pedro de
Challacollo stated that "[w] e were not well informed because we
thought that we would have to pay taxes on each animal we had,
so we did not have them taken into account in their totality."1 65
Another interviewee in El Choro said that "[t]here are many
people who were left without compensation, humble people who
could not express themselves." '166
Even those community members who understood that legal
alternatives existed declined, for the most part, to pursue them
because they believed it would not be effective and would take
163. 2 Environmental Audit, supra note 54, at 182.
164. Community of San Pedro de Challacollo Interview, supra note 49.
165. Id.
166. Community of El Choro Interview, supra note 120.
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too long. In an interview in the community of Santo Tomas, an
individual told us: "We wanted to start a suit, but we have seen
that a suit is not going to be resolved in a month or a year, so we
wanted to resolve it directly between the company and the com-
munity." 1 7 Another person added that "[o]ur justice delays a
lot, up to ten years, and the proof of the crime disappears."168
The pressure to sign compensation agreements was exacer-
bated by the communities' extreme poverty and need of emer-
gency assistance. Residents felt that they simply could not afford
delays in receiving compensation, even if by going through a
longer process, such as a lawsuit, they might receive more. Teo-
filo Quispe, from Pufiaca, told us that members of his commu-
nity knew that they could sue Transredes instead of signing but
decided to sign anyway because they needed the money: ninety
percent of the community was in favor of signing the compensa-
tion agreements, even though they were not happy with the set-
tlement amount.169 Moreover, some of the company's repre-
sentatives may have misled individuals regarding the economic
advantages of signing compensation agreements: one individual
we interviewed alleged that the company told his community
that the first to sign would be the best compensated.1 7 0
Another factor that undermined the bargaining position of
the communities was the emergence of division within and
among the various groups. In interviews with communities, we
heard repeated complaints about unequal distribution of com-
pensation, favoring certain communities or municipal leaders
and not others. Some alleged that this pattern of distribution
was part of a deliberate strategy by the company to divide the
communities and turn them against each other. For example,
one community leader in San Pedro de Challacollo told us that:
Transredes has made us fight among families, among com-
munities, and among peoples. At first, we worked with El
Choro. Unfortunately, our municipal authorities have leaned
in favor of El Choro. Over time, we have been totally aban-
doned by authorities of the municipality .... We have been
compensated... with thirty-two tractors, but Challacollo only
167. Community of Santo Tomas Interview, supra note 101.
168. Id.
169. See Statements by Teofilo Quispe, Community of Pufiaca Interview, supra note
119.
170. See Community of El Choro Interview, supra note 120.
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received five tractors, and the rest benefited our brothers
from El Choro. 
71
Determining whether Transredes deliberately treated the
communities differently or the division was a predictable by-
product of a poorly understood distribution scheme is difficult.
The company apparently resisted the urging of NGOs to meet
with all of the community leaders as a group and instead opted
to deal with the communities individually. 172 Moreover, Trans-
redes did little or nothing to dispel the perception of unequal
treatment. Whatever the source of the divisions, the lack of
unity among the communities reduced their strength in negoti-
ating with the company and made it more difficult for them to
secure an effective governmental response.
Several provisions of the compensation agreements them-
selves further exacerbated the power imbalance between the
company and the communities. First, the Framework Agree-
ments established that Transredes would provide emergency as-
sistance to the communities that signed. 17' Given the communi-
ties' urgent needs for water and medical and veterinary assis-
tance after the spill, this provision was a powerful incentive for
communities to sign the Framework Agreements. Thus, even if
they had doubts about the compensation process proposed by
Transredes, the provision regarding emergency assistance practi-
171. Statements byjavier Carasila Yugar, President of the Territorial Base Organi-
zation of Rancho Carasila, Community of San Pedro de Challacollo Interview, supra
note 49. While this statement is representative of what many people told us about the
effect the compensation process had on internal community relations, it does not nec-
essarily mean that Rancho Carasila was treated differently from El Choro communities
in the compensation process. The compensation chart provided to us by CARE and
Transredes states that twenty-six families in Rancho Carasila received a total of U.S.
$6,371.92 in kind, primarily in the form of cattle. See BALANCE DEL PROGRAMA DESAGUA-
DERO, supra note 142, at 21. The average community of approximately thirty-eight fami-
lies in El Choro received U.S. $21,000-U.S. $22,000 in the form of tractors and the
planting of forage. These numbers indicate that the average family in El Choro re-
ceived more compensation than the average family in Rancho Carasila; however, this
difference may simply reflect differential losses resulting from the spill.
172. For example, the Bishop of Oruro, Monsefior Braulio Saez, stated in an inter-
view:
I think that Transredes was concerned about their reputation and the money
that they would have to pay because they started having separate meetings with
the communities rather than a total meeting with the communities as the insti-
tutions wanted.
Interview with Monsenor Braulio Saez, Bishop of Oruro, In Bolivia (May 22, 2003).
173. See Convenio Marco, supra note 144, at cl. 3.1(a).
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cally ensured that communities would sign Framework Agree-
ments.
Second, the Framework Agreements called for Transredes
to hire two sets of evaluators, one selected by the company and
one by each community. 174 As a practical matter, the communi-
ties could not afford to pay for evaluators and therefore had to
rely on Transredes. Yet because Transredes employed them, the
evaluators faced an immediate conflict of interest. Worse yet,
this situation created a tool for Transredes to manipulate evalu-
ators' findings: Some observers have alleged that when the time
came for the two teams to compare their results, "the indepen-
dent evaluators did not defend the results of their work because
they were pressured with the threat that their wages would be
withheld if they did not accept the amount proposed by Trans-
redes.1'1 75 These allegations offer one possible explanation of
the Environmental Audit's finding that "the payments that
Transredes made to evaluators bear no relation to the number
of claim forms to be evaluated, and it is not clear what criterion
was applied for this.,"176
Not only did the communities lack the resources to hire
their own evaluators, they lacked the necessary expertise to se-
lect qualified individuals. As the Environmental Audit noted:
"The identification of these professionals signifies a problem for
a population that does not have a fluid contact with profession-
als with these characteristics ... 177 In the absence of commu-
nity expertise, Transredes stepped in to fill the gap. Out of
twenty-eight authorities interviewed by the auditors regarding
this issue, five stated that Transredes imposed or actively partici-
pated in the selection of the community evaluator.1 7 8 It is diffi-
cult to see how these individuals, selected and paid by Trans-
redes, were in any sense independent.
174. See id.; Acta, supra note 147, at 2.
175. MONTOYA ET AL., supra note 39, at 170.
176. 2 Environmental Audit, supra note 54, at 157. Indeed, the audit includes a
chart listing the fees paid to each independent evaluator, and the number of claim
forms evaluated. Id. at table 11.3.4.5-1. An example of the fee variations referenced in
the audit is that for the Rivera Agreement, the independent evaluator was paid U.S.
$50,800 to conduct an evaluation of 133 claim forms. In contrast, the independent
evaluator for the Llocohuta agreement was paid U.S. $5,453 to evaluate 147 claim
forms. Id.
177. Id. at 155.
178. See id. at 157.
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Finally, although the agreements that the communities
signed with Transredes and CARE established a set of deadlines
for the completion of each step in the compensation process,
179
these deadlines were not met. 8 ° Thus, according to the Envi-
ronmental Audit, "the agreements that Transredes signed with
the affected communities suggest to them a space of time for
receipt of compensation that was not realistic, but that could
have motivated them to sign the Framework Agreement to rap-
idly receive the compensation and dispose of it to cover the
harms they had suffered due to the spill." '181 In other words, if
the communities settled for less money in order to receive des-
perately needed compensation more quickly, they lost some of
the benefit of their bargain when the payments were delayed.
(b) The CARE Distribution
On June 20, 2000, CARE-Bolivia and Transredes signed an
agreement to establish a "strategic alliance, making possible the
execution of projects of community development in the areas
where Transredes operates." 8 2 A separate agreement, signed by
CARE-Bolivia and Transredes on August 3, 2000, established that
CARE would carry out the compensation of families affected by
the oil spill, "and would turn a simple process of compensation
into a contribution to the sustainable development of a very
poor region.""" In an interview, Jan Schollaert, the Director of
CARE-Bolivia, stated that there was a lot of opposition both
within CARE and in the broader NGO community to this coop-
eration; however, Schollaert said that CARE "did it for strategic
reasons because [the] private sector is huge in Latin American
and if you want to be involved you have to work with them as
well."" 4
179. See id. at 139.
180. See id. at 139. The Audit explains that there were delays in the hiring of inde-
pendent evaluators for the communities (two to three months on average), so the eval-
uations were only completed three to four and a half months after the signing of the
Framework Agreement. After that, it often took weeks or months before the two sets of
evaluators agreed upon the final amount of compensation. Id. at 148.
181. Id. at 139-40.
182. CARE & TRANSREDES, PROGRAMA DESAGUADERO... DE CONFLICTOS Y COMPENSA-
C1oN A CONSENSO Y DESARROLLO: REPORTE DEL PRIMER AfO 6 (Sept. 2001) [hereinafter
FIRST REPORT].
183. Id. at 6.
184. Interview with Jan Schollaert, Country Director of CARE Bolivia, in Bolivia
(May 27, 2003).
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CARE set up a temporary office in Oruro, from which to
conduct distribution operations, and hired new personnel for
this purpose: at its peak, there were as many as twenty-eight peo-
ple working for CARE in the Desaguadero Program. a '- In our
interviews with CARE employees, we were told that the organiza-
tion was not involved in the process of determining the amount
of compensation owed, or in the process of negotiation over the
compensation agreements. 18 6 Rather, the organization came in
only after a compensation agreement had been signed, to assist
the communities in designing a community development pro-
ject, or to distribute compensation in kind.187
CARE-Bolivia claims that the process by which the compen-
sation was distributed was highly participatory.1 8 8 To assist com-
munities in reaching a decision about the form of compensa-
tion, CARE met with communities and determined what their
demands and primary needs were.1 89 On that basis, CARE devel-
oped a project with the participation of the community.'9 0 Each
community selected two individuals to participate, along with
CARE representatives, in a committee to administer the com-
pensation funds for that community ("Administrative Commit-
tee"). These committees were directly responsible for the man-
agement of compensation funds.' 91 In some cases, CARE sup-
plemented the agreed amount of compensation with additional
funding from other sources for the development projects. 192
Compensation was not provided in cash, but rather in the
form of community or group development projects, or in kind
(in the form of animals or seeds) .1 9 3 According to CARE, most
of the compensation, approximately seventy-five percent, took
the form of projects that benefited groups of families within a
185. See Pietro Fiorilo Interview, supra note 129.
186. See Interview with Jan Schollaert, supra note 184.
187. See id.
188. See CARE-Bolivia & Transredes, BALANCE DEL PROGRAMA DESAGUADERO, supra
note 142, at 8.
189. See id.
190. See id. The Environmental Audit notes that a comparison between the project
profiles elaborated with the communities and the actual compensation projects that
were carried out shows that the project profiles were not taken into account by CARE in
the definition of the final project. See 2 Environmental Audit, supra note 54, at 143.
191. See id. at 143. See also FIRST REPORT, supra note 182, at 19.
192. See id. BALANCE DEL PROGRAMA DESAGUADERO, supra note 142, at 9.
193. See Interview with Jorge Campero, CARE-Oruro, in Bolivia (May 22, 2003)
[hereinafter Jorge Campero Interview].
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community, such as the purchase of cattle and machinery.'94
Another seventeen per cent took the form of community
projects that would benefit the majority of the members of a
community, not just affected families. t95 Most often, these
projects consisted of the sowing of forage but also include the
development of systems of potable water, construction of hous-
ing and productive infrastructure, and the purchase of land. 9 6
Seven per cent of the compensation was used for the purchase of
food and tools.'9 7 CARE and Transredes note that as of the first
year of the compensation process, everyone who received com-
pensation, and particularly those persons who received compen-
sation in the form of community or group projects, received
training to ensure the sustainability of the projects.' For exam-
ple, CARE representatives are very proud of the fact that, where
tractors were purchased for communities, CARE taught commu-
nity members not only how to operate the tractors, but also how
to maintain them. This training would not have been ensured
had the communities been compensated in cash and left to
purchase their own tractors.
Transredes decided not to distribute cash because of the
risk that community members would not spend the cash in a
productive manner.'99 CARE representatives stated that paying
the compensation in cash would have been unwise because the
affected individuals might have spent it all without repairing the
harm caused by the spill.20
According to CARE and Transredes, through this process,
they distributed U.S. $1,190,746.96 in compensation to 3,938
families in 131 communities or an average of U.S. $302 per fam-
ily.20' CARE-Bolivia received U.S. $817,541 from Transredes for
implementing the Program.20 2 Put differently, CARE earned
194. See BALANCE DEL PROGRAMA DESAGUADERO, supra note 142, at 11.
195. See id. at 9.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 12.
198. See id. at 20.
199. See Fernando Gonzalez Statement, supra note 64.
200. SeeJorge Campero Interview, supra note 193.
201. See BALANCE DEL PROGRAMA DESAGUADERO, supra note 142, at 21-23. In addi-
tion, they distributed U.S. $13,329 in interest earned in the communities' bank ac-
counts, as well as U.S. $330,654 leveraged from other sources. See id. at 9.
202. See id.
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sixty-eight cents for every dollar it distributed to the communi-
ties.
Overall, the job that CARE did in distributing the compen-
sation appears to have been reasonably good. Although some
community members with whom we spoke stated that they would
have preferred compensation in cash, we did not hear significant
complaints about CARE's performance. Indeed, some aspects of
the partnership are valuable and worth emulating. In particular,
the provision of experts who can advise and assist communities
in the investment of funds appears to be a positive, if expensive,
development. Nevertheless some problems must be noted.
First, the communities could have been given greater control
over the form of compensation. Although some groups might
have lacked the organization and expertise to manage and invest
cash awards, this was likely not the case for all. Moreover, even
those least prepared to handle direct cash payments might have
been counseled and assisted in doing so. Second, by participat-
ing in the compensation process established by Transredes, with
all its flaws and imbalances, CARE contributed to the legitimiza-
tion of that process. Although CARE asserts that it played no
part in enlisting the communities to settle with Transredes, by
overseeing the distribution scheme it put a humanitarian face on
that process. In fact, this may be precisely the purpose for which
Transredes contracted with CARE. As stated by one CARE em-
ployee, "CARE has had to wash the face of Transredes, and per-
haps that was the objective behind everything. CARE has been
burned in some cases. 20 3
(c) The Second Disbursement
In April of 2001, over a year after the oil spill happened, the
government-ordered audit of the spill was completed and re-
leased.
In addition to procedural irregularities,20 4 the audit high-
lighted the following substantive problems in the compensation
scheme: First, "not all affected individuals have been recognized
as such in the process of compensation, such that discontent has
203. Interview with Pietro Fiorilo, supra note 129.
204. See 2 Environmental Audit, supra note 54, 182 (noting communities' lack of
legal advice, and fact that "all the documents with legal value that mark the milestones
in the process ... are defined unilaterally by Transredes ... these documents . did
not favor the communities . . ").
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been created in the communities due to this fact. ' 20 5 Second,
"the amounts of compensation established do not always ade-
quately express the true magnitude of the damages caused by
the spill to the population. '20 6 Third, "the environmental im-
pacts are not considered in the evaluations of the impacts and
amounts set for compensation. 20 7 The auditors were particu-
larly concerned about the fact that no compensation had been
paid for the impact of the spill on the population's pastures,
which they described as "the greatest harm" caused by the
spill.208 Affected community members apparently failed to in-
clude harm to pastures in their claim forms, not realizing that
the loss could be compensated.2 0 9 Finally, "the process has
turned out to be very slow, there being an important percentage
of communities that has not succeeded in receiving compensa-
tion. 2 1
0
On the basis of this analysis, the Audit recommended that
Transredes compensate those newly-identified individuals and
complete payment to those for whom compensation was incom-
plete or insufficient.211 It also recommended that Transredes
implement "a program to support the recovery of soils and pas-
tures, given that the compensation to communities does not re-
present compensation to the Bolivian State for the impacts
caused in the areas affected by exposure to the spill, the
cleanup, and pasturing. This program must cover the area ex-
posed to the spill and cleaned, and the area of native pastures
that were overused [as a result of the spill.] ,2 1 2 Finally, the audit
stated that, because of the impact of the spill on local organiza-
tions, Transredes should establish a program, implemented
through a specialized institution selected by those affected, to
strengthen such organizations and assist them in the consolida-
tion of basic citizen rights, land titling, and other social needs. 213
Ultimately, the auditors recommended that, in addition to
the U.S. $1.2 million that the company had already distributed
205. Id. at VII-15.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 11-182.
209. See id.
210. Id. at VII-15.
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. See id. at VII-16.
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through CARE, the company pay a total of U.S. $2.5 million
more in direct compensation to affected communities in a sec-
ond phase of the compensation process. 2 14 Transredes distrib-
uted this additional compensation directly, without CARE's assis-
tance. In general, this second round of compensation did not
satisfy communities who felt that it was still insufficient to cover
their losses. Curiously, notwithstanding its insistence that the
first distribution be made in kind or through development
projects, Transredes made the second distribution in cash. The
company evidently disregarded its earlier concerns regarding
mishandling of the funds and made the distribution without put-
ting into place procedures to ensure a fair distribution within
communities. As a result, in some cases, communities com-
plained that their leaders who received the cash disappeared
with it and were not seen again by the communities.215
(d) Exceptional Cases
In only two instances, communities or individuals rejected
the compensation process described above and filed lawsuits
against Transredes for compensation. However, after numerous
delays and obstacles in the Bolivian courts, both of these cases
ended in settlements for the amount of compensation cited in
the Environmental Audit.
The first case was a criminal complaint filed by Ms. Dionicia
Vasquez, with the assistance of the NGO Pastoral Social, against
Transredes for the crime of "contaminating waters destined for
public consumption, industrial, agricultural, and fishing uses,"2 1 6
which resulted in damage to her quinoa crops.2 1 7 Transredes
presented a series of jurisdictional and procedural arguments
for the dismissal of the case, most of which were rejected by the
courts. 2 18 However, Ms. Vasquez ultimately "got tired"219 and
214. See Interview with Transredes Legal Team, in Bolivia (May 29, 2003). In addi-
tion, the Audit recommended that Transredes pay U.S. $2.2 million in indirect com-
pensation for the recovery of grasslands, to be administered by the government. Id.
215. See Community of Pufiaca Interview, supra note 119.
216. See C6digo Penal, arts. 216(2), 358(5).
217. See Complaint by Dionicia Vdsquez de Riglos against Transredes, S.A. (Mar.
24, 2000).
218. See Resumen del Juicio Penal iniciado por Dionicia Vdsquez de Riglos (sum-
mary of case provided by Transredes, S.A.).
219. See Arturo Alessandri Interview, supra note 162.
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settled with the company for U.S. $58,000.22o
The second case involved two communities, Japo and Chu-
quifia, which refused to sign even the Framework Agreements,
and instead, started documenting the effects of the oil spill, con-
ducting protests, and demanding that independent commissions
be formed to conduct studies of the specific problems. 221 Ac-
cording to most observers, Japo and Chuquifia were able to chal-
lenge Transredes' compensation process thanks to Chuquifia's
past experience and savvy leadership. Chuquifia had substantial
experience negotiating with the mining company Inti Raymi
over compensation to the community for Inti Raymi's use of ad-
jacent land to conduct mining operations.222 Chuquifia's leader,
Raul Rocha, is also a regional politician who travels frequently
between Oruro and La Paz, and he may possess a better under-
standing of the legal system than the other community leaders.
Japo does not share Chuquifia's experience, and its behavior is
consequently more surprising, but it seems to have simply fol-
lowed Chuquifia's lead on the issue.
In their lawsuit, filed in July 2001 in a La Paz civil court,
Chuquifia and Japo sought over U.S. $14 million in compensa-
tion for damages caused by the spill. 2 23 The plaintiffs alleged
that the oil spill contaminated their water and destroyed the pas-
tures on which their animals fed, leading to illnesses and death
220. See Convenio Transaccional Definitivo, Transredes - Dionicia Vdsquez de
Riglos (July 20, 2002).
221. Transredes and these communities agreed to establish a Water Commission
and a Forage Commission. The Water Commission evaluated and made recommenda-
tions with regard to these communities' needs for drinking water, the need to dig wells
to provide water to the communities, and the condition of animals' drinking places. See
COMISION DE AGUA, INFORME DE LA COMISION DE AGUA AL MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA,
GANADERIA V DESARROLLO RuRAL (June 5, 2000). The Forage Commission issued a Re-
port evaluating the sufficiency of forage for animals in Chuquifia and Japo, and deter-
mining the extent of need for forage to be provided. See COMISION DE FORRAJE, IN-
FORME DE LA COMISI6N DE FORRAJE AL MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA, GANADERIA V DESAR-
ROLLO RuRAL (June 8, 2000).
222. This point has been made by several commentators. See, e.g., MONTOYA ET AL.,
supra note 39, at 182. See also LEANNE FARRELL, PETR6LEO EN EL ALTIPLANO? DIEZ
MESES DESPUs ... UN ANALISIS DE LA COMPENSACION PARA EL DERRAME DESAGUADERO 20
(Dec. 8, 2000).
223. See Complaint by Raul Rocha Ayala, Gregorio Quispaya Lucana, and Eugenio
Huaygua Pita, against Transredes (La Paz Civil Court,July 21, 2001) [hereinafter Rocha
Complaint]. This complaint was later amended to include the Ministry of Sustainable
Development as a defendant, for failing to properly apply the law in the oil spill case.
See Motion to Join Ministry of Sustainable Development as a Defendant (La Paz Civil
Court, May 10, 2002).
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in the animals. 224 They also alleged that although Transredes
had promised to cover the cost of provision of emergency forage
for the animals, Transredes refused to do so in an attempt to
force them to sign a compensation agreement. 225 The com-
plaint stated that Transredes threatened the members of the
Forage Commission with non-payment so that they would mini-
mize the need for forage and would sign on to the report pro-
posed by the company's technicians. 226 According to the plain-
tiffs, when the members of the Forage Commission reported
these facts to the government, "the authorities did not take any
action, evidencing a great institutional weakness, as well as negli-
gence that could be considered criminal." 227 The plaintiffs al-
leged that the cleanup process was superficial and did not rem-
edy the damage done to the soil; that they suffered economic
losses because their animals lost market value due to the percep-
tion that they were contaminated; that they were forced to leave
their land for a period of time; and that the spill broke the natu-
ral harmony of their lives and was a major economic catastro-
phe. 2 28
The case never reached the merits; like Ms. Vasquez's suit, it
was bogged down in jurisdictional issues for nearly two years, un-
til it was settled. 29
224. See Rocha Complaint.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. See id. The complaint stated that these facts established violations of the
plaintiffs' rights to life, health, security, work, their right not to be displaced, right to
conservation of the environment and natural resources, and the right to respect for
indigenous cultural practices, among others. In addition, according to the complaint,
Transredes was liable pursuant to a provision in the Civil Code that states that
"[w] hoever through a faulty fact causes to another an unjust injury, is obligated to com-
pensate." See COD. Civ., art. 984; Rocha Complaint, supra note 223. The plaintiffs re-
lied on the Administrative Resolution by the Superintendency of Hydrocarbons fining
Transredes for the spill to prove the company's fault. Id. They also relied on the
provision of the Civil Code that states that: "Whoever in the performance of a danger-
ous activity causes injury to another is obligated to indemnify if he or she does not
prove the fault of the victim." COD. Crv., art. 998; Rocha Complaint, supra note 223.
229. About a month after the original complaint was filed, the trial judge dis-
missed the case for lack ofjurisdiction. SeeJuez 10mo de Partido en lo Civil, Resolucion
No. 481/2000 (Aug. 16, 2001). He was reversed on appeal on January 30, 2002. On
October 30, 2002, the trial judge ruled in favor of a motion by Transredes, finding
improper service of process because Transredes was served in its La Paz offices, rather
than its main office in Santa Cruz. OnJanuary 28, 2003, the judge once again dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs appealed this decision. However, the
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b. The Bolivian Government's Administrative Response
As this Report has already noted, the government's re-
sponse to the spill during its immediate aftermath was quite lim-
ited. For the most part, the government's actions were adminis-
trative: issuing various resolutions and sanctions and most signif-
icantly, ordering the Environmental Audit. Issued over a year
after the spill occurred, the audit report comprised eight
volumes and numerous appendices, thousands of pages in all.
Yet because it was not even begun until nearly six months after
the spill, the auditing process was limited in important ways and
the report of the audit is therefore not as thorough as it might
have been. The administrative resolutions provided for only
minimal sanctions, and, at the time this Report went to press,
were still being contested by the company. Although citizens
have demanded that the government initiate criminal proceed-
ings against Transredes it has so far failed to do so.
This section begins by setting out the legal and political
framework applicable to the Bolivian government's administra-
tive actions after the spill, describing Bolivia's administrative
structure and the procedures that apply to the oil spill case. It
then examines these actions, focusing particularly on the audit,
its limitations, and the resulting sanctions issued against Trans-
redes.
(1) Administrative Framework
(a) Agency Structure
Under Bolivia's environmental regulations, the Vice-Minis-
try of Environment and Natural Resources, (part of the Ministry
of Sustainable Development,) was the "Competent Environmen-
tal Authority" at the national level, who should have overseen
and responded to the spill.23 The Vice-Ministry of Energy and
parties reached a settlement on May 21, 2003 (during the Crowley Program's mission)
when the plaintiffs and Transredes signed a compensation agreement for the amount
of U.S. $397,118.85 (the amount of compensation that was appropriate according to
the Environmental Audit). See Convenio Transaccional Definitivo, Transredes - Chu-
quifia (May 21, 2003) [hereinafter Transredes - Chuquifia Convenio Transaccional
Definitivo].
230. The Vice-Ministry's functions in this context include that of proposing pro-
grams of prevention and control of contamination of waters and the atmosphere. See
Reglamento de Ley de Organizacion del Poder Ejecutivo, Decreto Supremo 25055, art.
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Hydrocarbons, (part of the Ministry of Economic Development,)
was the "competent sector organism, 2 31 and as such was respon-
sible for participating "in processes of environmental monitor-
ing and control, and for promoting and incentivizing the appli-
cation of measures for environmental improvement and conser-
vation."23 2 In addition, the Vice-Ministry for Indigenous Affairs
is required to monitor the "fulfillment and application of the
laws and international agreements that establish rights and pro-
mote the development of indigenous and original peoples. 23
3
Bolivia has a separate system, known as SIRESE ("Sistema de
Regulacion Sectorial" or "System of Sector Regulation"), at the
national level to regulate particular sectors of economic activity.
Within SIRESE, there is a Superintendency of Hydrocarbons,
which is responsible for granting, modifying and revoking con-
cessions and licenses for hydrocarbons activity; applying sanc-
tions in accordance with sector norms, contracts, and licenses;
monitoring the fulfillment of the obligations and rights of con-
cessionaires; and applying penalties established within its regula-
234tions.
(b) Procedures for Violations of the Law of the Environment
Bolivia's Law of the Environment establishes a procedure
that must be followed when someone reports a violation of its
norms protecting the environment: "All persons and public offi-
cials have the obligation of reporting to the competent authority
the infraction of norms that protect the environment." 235 Once
a written report has been presented, the authority receiving the
report must, within twenty-four hours, indicate the date and
time for an inspection to be carried out within the following sev-
enty-two hours. 2 3 6 A testing period lasting six days begins imme-
16 (May 23, 1998) [hereinafter Supreme Decree 25055]. See also 2 Environmental Au-
dit, supra note 54, at 45.
231. Ley de Organizacion del Poder Ejecutivo No. 1788, art. 11 (Sept. 16, 1997)
(Bol.); Supreme Decree 25055, supra note 230, art. 11.
232. See 2 Environmental Audit, supra note 54, at 46.
233. Supreme Decree 25055, supra note 230.
234. See Ley SIRESE No. 1600, art. 10 (Oct. 28, 1994) (Bol.); Ley de Hidro-
carburos, No. 1689, art. 66 (1996) (Bol.); Reglamento de Transporte de Hidrocaburos
por Ductos, art. 7 (1996) (Bol.).
235. Law of the Environment, supra note 58, art. 100.
236. Id. art. 101(a).
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diately after the inspection.237 Once the six days have passed,
the Authority must dictate a resolution within 48 hours.2 3 8 The
Resolution must determine the corresponding sanction, and the
compensation for the damages caused.23 9 Violations of the Law
of the Environment are generally considered administrative in-
fractions.2 4 ° However, if the environmental authority deter-
mines that a given violation constitutes an environmental crime,
the authority must submit all its information to the Public Minis-
try for processing within the criminal justice system.241
(2) The Environmental Audit and Resulting Sanctions
The most significant governmental response to the oil spill
was the ordering of the Environmental Audit. Despite the im-
237. Id.
238. Id. art. 40.
239. Id. art. 101(b).
240. Id. arts. 99, 101. Such sanctions are to:
be imposed by the competent environmental authority, and consist of: first,
written admonishments for first occurrences of the infraction, allowing the
admonished party a period of time to correct the infraction; second, if the
infraction persists, imposition of a fine - an appropriate sanction and restitu-
tion for the damage caused. measured as three per thousand over the total
declared patrimony or assets of the company, project, or work; and third, in
cases of recurrence of the infraction, license revocation.
Id.
241. Id. at art. 101 (c). The Law defines several environmental crimes relevant to
the oil spill, including contaminating water destined for human consumption, and in-
terrupting the provision of water for human consumption or irrigation:
Article 105(a): One commits a crime against the environment if... a person:
Poisons, contaminates, or adulterates waters destined to human consumption,
to industrial use, to agricultural, ranching, or fishing, or industrial use, over
the permissible limits to be established in the respective regulations.
Article 107: Whoever pours in or throws untreated residual waters, chemical
or biochemical liquids, objects or waste of any nature, in the channels of wa-
ters, on the shores, aquifers, riverbeds, rivers, lakes, lagoons, reservoirs of wa-
ters, capable of contaminating or degrading the waters that exceed the limits
to be established in regulations, will be sanctioned with the penalty of depriva-
tion of liberty from one to four years, and with a fine of one hundred per cent
of the damage caused.
Article 108: Whoever illegally or arbitrarily interrupts or suspends the service
of provision of water for the consumption of populations, or destined to irriga-
tion, will be sanctioned with deprivation of liberty of up to two years, plus
thirty days of fine equivalent to the basic daily salary.
Article 112: Whoever ... does not fulfill sanitary and environmental protec-
tion norms, will suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty of up to two years.
Id. at art. 112.
Id. arts. 105(a), 107, 108, 112.
NO RECOURSE
portance of documenting the causes of the spill and the damage
that resulted, the Audit did not officially begin until July 13,
2000.242 According to Patricia Garcia, legal advisor to the Minis-
try of Sustainable Development, the Vice-Ministry had twice or-
dered that the auditing process begin, but because of Trans-
redes' preference for the use of outside consultants to respond
to the spill, it "did not obey, saying that the audit was not neces-
sary. ''243 Another reason for the delay in starting the Audit, ac-
cording to the same official, was that Transredes and the Vice-
Ministry were engaged in negotiations over the process of selec-
tion of the auditors, who would pay for the audit, and how much
the audit should cost, given that the law at the time did not in-
clude specific provisions regarding these issues. 24 4 Ultimately,
the government and Transredes agreed that the company would
pay for the costs of the Audit, and that it would also hire a con-
sulting firm to select the auditing firm. 2 4 5 The Vice-Ministry set
the terms of reference for the Audit, (which determine the Au-
dit's scope and subject). 246
The consulting firm ENSR International Bolivia conducted
the Environmental Audit.24 7 Because ENSR lacked expertise on
social and economic issues, ENSR subcontracted with the organi-
zation Instituto Socio Ambiental ("ISA") to work on the social
and economic aspects of the Audit.
248
242. See Resumen Cronologico, supra note 87, at 1 3.21.
243. Interview with Patricia Garcia, supra note 14.
244. Id. According to Ms. Garcia, the company wanted to set a cap on how much it
would spend on the audit, but the Vice-Ministry did not agree to this. She also stated
that the gaps in the law regarding the auditing process have been corrected through a
decree: now the government chooses the auditor but the company pays for it. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. The selection of ENSR was not uncontroversial. At least one NGO represen-
tative, Patricia Molina of FOBOMADE, has questioned the firm's independence, noting
ENSR's close connections with oil companies. See Interview with Patricia Molina, in
Bolivia (Feb. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Interview with Patricia Molina, February].
248. Officials from ENSR refused to speak with the Crowley delegation, on the
grounds that a confidentiality clause in their contract with Transredes prevents them
from discussing the contents of the Audit. However, pursuant to a written authoriza-
tion from Transredes, Luz Maria Calvo, head of the social unit of the auditing team, was
able to provide written answers to a questionnaire from the Crowley delegation.
Some have alleged that the sections of the Audit written by ISA are good, but sug-
gest that the analysis of the environmental damage caused by the spill, done by ENSR, is
overly favorable to Transredes. See Interview with Patricia Molina, February, supra note
247.
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The auditors faced a number of obstacles in data-gathering
that ultimately undermined the independence of their conclu-
sions. First, because Transredes' consultants had conducted
most of the studies in the period immediately after the spill, the
auditors lacked independent technical information regarding
the short term effects of the spill and the measures that Trans-
redes took to respond to it. 24 9 Second, changes in environmen-
tal conditions between the time of the spill and the start of the
audit nearly six months later prevented the auditors from con-
ducting effective studies of the environmental impact of the
spill.250 Also, the lack of baseline information regarding the en-
vironment and population of the affected area prevented the au-
ditors from reaching definitive conclusions about the effects of
249. In response to the questions of (1) whether studies of the impact of the oil
spill were conducted immediately after the oil spill, and (2) if so, who conducted the
studies, Ms. Calvo responded as follows: "The studies . . . were carried out by several
national and foreign companies hired by Transredes...." See Luz Maria Calvo, Responses
to Crowley Questionnaire, answer 8 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Calvo Responses].
250. Interview with Patricia Garcia, supra note 14. See also, Calvo Responses, supra
note 249, at answer 6. Ms. Calvo emphasized, among other problems faced by the au-
diting team, the following:
(1) The audit started when the cleanup process had practically ended. Conse-
quently, evidence of the crude oil was then minimal.
(2) Because of the delay, the team was unable to verify the impact of the spill
on the health of livestock. Although the auditing team reviewed numerous
declarations of impacts on the health of livestock, especially abortions and
deaths of animals, they were unable to formally verify them because of the loss
of evidence in the period of time before the audit began.
(3) Because of the delay, and the resulting loss of evidence, the team was also
unable to verify the immediate impact of the spill on human health. Thus,
such impact could not be used as a basis for calculating compensation.
(4) Because the spill affected the normal calendar for taking livestock to pas-
ture, and the livestock was kept in the dry pastures that were not reached by
the spill, these dry pastures were overused by the time the audit started. Thus,
the team was unable to evaluate these pastures.
Id.
"More broadly," Ms. Calvo notes:
the separation [of time] between the audit and the moment of the spill forced
the socio-economic team of the audit to double its technical efforts . . . to
reconstruct the event and its impact via alternative methodologies .... In
short, it was necessary to develop an enormous reconstruction job of what hap-
pened based on the comparison of various sources: affected individuals, docu-
mentation of the company, bibliography, interviews with authorities, etc.
Id. Nonetheless, Ms. Calvo also points out that "the delay in the start of the audit al-
lowed us to see impacts that at the time of the spill could not be seen, such as: the
duration of the drop in prices, or the duration of the impact on the calendar for pastur-
ing livestock." Id.
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the spill.2" 1 For example, because general information on the
health of the affected livestock populations did not exist, the au-
ditors had difficulty attributing animal deaths and health
problems to the oil spill.2 52
The auditors' Final Report was due on December 21, 2000;
however, at the request of the auditors, the Vice-Ministry ex-
tended the deadline for the Report on two occasions. 253 On
both occasions, the main reason cited for the delay was Trans-
redes's failure to provide requested information to the auditors
in a timely manner.254 According to the company, its files were
in disarray, so it had trouble putting the requested documenta-
tion together.255 The Report was finally delivered on April 2,
2001, fourteen months after the spill occurred.2 5 6
Despite these obstacles, the auditors identified deficiencies
in Transredes' environmental manifest, its maintenance of the
oil pipeline, and the measures it took to respond to the disas-
ter.2 57 Among its most important recommendations were: that
Transredes provide additional compensation to the affected
communities;258 that it conduct, through independent consul-
tants, continuing monitoring operations, including annual sam-
pling of soil, water, and biological organisms in various areas
251. Interview with Patricia Garcia, supra note 14. Ms. Calvo also notes this prob-
lem, pointing out that:
Baseline information was one of the big obstacles that had to be confronted to
determine the socioeconomic impact of the spill. In the case of the health of
the population, baseline information in the country is better than in other
respects, thanks to the existence of the National System of Information on
Health ("Sistema Nacional de Informacion en Salud"). But with respect to
[demographic] and economic data, livestock-raising, pastures, etc., the base-
line information was very weak and it was necessary to reconstruct it.
Calvo Responses, at answer 11.
252. Interview with Patricia Garcia, supra note 14.
253. See Resumen Cronologico, supra note 87, at 3.2-3.4.
254. See id. at 3.3-3.4.
255. See Fernando Gonzalez Statement, supra note 64. Ms. Calvo stated that one of
the problems the auditing team faced was the timely delivery of information regarding
the compensation process. See Calvo Response, supra note 249, at answer 12. She ex-
plains that "according to the company, this was delayed because the agreements with
the communities had not been finalized." Id. at answer 14.
256. Resumen Cronologico, supra note 87, at 3.3, 3.4.
257. See generally Dictamen, 7 Environmental Audit, supra note 54. Transredes offi-
cials have expressed their disagreement with several of these conclusions, and have
stated that they considered suing some of the auditors, but are unlikely to do so. See
Interview with Anthony Henshaw, supra note 111.
258. See 7 Environmental Audit, supra note 54, at 15.
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around the Desaguadero; 219 that it establish a program to moni-
tor continuing health effects on the human and animal popula-
tion;2 6 0 and that it establish an integral recovery program for the
fields that were directly affected or overused as a result of the
spill.
261
The audit also formed the basis for an administrative resolu-
tion by the Vice-Ministry of Environment admonishing Trans-
redes for three infractions related to the spill.26 2 The Vice-Minis-
try imposed a fine of a little over twelve million bolivianos (ap-
proximately U.S. $1.8 million) 263 for a fourth infraction, the
failure to present an Action Plan, for which the company had
been previously admonished. 26' Transredes appealed the reso-
lution on July 31, 2001.265 According to the company, as of Au-
259. See id. at 19.
260. See id. at 34, 40.
261. See id. at 30-31.
262. Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Planificaci6n, Resolucion Administra-
tiva VMARNDF No. 011/01 (July 18, 2001) [hereinafter Administrative Resolution 011/
01]. Admonishments issue for first time violations of the environmental law, in cases
where the violations do not constitute environmental crimes. See Reglamento General
de Gesti6n Ambiental, No. 24176, art. 97(a). The Vice-Ministry of the Environment
also initiated two administrative proceedings against Transredes that were unrelated to
the results of the audit: one dealt with Transredes' commitment to provide forage to
the communities of Japo and Chuquiiia, and the other sanctioned Transredes for de-
positing oil in Sica Sica without a license. The first of these was closed due to the
signing of compensation agreements between Transredes and the communities ofJapo
and Chuquifia. See Convenio Transaccional Definitivo, Japo and Transredes (Feb. 15,
2002); Convenio Transaccional por Impactos del Derrame a Mediano Plazo, Japo and
Transredes (July 12, 2002); Transredes - Chuquifia Convenio Transaccional Definitivo,
supra note 229. The second resulted in a fine of U.S. $107,233.70 on Transredes. See
Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Planificaci6on, Resolucion Administrativa No.
003/01 (Jan. 31, 2001) [hereinafter Administrative Resolution 003/01]. On appeal to
the Bolivian Supreme Court, the Court upheld the resolution in part, and reversed
solely with regard to the calculation of the amount of the fine. See Sala Plena de la
Corte Suprema de Justicia de Bolivia, Sentencia 90/2002 (Dec. 5, 2002).
263. The company stated in its appeal of this decision that, in dollars, the fine was
U.S. $1,839,277. See Transredes, Apela de la Resolucion Administrativa VMARNDF No.
011/01 del 18 dejulio del 2001, 9.6 (July 31, 2001) (on file with authors) [hereinafter
Transredes Appeal].
264. Fines issue for violations that persist after an admonishment; these fines are
calculated as three per thousand of the total declared patrimony or assets of the com-
pany, project, or work at issue. See Reglamento General de Gesti6n Ambiental, art.
97(b).
265. See Transredes Appeal, supra note 263. The grounds for appeal include viola-
tions of the company's "right to a defense" with regard to the final report of the audit,
violations of the principle of non bis in idem (similar to double jeopardy), the Vice Minis-
try's lack ofjurisdiction, incorrect application of the law to the facts, and violations of
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gust 2003 a decision by the Ministry of Sustainable Development
was pending.26
6
The first infraction addressed by this resolution was Trans-
redes' presentation of incomplete and altered information
under oath in the Environmental Manifest required by the Vice-
Ministry as a prerequisite to conducting its operations.267 Ac-
cording to the resolution and Transredes' own submission to the
Vice-Ministry, Transredes failed to include the Desaguadero
River in the Contingency Plan for spills in major watercourses in
its Environmental Manifest.268 As a result of this omission by
Transredes, the Vice-Ministry approved the Environmental Man-
ifest without giving special consideration to an area of high eco-
logical fragility.2 69
Moreover, Transredes' Environmental Manifest notes that
the OSSA II pipeline system had exceeded its projected useful
life by twelve or thirteen years at the time of the Environmental
the principle of non-retroactivity of the law. Id. Because the details of these arguments
are of limited relevance to this Report, we do not discuss them at length here.
266. See Resumen del Proceso Administrativo Ambiental: "Infracciones adminis-
trativas a los Reglamentos de la Ley del Medio Ambiente sobre la base del andlisis del
Informe de Auditoria Ambiental", at 3 (on file with authors).
267. SeeAdministrative Resolution 011/01, supra note 262, at 21. Under the Regu-
lations for Environmental Prevention and Control ("REPC"), the legal representatives
of projects, works, or activities in process of implementation or operation at the time
the REPC went into effect were required to submit an Environmental Manifest
("Manifiesto Ambiental" or "MA") to the competent environmental authority. In the
MA, the legal representatives of the project are required to explain "the environmental
state in which the project is, and propose a plan of environmental adaptation, if appro-
priate. The environmental manifest has the status of a sworn declaration, and can be
approved or rejected by the competent environmental authority. . . ." See Reglamento
de Prevenci6n y Control Ambiental, arts. 7, 100. Bolivia's environmental regulations
forbid the presentation of an environmental manifest with altered information. See
Reglamento General de Gesti6n Ambiental, art. 96(b); Reglamento de Prevenci6n y
Control Ambiental, art. 169(b). The provision does not refer to incomplete informa-
tion, but only to altered information. Thus, Transredes is arguing on appeal that this
provision simply does not apply to the facts, given that the company did not actively
alter any information in the Environmental Manifest. See Transredes Appeal, supra
note 263, at 6 et seq.
268. See Administrative Resolution 011/01, supra note 262, at 16. See also Trans-
redes Memorial de Defensa a la Citacion VMARNDF Nro. 001/2001 del 19 dejunio del
2001, 5 (July 4, 2001) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Transredes Response].
269. The Competent Environmental Authority approves the Environmental Mani-
fest through a Declaration of Environmental Adaptation ("Declaratoria de Adecuacion
Ambiental" or "DAA). See Reglamento General de Gesti6n Ambiental, supra note 262,
art. 57. The DAA has the character of an environmental license, and establishes the envi-
ronmental conditions that must be satisfied in accordance with the Environmental
Manifest. Id.
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Manifest's approval, but according to the Ministry it did not
identify "specific environmental deficiencies for the OSSA II. ' 270
As a result, the Environmental Manifest did not identify corre-
sponding mitigation or corrective measures, including the main-
tenance of the ducts in areas where they crossed bodies of
water.271 In short, Transredes failed to provide complete and
useful information in its Environmental Manifest, which in turn
undermined a monitoring system premised on self-reporting.
The second infraction resulted from Transredes' failure to
implement mitigation measures in advance of the spill.2 72 Ac-
cording to the Vice-Ministry, Transredes failed to respond to the
spill in an "efficient and immediate manner" as required in the
Environmental Manifest because, as recognized by Transredes it-
self, its system to monitor oil flow was out of service from January
to February 15, 2000.273 As a result, the oil spill went undetected
for eighteen to thirty-two hours.2 7 4 The Vice-Ministry also noted
that Transredes had failed to train its personnel for emergen-
cies.2 7 5
The third infraction was based on Transredes' contamina-
tion of soil and water as a result of the oil spill. 276
The fourth infraction listed by the Vice-Ministry was based
on Transredes' failure to present an Action Plan describing the
270. See Administrative Resolution 011/01, supra note 262, at 17.
271. See id.
272. See Administrative Resolution 011/01, supra note 262, at 21. Failure to imple-
ment mitigation measures in the Plan for Application and Environmental Monitoring is
a contravention of Bolivia's Environmental Law. See Reglamento General de Gesti6n
Ambiental, art. 96(h); Reglamento de Prevenci6n y Control Ambiental, art. 169(i).
273. See Administrative Resolution 011/01, supra note 262, at 13. Transredes ad-
mitted to the fact that its oil flow monitoring system was out of service in a submission
to the Ministry of Sustainable Development. See also Transredes Response, supra note
268, at 5(3),(1) (on file with authors).
274. See Administrative Resolution 011/01, supra note 262, at 13.
275. Id. at 14. The Vice-Ministry noted that such training was required under the
environmental regulations for the Hydrocarbons Sector. Id. at 14. See also Reglamento
Ambiental para el Sector Hidrocarburos, Decreto Supremo No. 24335, art. 121 (Jul. 19,
1996).
276. See Administrative Resolution 011/01, supra note 262, at 22 (July 18, 2001).
Bolivian environmental regulations provide that "contamination of bodies of water by
an oil spill" is an administrative infraction. See Reglamento en Materia de Contamina-
cion Hidrica, art. 71(j). Also, Bolivia's Environmental Law provides that a contraven-
tion or fault is committed by anyone who takes actions that injure, lesion, deteriorate,
damage, or destroy the environment. See Law of the Environment, supra note 58, art.
103. In turn, actions that degrade the environment include actions that "contaminate
the air, the waters in all their States, the soil, and sub-soil." Id. art. 20(a).
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mitigation and corrective measures to be taken.277 According to
the resolution, Transredes' failure to satisfy the Vice-Ministry's
request for the plan prevented the Vice-Ministry from evaluating
and verifying the fulfillment of the Environmental Law and its
regulations following the spill. 278 Because the behavior persisted
despite a previous admonishment, 279 the new resolution carried
a fine.2 0 According to the Vice-Ministry, Transredes' failure to
present an Action Plan constituted a "failure to carry out the
application of the corrective or mitigation measures" in a timely
way following a determination by the government that such mea-
sures are necessary.281
Interestingly, the government did not dictate the specific
corrective or mitigation measures that were to be taken by the
company. Rather, the Vice-Ministry simply required the com-
pany to list in an Action Plan the measures it intended to take.
In its administrative resolution fining the company, the Vice-
Ministry notes that, according to Bolivia's environmental regula-
tions, "those responsible for economic activities that cause envi-
ronmental damages are responsible for the reparation and com-
pensation of the same. '"282 Yet, the fact that the company was
legally responsible for repairing and compensating the damage
does not explain why the government asked the company to de-
velop an Action Plan, rather than itself dictating the measures
that the company should take. On the contrary, given that the
company would be required to fund the cleanup and compensa-
tion programs, it had every incentive to limit their scope. More-
over, given that Transredes had already been admonished for its
failure to present the requested Action Plan, leaving to Trans-
277. See Administrative Resolution 011/01, supra note 262, at 22. The resolution
notes that the Action Plan should have also included details about the resources that
were required and available for the actions of containment, recovery and cleanup, pro-
gram of remediation and restoration, which were to be approved and controlled by the
Viceministry; because of the failure to present an Action Plan, the Viceministry was
never able to corroborate the expenses that the company incurred. Id. at 3.
278. Id. at 22.
279. Administrative Resolution 003/01, supra note 262.
280. Administrative Resolution 011/01, supra note 262, at 22.
281. Id. See also Reglamento General de Gesti6n Ambiental, supra note 262, art.
96(g). See also Law of the Environment, supra note 58, art. 97 (providing that the gov-
ernment will dictate necessary measures to correct irregularities that are found through
inspections, will notify the interested party, and grant an adequate term to correct the
irregularities).
282. Administrative Resolution 011/01, supra note 262, at 22.
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redes the development of a response to the spill seems problem-
atic. Finally, even this limited and indirect enforcement effort
was made well after it had any chance to be effective. Indeed,
the Vice-Ministry first admonished Transredes for a failure to
present an Action Plan only after an entire year had passed since
it had demanded the Plan and after most of the cleanup and
compensation processes had been completed.
For its part, Transredes claims that it did present an Action
Plan, in the form of the "Intermediate Report of the Contin-
gency Plan of the Cleanup and Monitoring Work - Oil Spill in
the Desaguadero River Contingency" or "Informe Intermedio
del Plan de Contingencia de los Trabajos de Limpieza y
Monitoreo - Contingencia Derrame en el Rio Desaguadero"
(the "Intermediate Report").28 According to the company, this
Intermediate Report, while not specifically named "Action Plan,"
fully satisfied the government's demand. Indeed, every page of
the Intermediate Report bears the footnoted title "Oil Spill in
the Desaguadero River: Action Plan. ' 284 Nonetheless, the re-
port is only twenty pages long, (not including annexes consisting
primarily of results of various studies,) and is of a very general
nature; thus, it is questionable whether this report satisfied the
relevant legal requirements. 28 5
(3) The Superintendency of Hydrocarbons' Fine
On August 3, 2000, the Superintendency of Hydrocarbons
issued an administrative resolution fining Transredes 710,000
bolivianos, (approximately U.S. $100,000), the maximum sum al-
lowable by law, for failing to maintain the pipeline over the Desa-
guadero and thereby causing the oil spill.28 6 Although the
amount of the fine was small, Transredes has appealed the reso-
lution to the Bolivian Supreme Court after exhausting all admin-
istrative appeals.28 7
283. See Transredes Appeal, supra note 262, at 9 et seq.
284. See generally Transredes, Contingencia Derrarne en la Cuenca del Desagua-
dero: Informe Intermedio del Plan de Contingencia de los Trabajos de Limpieza y
Monitoreo (Feb. 2000).
285. See id.
286. See Superintendencia de Hidrocarburos, Resolucion Administrativa No. 257/
2000, at 36 (Aug. 3, 2000).
287. Transredes first appealed within the Superintendency of Hydrocarbons, and
then to the General Superintendent overseeing all Superintendencies. Transredes lost
the first appeal. See Superintendencia de Hidrocarburos, Resolucion Administrativa
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(4) The Failure to Initiate Criminal Proceedings
As previously noted, Bolivian law requires that, once a viola-
tion of the Law of the Environment is reported, the Vice-Minis-
try of the Environment conduct an inspection of the site of the
violation, and shortly thereafter make a determination of
whether the violation constitutes an environmental crime or
merely an administrative infraction. If the violation constitutes
an environmental crime, the Vice-Ministry is required to submit
its information to the Public Ministry for the initiation of a crimi-
nal proceeding.
Although the oil spill seems to fit within the language of
several environmental crimes specified in the Law of the Envi-
ronment,288 the Vice-Ministry never submitted its information to
the Public Ministry, and no criminal proceeding was ever initi-
ated. Patricia Garcia, a legal advisor to the Ministry of Sustaina-
ble Development, explained that the Vice-Ministry faced two ob-
stacles to starting a criminal proceeding: first, the lack of suffi-
cient information about the spill's impact, and second, the lack
of clearly established levels of permissible contamination in the
applicable regulations. 2 9 Even after the conclusion of the audit,
the Vice-Ministry felt that it did not have enough evidence of
contamination of waters to proceed with a criminal case.29 °
No. 014/2001 (Jan. 15, 2001). The General Superintendency confirmed most of the
findings of the Superintendency of Hydrocarbons, and only overturned the fine, with
instructions that the Superintendency of Hydrocarbons justify the imposition of the
maximum fine; subsequently, the Superintendency of Hydrocarbons issued another res-
olution in which it imposed the fine once again and provided a detailed justification for
it. See Superintendencia de Hidrocarburos, Resolucion Administrativa No. 0061/2002
(Feb. 6, 2002). See also Letter from Guillermo Torres to the Crowley Program, supra
note 70 (Sept. 26, 2003). According to former Superintendent of Hydrocarbons Carlos
Miranda, the company challenged the fine because it has recovered money from its
insurance company for the expenses related to the spill on the grounds that the spill
was an accident, caused by force majeure; given that the fine implies that the company
was at fault, this may mean that the company will have to return some of its insurance
money. See Interview with Carlos Miranda, Ex-Superintendent, Hidrocarburos, in Bo-
livia (Feb. 2003).
288. See discussion supra note 241.
289. See Interview with Patricia Garcia, supra note 14. The limits to Articles 105
and 107 of the Law of the Environment were established one year later, through an
amendment to the Environmental Regulations for the Hydrocarbons Sector, in Su-
preme Decree No. 26171 (May 4, 2001).
290. See Interview with Patricia Garcia, supra note 14.
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B. Human Rights Issues
The oil spill in the Desaguadero presents several potential
human rights violations by the Bolivian government, including
violations of the right to water, the right to health, and several
rights pertaining to indigenous peoples. With regard to each of
these possible violations, this section analyzes the responsibility
of both the State and the company under international human
rights standards. Although the section discusses the rights sepa-
rately, a general point should be noted at the outset: determin-
ing whether ESC rights have been violated and by whom is prob-
lematic in that international law defines the rights very broadly
and without specifying clear standards of care. Ultimately, we
conclude that the government bears responsibility for compro-
mising the enjoyment of these rights; however, the analysis em-
phasizes the ambiguity of the duties of the parties under interna-
tional human rights law.
Notwithstanding the vagueness of the substantive standards,
international human rights law does provide a procedural stan-
dard that is quite useful in this case: international law requires
States to establish effective remedies for human rights violations,
including violations of economic, social and cultural rights. This
case is an excellent example of a State failure to provide effective
remedies for violations (or, in any case, arguable violations) of
ESC rights.
1. Substantive Rights
a. The Right to Water
The obligations of the Bolivian State with regard to the
right to water can be inferred from its ratification of human
rights treaties, such as the ICESCR, that guarantee rights the ful-
fillment of which is impossible without water. Thus, a right to
water is implicit in several recognized human rights, including,
among others, the right to life,29 1 the right to health,29 2 the right
291. Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinaf-
ter "ICCPR"), to which Bolivia has acceded, provides: "Every human being has the
inherent right to life." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6, Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 361 [hereinafter ICCPR]. While this Article has
generally been interpreted as prohibiting States from arbitrarily depriving anyone of
life, recent trends have shifted towards requiring States to take positive measures to
ensure the right to life. See Stephen McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and
International Implications, 5 GEO. INT'L ENvrL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1992) (quoting Human
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to an adequate standard of living,293 and the right to adequate
food. 29 4 There is also an argument that the right to water exists
Rights Committee member Rosalyn Higgins, as stating that "under the right to life...
States are under the duty 'to pursue policies which are designed to ensure access to the
means of survival' for all individuals and all peoples.'"). The Human Rights Commit-
tee, established by the ICCPR, has recommended that under Article 6, States should
take measures to promote human security by reducing infant mortality and increasing
life expectancy, particularly by eradicating malnutrition and epidemics. Id. The right
to drinking water has been recognized as "an essential component of the right to life."
See Preliminary Report on the Relationship between the enjoyment of economic, so-
cial, and cultural rights and the promotion of the realization of the right to drinking
water supply and sanitation, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 4, art. 42, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4Sub.2/2002/10 (2002) [hereinafter Guisse Report].
292. Article 12 of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights ("ICESCR"), to which Bolivia has acceded, provides that States Parties "recognize
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical
and mental health." See ICESCR, supra note 17, art. 12(1), 6 I.L.M. at 363. In its Gen-
eral Comment on the right to health, the United Nations Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, interpreted that right as including not only timely and ap-
propriate health care, but also factors that are necessary for good health, including
access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation. See ESCR Committee, General
Comment No. 14, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, art. 4, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) [hereinafter General Comment No. 14]. In addition, the
Protocol of San Salvador, which Bolivia has signed though not yet ratified, contains a
right to health, understood to mean "the enjoyment of the highest level of physical,
mental and social well-being." Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 17, art. 10(1), 28
I.L.M. at 164. Furthermore, Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(1989), to which Bolivia is a party, states that children are entitled to achieve the high-
est attainable standard of health, which requires States to take appropriate measures to
eliminate disease and malnutrition, and to provide adequate nutritious foods and clean
drinking water. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 24(1), 24(2)(c), G.A. Res.
44/25, ann., 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 45, at 167 (1989) (entered into force Sept. 2,
1990).
293. Article 11 of the ICESCR requires States to "recognize the right of everyone
to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food,
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions."
ICESCR, supra note 17, art. 11, 6 I.L.M. at 363. While there is no specific mention of
water, it can be inferred that an adequate standard of living can not be achieved with-
out a sufficient water supply. See, e.g., Guisse Report, supra note 291 ("Water is essential
to life.") Furthermore, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women [hereinafter CEDAW], to which Bolivia is a party, requires States
to ensure that women enjoy the right to adequate living conditions, particularly in rela-
tion to housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply. CEDAW, supra note 17, art. 14,
19 I.L.M. at 40-41.
294. The right to adequate food is recognized indirectly in the right to an ade-
quate standard of living and also independently in the Protocol of San Salvador, which
states that everyone has the right to "adequate nutrition which guarantees the possibil-
ity of enjoying the highest level of physical, emotional and intellectual development."
Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 17, art. 12, 28 I.L.M. at 165. A report submitted to
the Commission on Human Rights by Special RapporteurJean Ziegler on the right to
food provides that "the key element of water must also be a fundamental element of the
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as a matter of customary international law.295
Very recently, the ESCR Committee issued a General Com-
ment on the Right to Water 29 6 ("General Comment 15") that
recognizes water as an independent right under Articles 11 and
12 of the ICESCR and provides substantial guidance on what the
right to water entails.297 General Comment 15 defines the right
to water broadly, requiring it to be accessible, affordable, safe,
adequate for a life of dignity, and provided without discrimina-
tion. 29 8  As an immediate measure, General Comment 15 re-
quires States to ensure that people have access to the minimum
right to food." Report by the Special Rapporteur Jean Ziegler on the right to food,
Commission on Human Rights, 59th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
2003/54 (2003).
295. A variety of sources indicate that a right to water is universally recognized.
These include international human rights law documents that expressly or implicitly
recognize the right, the recognition of the right to water in numerous international
fora and agreements, and the opinion of experts, including the U.N. Special Rap-
porteur on water rights for the U.N. Subcommission on the Protection and Promotion
of Human Rights. See Guisse Report, supra note 291. See also World Health Organiza-
tion, The Right to Water, ch. 1, available at http://www.who.int/water-sanitation-health/
righttowater/en/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2004). Furthermore, most States have engaged
in a consistent practice of taking measures to ensure water provision for their citizens,
thereby satisfying the requirement that a customary law be evidenced by the general
practice of States. Finally, it could be argued that States are motivated by the belief that
States have a legal obligation to ensure access to clean and affordable water for its
inhabitants, as suggested by the fact that numerous world conferences and summits
have recognized water as a human right, not merely a need. See, e.g., Mar del Plata
Action Plan, adopted in 1977 during a UN Conference on Water; Agenda 21, adopted
in the UN Conference on Environment and Development (1991), which provides that
"all peoples . . .have the right to have access to drinking water in quantities and of a
quality equal to their basic needs"; and the Global Water Contract in 1998, which
stressed the individual right to water and the participation by citizens in achieving this
right. Nonetheless, the argument loses some of its force in the face of contrary state-
ments emerging from other international conferences and meetings. See, e.g., The
Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, Principle No. 4 (providing
that "[w]ater has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized
as an economic good").
296. ESCR Committee, General Comment No. 15, The Right to Water (arts. 11
and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights), U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (29th Sess. 2002) [hereinafter General Comment 15].
297. As previously noted, general comments by the ESCR Committee are non-
binding documents. However, they are used by the Committee to flesh out the norma-
tive content of the ICESCR rights, set benchmarks, devise accountability mechanisms,
provide means for vindication to aggrieved people, and hold States accountable inter-
nationally through the examination of reports. HENRYJ. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, IN-
TERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAw, POLITICS, MORALS: TEXT AND MATERI-
ALS 305-06 (2d ed. 2000).
298. General Comment 15, supra note 296.
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level of water required for personal and domestic uses, including
drinking, sanitation, washing clothes, cooking and personal and
household hygiene. 99 States must ensure that water is provided
in a non-discriminatory manner, and pay special attention to the
needs of poor and vulnerable groups, such as children, women
and indigenous peoples.3 °° Other obligations can be progres-
sively realized based on the State's resources. The goal is for the
State to move quickly and effectively towards a full realization of
the right to water. °1 States must also ensure that the manner of
the realization to the right to water is sustainable, in order to
preserve the right for present and future generations.0 2
State obligations regarding the right to water fall into three
categories: to respect, protect and fulfill.30 3 The duty to respect
requires a State to ensure that the activities of its institutions,
agencies and representatives do not interfere with people's ac-
cess to water, including their customary and traditional arrange-
ments for water allocation. 30 4 The duty to protect requires States
to take measures to ensure that the right to water is not inter-
fered with by a third party, including legislative measures and
the establishment of regulatory systems.3 05 The duty to fulfill re-
quires States to facilitate people's enjoyment of the right to
water, promote the right through education on water issues, and
provide the right to people who are otherwise unable to realize it
themselves.30 6 The General Comment also emphasizes the prin-
cipal of non-retrogression, whereby governments are prohibited
from going back on any measures they have already taken to pro-
vide water.30 7
The communities in the vicinity of the Desaguadero River
have long suffered neglect in the provision of water services. For
the most part, they have no connections to water services and
cannot afford to purchase water from other sources, so they de-
pend on the Desaguadero for all of their water. The water in the
Desaguadero is of questionable quality, probably unsafe to drink
299. See id. arts. 12-13.
300. See id. arts. 6-7.
301. See id. art. 18.
302. See id. art. 75.
303. See id. art. 209.
304. See id. art. 21.
305. See id. art. 23.
306. See id. art. 2510.
307. See id. arts. 19, 428.
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due to contamination. Thus, there is an ongoing failure of the
government to make any effort to fulfill the right to water of the
people in these communities. That said, the oil spill in the Desa-
guadero made it impossible for the people who depend on the
Desaguadero's water to use it for any purpose.
The critical question is whether and at what point the gov-
ernment violated the communities' right to water. Although it is
clear that the government had an obligation to protect the com-
munities' right to water, the difficulty arises because interna-
tional human rights law does not specify a standard of care with
respect to the right. At one extreme, one could argue that any
act or omission that results in an interference with someone's
enjoyment of the right to water is a violation of the right. Under
this standard, the fact of the spill alone would establish that the
government (through a failure to protect the right) is responsi-
ble for violating the right to water. Yet, imposing a strict liability
standard for the violation of the right to water would have the
paradoxical and, in our view, undesirable effect of treating as
violations of international human rights some acts or omissions
that might not give rise to liability under ordinary tort standards.
Applying the higher standard of negligence, the Bolivian
government is nevertheless responsible for violating the right to
water in this case. Although the State made some effort to en-
force legislation forbidding pollution of water resources, its en-
forcement effort and the legislation itself were so inadequate as
to constitute a breach of the State's duty to protect the right to
water. For example, according to the Vice-Ministry of Environ-
ment, although the pipeline was over a decade past its useful life,
the government failed to order the company to take special mea-
sures to replace the pipeline or continuously maintain it pend-
ing its replacement. Moreover, the Vice-Ministry of Environ-
ment should have noted and corrected the absence in Trans-
redes' environmental manifest of any reference to the fact that
its pipeline went over the Desaguadero, or to measures that
could prevent or mitigate a spill in the Desaguadero. The system
of bureaucratic oversight established by Bolivian law relied en-
tirely on the self-reporting of corporations. Whether such a sys-
tem could ideally function effectively enough to protect the
rights at stake is questionable. The Bolivian government's fail-
ure to enforce even this weak scheme rendered it entirely inef-
fective.
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b. The Right to Health
A number of international treaties to which Bolivia is a
party308 recognize the right to health. The International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes "the
right of everyone "to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health."3 °9 Additionally, the
right to health is recognized, inter alia, in the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion,31 ° the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women,31' the Convention on the Rights of
the Child,3 12 and in several regional human rights treaties, in-
cluding the Protocol of San Salvador.313
As described by the ESCR Committee, the right to health
encompasses more than access to health care; rather, "article
12.2 acknowledge[s] that the right to health embraces a wide
range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in
which people can lead a healthy life, and extends to the underly-
ing determinants of health, such as food and nutrition, housing,
access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, safe
and healthy working conditions, and a healthy environment. "314
Of relevance to the oil spill case, the Committee has noted that:
Violations of the obligation to protect follow from the failure
of a State to take all necessary measures to safeguard persons
within their jurisdiction from infringements of the right to
health by third parties. This category includes such omissions
as the failure to regulate the activities of individuals, groups
or corporations so as to prevent them from violating the right
308. Bolivia is a party to, among other treaties, the ICESCR (ratified Nov. 1982),
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ratified Oct.
1970), CEDAW (ratified July 1990), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(ratified July 1990). As previously noted, it has signed but not yet ratified the Protocol
of San Salvador.
309. ICESCR, supra note 17, art. 12, 6 I.L.M. at 363.
310. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, article 5 (e) (iv), Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
311. CEDAW, supra note 17, arts. 11.1 (f), and 12, 19 I.L.M. at 39-40.
312. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 292, art. 24.
313. Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 17, art. 10, 28 I.L.M. 164. See also Euro-
pean Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (entered into force Feb. 26, 1965)
of 1961 as revised, (art. 11); the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) art.
16.
314. General Comment No. 14, supra note 292, para. 4.
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to health of others... and the failure to enact or enforce laws
to prevent the pollution of water, air and soil by extractive
and manufacturing industries. 15
Thus, the Committee draws a clear connection between State re-
sponsibility and the actions of third parties such as corporations.
As with the right to water, the spill affected the community
members' enjoyment of the right to health. First, the Environ-
mental Audit notes some evidence of direct effects on the com-
munity members' health. Second, the spill deprived the com-
munity members of the conditions for leading a healthy life, in-
cluding access to safe and potable water and a healthy
environment.
Assuming that the link between the spill and negative effects
on health can be established, the failure to effectively monitor
Transredes' activities constitutes a failure to protect the right to
health. And the government's failure to intervene following the
spill to minimize the negative consequences to health also vio-
lated the right.
c. The Rights of Indigenous Peoples
The rights of indigenous peoples are explicitly protected
through several international treaties, the most comprehensive
of which is International Labor Organization Convention No.
169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, which has been
incorporated into Bolivian Law.3 16 Additional important docu-
ments are the United Nations' Draft Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (the "Draft Declaration") ,317 and the Pro-
posed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples. 18 Neither is binding, but both are useful guides to the in-
terpretation of indigenous peoples' rights.
319
315. Id. at para. 51.
316. See Law 1257 (July 11, 1991).
317. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/
2/Add.1 (1994) [hereinafter Draft Declaration].
318. Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Ap-
proved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on February 26, 1997, at
its 1333rd session, 95th Regular Session), OEA/Ser/L/V/.II.95 Doc.6 (1997).
319. Awaiting adoption by the United Nations, the provisions of the Draft Declara-
tion are not yet binding on the States. Nevertheless, the Draft offers persuasive force
and signals the current trend towards international protection of indigenous peoples'
rights. Although the Draft Declaration has yet to be adopted by the Organization of
American States ("OAS"), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights previously
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ILO No. 169 applies to:
[T] ribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cul-
tural and economic conditions distinguish them from other
sections of the national community, and whose status is regu-
lated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or
by special laws or regulations;
[P]eoples in independent countries who are regarded as in-
digenous on account of their descent from the populations
which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to
which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or coloni-
zation or the establishment of present State boundaries and
who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of
their own social, economic, cultural and political institu-
tions. 3
20
A fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which
ILO No. 169 applies is the self-identification of the groups as
indigenous or tribal.12 ' As previously noted, according to offi-
cials at Bolivia's Vice-Ministry for Indigenous Affairs, the Aymara
and Quechua-speaking communities near the Desaguadero do
not qualify as indigenous groups because they identify as peas-
ants, rather than as indigenous peoples. However, the Uru
Moratos, at least, do self-identify as indigenous groups and are
considered to be such by the Bolivian government. Therefore,
without prejudice to the question of whether the Aymaras and
rejected the argument for barring interpretation of the American Declaration in light
of the Draft Declaration. Regarding the Draft Declaration in particular, the Commis-
sion noted that:
[w]hile [Article XVIII], like the remainder of the Draft Declaration, has not
yet been approved by the OAS General Assembly and therefore does not in
itself have the effect of a final Declaration, the Commission considers that the
basic principles reflected in many of the provisions of the Declaration, includ-
ing aspects of Article XVIII, reflect general international legal principles devel-
oping out of and applicable inside and outside of the inter-American system
and to this extent are properly considered in interpreting and applying the
provisions of the American Declaration in the context of indigenous peoples.
Draft Declaration, supra note 317.
Although the Commission confined its application of the Draft Declaration to the
interpretation of the American Declaration, the argument for interpreting Petitioners'
complaints in light of ongoing developments in international human rights law finds
force with respect to other international instruments as well. In addition, several other
treaties not specific to indigenous peoples contain provisions implicating the rights of
indigenous peoples.
320. Draft Declaration, supra note 317.
321. ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 17, art. 1, 28 I.L.M. at 1384-85.
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Quechuas do or do not qualify as indigenous, the following anal-
ysis will focus on the Uru Moratos' rights as indigenous peoples.
In addition to all the human rights previously discussed in
this section, international law provides for various rights that spe-
cifically pertain to indigenous peoples. Of these rights, the most
relevant to this case are the right to property, the right to cul-
tural integrity, and the right to environmental protection.
Transnational instruments generously protect the rights of indig-
enous groups to property, including the right to develop, use
and enjoy their lands.322 ILO No. 169 requires both recognition
and affirmative enforcement of property rights: Article 14(1)
states that "[lt] he rights of ... [indigenous] peoples ... over the
lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognized; '3 23
and Article 14(2) states that "[g]overnments shall take steps as
necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned tra-
ditionally occupy and to guarantee effective protection of their
rights of ownership and possession."324 In addition, Article 18 of
ILO No. 169 states that "[a]dequate penalties shall be estab-
lished by law for unauthorized intrusion upon, or use of, the
lands of the peoples concerned, and governments shall take
measures to prevent such offences."3 25
ILO No. 169 establishes that governments are responsible
for "promoting the full realization of the social, economic and
322. Draft Declaration, supra note 317, arts. 10, 26, 27, 28, 30; ILO Convention
No. 169, supra note 17, arts. 13-19, 28 I.L.M. at 1387-88; American Convention on
Human Rights supra note 17, ratifiedJune 20, 1979, art. 21, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.
Treaty Series No. 36; American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 13,
O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965) [hereinafter
American Declaration]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 17, G.A. Res. 217
A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 5(a) (v), June 7, 1966, Sept. 22,
1970, art. 5(a) (v), 660 U.N.T.S. 195. [hereinafter ICERD]; Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XXIII (51) Concerning Indig-
enous Peoples, para. 5, CERD/C/51/Misc.13/Rev.4 (1997); Copenhagen Declaration
on Social Development and Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social De-
velopment, Annex II: Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social Develop-
ment Content, Chapter II: Eradication of Poverty, para. B(32), U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.166/9/Annex II (1995), available at gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/un-
confs/wssd/summit/off/a-9.en; Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable De-
velopment, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development Statement of Principles,
Principle 26.4(b), U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26
(1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21].
323. ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 17, art. 14(1).
324. Id. art. 14(2).
325. Id. art. 18.
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cultural rights of these peoples with respect for their social and
cultural identity, their customs and traditions and their institu-
tions. In applying the provisions of the Convention, "the so
cial, cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices of these
peoples shall be recognized and protected."3 27 In addition, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has found that
States have an obligation under the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man to protect indigenous peoples' cul-
tural integrity.328 The United Nations Human Rights Commit-
tee has stated that "culture manifests itself in many forms, in-
cluding a particular way of life associated with the use of land
and resources, specially in the case of indigenous peoples. 3 29
Finally, article 7(4) of ILO No. 169 instructs States to "take
measures, in cooperation with the peoples concerned, to protect
and preserve the environment of the territories [indigenous
peoples] inhabit." The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights has stated that "the protection of the rights of indigenous
individuals and communities affected by oil and other develop-
ment activities requires that adequate protective measures be
put in place before damage has been suffered. 331
According to the community members we interviewed, the
oil spilled by Transredes reached portions of territory tradition-
ally inhabited by the Uru Moratos. If so, the oil spill was an "un-
authorized intrusion upon ... the lands of [indigenous] peo-
ples" which the government was required to take measures to
prevent. Insofar as the Uru Moratos' cultural practices are inti-
mately associated with the water and plant and animal life in the
Desaguadero River system, the oil spill directly threatened their
distinct culture. In the end, the government's near complete
326. Id. art. 2(b).
327. Id. art. 5(a).
328. Danns' case, Report No. 75/02, Case No. 11.140 Mary and Carrie Dann, para.
131, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (2002)
329. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23(50), para. 7.
330. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ecuador, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.96 (1997). See also Report on Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Indige-
nous People and their relationship to land (1999), the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities; The Yanomami Case, Case 7615 (Bra-
zil), Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1, at 24, 31 (1985); The Miskito
Case, Case 7964 (Nicaragua), Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/VII.62, doc. 10 rev. 3
(1983) (discussing just compensation for destroying indigenous property); Study on In-
digenous Land Rights, UN Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities, Resolution 1997/10.
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failure to intervene to protect the interests of the highly vulnera-
ble population of Uru Moratos from the direct impact of the
spill and, more importantly, in the negotiation process with
Transredes, constitutes a breach of its obligations to indigenous
populations under ILO No. 169.
2. Transredes' Obligations as a Private Actor
For the most part, human rights law addresses the activity of
private actors only indirectly by imposing obligations on States to
regulate their conduct. Thus, the actions of Transredes raise
human rights concerns in that they triggered obligations on the
part of Bolivia to prevent or respond to the crisis. The recent
approval of the Draft Norms for TNCs, however, raises the possi-
bility of holding TNCs directly responsible for violations of
human rights. Although these Norms were not binding on
Transredes at the time, we consider in this subsection how the
Draft Norms would apply to the facts in this case in order to
illustrate the importance of the Norms in addressing TNC con-
duct.
The Draft Norms for TNCs provide that "within their re-
spective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corpora-
tions and other business enterprises have the obligation to pro-
mote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of, and
protect human rights recognized in international as well as na-
tional law."3" 1 Among other obligations, the Draft Norms for
TNCs provide that "[t] ransnational corporations and other busi-
ness enterprises shall respect civil, cultural, economic, political,
and social rights, and contribute to their realization, in particu-
lar the rights to... adequate food and drinking water; and re-
frain from actions which obstruct or impede the realization of
those rights. 33 2
Under this standard, Transredes' act of knowingly pumping
oil through a pipeline that was off its supports, despite the dan-
ger of a spill, could be considered negligent or even reckless
with respect to the right to water. Even if the initial spilling of
oil was not negligent, Transredes' failure to detect and contain
the spill in a timely way and to act quickly and effectively to mini-
mize its impact would seem to satisfy a negligence standard of
331. Draft Norms for TNCs, supra note 29, art. 1.
332. Id. art. 12.
NO RECOURSE
liability. Moreover, to the extent that Transredes' failure to in-
clude a plan for the region in its Environmental Manifest as re-
quired by Bolivian law contributed to its ineffective response, it
might be responsible under a negligence per se standard.
With respect to the right to health, the Draft Norms for
TNCs state that "[t] ransnational corporations and other business
enterprises shall respect civil, cultural, economic, political, and
social rights, and contribute to their realization, in particular the
rights to . . . the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health; and refrain from actions which obstruct or im-
pede the realization of those rights.111 3 As previously noted, as-
suming a standard of ordinary negligence, Transredes' failure
either to repair the pipeline or discontinue the pumping of oil
could warrant a finding of negligence with respect to the spill.
In addition, to the extent that Transredes' cleanup efforts were
inadequate, the company failed to minimize the health conse-
quences to the population. Even more troubling are reports
that Transredes actively misled the affected communities as to
the risks to health presented by the spill. If true, these reports
suggest an intentional tort rather than negligence.
Yet, establishing a violation of the right to health in this case
presents an evidentiary obstacle: because of the lack of specific
demographic information regarding the baseline health of the
affected communities, the actual impact of the spill is difficult to
measure. This is especially true as to long term health conse-
quences of the contamination. The widespread contamination
of the river by mining in the region further complicates the issue
of causation. In view of these problems, and despite the fact that
Transredes' negligence put at risk the health of the members of the com-
munity, we cannot state conclusively that Transredes would be in
violation of its obligations under the Draft Norms to protect the
right to health.
Although the Draft Norms for TNCs do not specifically ad-
dress TNCs' obligations with regard to indigenous peoples, they
do provide that TNCs are generally obligated to respect eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights. 34 Thus, TNCs are obliged to
respect indigenous peoples' rights as elaborated in ILO No. 169,
as part of this general obligation. Assuming that the relevant
333. Id.
334. Id.
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standard with respect to the rights of indigenous peoples is neg-
ligence under the Draft Norms and ILO No. 169, Transredes
would be in violation of the Uru Moratos' rights to property, to a
healthy environment, and to cultural integrity, according to the
same argument elaborated above regarding State responsibility.
3. Procedural Rights: The Right to Effective Remedies
As noted in the last subsection, the facts surrounding the oil
spill present several potential violations of substantive human
rights. However, primarily as a result of the incomplete elabora-
tion of the relevant human rights standards, establishing the ex-
istence of a violation is difficult.
Nonetheless, one fact that does stand out about the oil spill
is the government's near-complete failure to intervene in the re-
sponse to the crisis, essentially allowing Transredes to make all
the key decisions about clean-up, emergency relief, and compen-
sation proceedings. The government's abandonment of the af-
fected communities is itself a human rights violation: the failure
to provide effective remedies as required by international law.
An essential obligation of States with regard to the protec-
tion of human rights is that of creating effective remedies for
violations of those rights. 35 As an initial matter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights provides that "[e]veryone has the
right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the con-
stitution or by law." '3 6 The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR") specifically states that governments
are required to provide effective remedies for violations of the
rights contained therein: States Parties undertake "[t]o ensure
that any person whose rights or freedoms... are violated shall
have an effective remedy. . .; [t]o ensure that any person claim-
ing such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by
competentjudicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by
any other competent authority provided for by the legal system
of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
[and t]o ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce
335. Id.
336. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 8, Dec. 10, 1948, UDHR, art. 8,
G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Pt. 1, Resolutions, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)
[hereinafter UDHR].
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such remedies when granted. 3 37
The American Convention on Human Rights also provides
specifically for a right to judicial protection, which requires
States Parties to create courts or tribunals to which individuals
can have recourse for protection of the rights, including ESC
rights, contained within the Convention.33 8  In addition, the
American Convention requires States to provide a fair hearing,
not only in criminal proceedings, but also "for the determina-
tion of... rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any
other nature."3 3 9 Of significance to this case, the Inter-American
Court has also found that Article 1, which requires States to
guarantee the full and free exercise of rights, entails obligations
of due diligence with respect to violations of Convention rights:
The second obligation of the States Parties is to "ensure" the
free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Conven-
tion to every person subject to its jurisdiction. This obligation
implies the duty of the States Parties to organize the govern-
mental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through
which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of
juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human
rights. As a consequence of this obligation, the States must
prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized
by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore
the right violated and provide compensation as warranted for
337. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 2(3).
338. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 17, art. 25(1) and (2).
The Convention provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effec-
tive recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that
violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the
state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have
been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties, to
develop the possibilities ofjudicial remedy; and to ensure that the competent
authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.
Id.
339. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 17, art. 8(1). The
Inter-American Court has commented that:
Under the Convention, States Parties have an obligation to provide effective
judicial remedies to victims of human rights violations (Art. 25), remedies that
must be substantiated in accordance with the rules of due process of law (Art.
8(1)), all in keeping with the general obligation of such States to guarantee
the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention to all
persons subject to their jurisdiction (Art. 1).
See Velasquez Rodriguez Case (Preliminary Exceptions), (1987) 1 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) para. 91.
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damages resulting from the violation. 4 '
Although the ICESCR does not specifically list a right to effective
remedies for violations of ESC rights, there are strong arguments
supporting the view that this right is implied, at least where the
rights at issue are justiciable. Under the ICESCR, each State
Party undertakes "to take steps... to the maximum of its availa-
ble resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full reali-
zation of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legis-
lative measures." '' As noted by the ESCR Committee, the
phrase "all appropriate means" in this article of the ICESCR im-
plies that States parties must not only legislate, but also imple-
ment other measures to protect ESC rights. Thus, "among the
measures which might be considered appropriate, in addition to
legislation, is the provision of judicial remedies with respect to
rights which may, in accordance with the national legal system,
be considered justiciable"342 and "[o] ther measures which may
also be considered 'appropriate' . . . .include, but are not lim-
ited to, administrative, financial, educational and social mea-
sures."
343
In addition, the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights ("Maastricht Guidelines") ex-
plain that "[v]iolations of economic, social and cultural rights
can occur through the direct action of States or other entities
340. See Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 4 (1988).
341. ICESCR, supra note 17, art. 2, 6 I.L.M. at 361.
342. Id. art. 5. On the question of justiciability of ESC rights, the Committee has
stated:
It is sometimes suggested that matters involving the allocation of resources
should be left to the political authorities rather than the courts. While the
respective competences of the various branches of government must be
respected, it is appropriate to acknowledge that courts are generally already
involved in a considerable range of matters which have important resource
implications. The adoption of a rigid classification of economic, social and
cultural rights which puts them, by definition, beyond the reach of the courts
would thus be arbitrary and incompatible with the principle that the two sets
of human rights are indivisible and interdependent. It would also drastically
curtail the capacity of the courts to protect the rights of the most vulnerable
and disadvantaged groups in society.
Id.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 9: The
Domestic Application of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24 (1998), art. 10.
343. Id. art. 7.
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insufficiently regulated by States. ''344 Thus, States have a respon-
sibility, pursuant to their obligation to protect ESC rights, "to
ensure that private entities or individuals, including transna-
tional corporations over which they exercise jurisdiction, do not
deprive individuals of their economic, social and cultural
rights. '3 45 Such deprivations "are in principle imputable to the
State within whose jurisdiction they occur. As a consequence, the
State responsible must establish mechanisms to correct such viola-
tions, including monitoring, investigation, prosecution, and remedies for
victims."34 6 The Maastricht Guidelines specifically state that
"[a] ny person or group who is a victim of a violation of an eco-
nomic, social or cultural right should have access to effective ju-
dicial or other appropriate remedies at both national and inter-
national levels." '347 And "[a]ll victims of violations of economic,
social and cultural rights are entitled to adequate reparation,
which may take the form of restitution, compensation, rehabili-
tation and satisfaction or guarantees of non-repetition. 3 48
Various international declarations and instruments also es-
tablish that particular ESC rights potentially violated in the oil
spill entail a right to effective remedies. For example, the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides that
"[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to .. .effective remedies
for all infringements of their individual and collective rights" 4 '
Similarly, the Committee on ESCR has stated that "[a] ny persons
or groups who have been denied their right to water should have
access to effective judicial or other appropriate remedies at both
national and international levels... All victims of violations of
the right to water should be entitled to adequate reparation, in-
cluding restitution, compensation, satisfaction or guarantees of
non-repetition. '  In addition, the Committee has taken the
view that "[a] ny person or group victim of a violation of the right
to health should have access to effective judicial or other appro-
priate remedies at both national and international levels."351
344. Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
para. 14, Maastricht, The Netherlands, Jan. 22-26, 1997.
345. Id. at para. 18.
346. Id. at para. 16 (emphasis added).
347. Id. at para. 22.
348. Id. at para. 23.
349. Draft Declaration, supra note 317, at para. 30.
350. General Comment 15, supra note 296, art. 55.
351. General Comment 14, supra note 292, at para. 59.
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In the case of the Transredes oil spill, there is a strong argu-
ment that the Bolivian government failed to provide effective
remedies for Transredes' violations of the community members'
rights to water and health, as well as the rights of indigenous
peoples. Although determining conclusively whether there was
a violation of these substantive rights is difficult, the right to ef-
fective remedies should apply whenever there is a colorable
claim of a human rights violation; indeed, the point of providing
mechanisms for investigation, adjudication, and reparation is to
determine whether violations have occurred. This case raised se-
rious human rights concerns that merited a government re-
sponse; thus, the right to effective remedies was triggered.
The right to effective remedies requires, among other
things, that the government provide effective judicial remedies
for violations of justiciable rights. In this case, several of the
rights were justiciable - indeed, Bolivian law allows for civil suits
for damages resulting from contamination of water sources.
However, although it was theoretically possible for affected indi-
viduals to sue Transredes or the government for a remedy, in
fact there were significant barriers to successful pursuit of a civil
suit, including the high costs of a lawsuit, difficulties in obtaining
counsel, and perceived lack of impartiality of the judiciary.
Thus, there are institutional problems in Bolivia's judicial system
that limit all Bolivians' access to effective judicial remedies for
human rights violations. These institutional problems have a
particularly negative impact on poor people's ability to access
justice because they cannot afford the costs of legal action. In-
deed, several of the community members we interviewed sug-
gested that the costs of suing and their perception that the judi-
cial system would favor the company were significant deterrents
to suit. Moreover, delays in legal proceedings are a further ob-
stacle to poor people's accessing the judicial system. For exam-
ple, the civil lawsuit filed by the Chuquifia community against
Transredes was still in a jurisdictional phase nearly two years af-
ter its filing. Given the economic need of the community, the
slowness of the process provided a strong incentive to settle.
The right to effective remedies encompasses more than ju-
dicial remedies. As noted in the Maastricht Guidelines, States
are required to "establish mechanisms to correct such violations,
including monitoring, investigation, prosecution, and remedies
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for victims. '35 2 In the oil spill case, the Bolivian government did
very little to correct the violations; in fact, it appeared to have
few if any mechanisms in place to deal with the spill and its con-
sequences. To begin with, given the vulnerability of the victims,
it would have been appropriate for the government to advise the
victims of their rights and legal options; it would also have been
appropriate to have governmental legal experts (for example,
representatives from the ombudsman's office) supervise the pro-
cess by which Transredes and the communities reached settle-
ments. Similarly, the government should have taken a more ac-
tive role in ensuring that emergency assistance, including veteri-
nary and medical assistance, was provided in a prompt and
effective manner. Given that Transredes' medical and veterinary
experts had an incentive to minimize the health impacts of the
spill, the government should have sent its own doctors and veter-
inarians to treat the affected communities and their animals. Fi-
nally, given that the victims were not in a position to collect in-
formation about the spill's impact, and that the company could
not be impartial in its studies of the impact, the government
should have begun conducting studies of the spill's impact im-
mediately.
In fact, the government did none of these things. Aside
from making occasional demands that the company take certain
actions with regard to cleanup and emergency assistance, for
many months after the spill took place the government essen-
tially abdicated its responsibility to provide any remedy for the
harms caused by the spill. The government failed to provide le-
gal advice to the affected communities, thereby allowing Trans-
redes to take advantage of the community members' need and
ignorance by having them sign settlement agreements of ques-
tionable fairness. And the government took no major actions to
remedy the harms caused by the spill or to monitor the com-
pany's actions with respect to the spill. The government did not
even collect information about the spill's impact until many
months later. The Environmental Audit was the sole means by
which harms and appropriate remedies were determined, and its
effectiveness was curtailed due to the long delay in starting the
audit and the resulting lack of independent information about
the spill's impact.
352. Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 344, at para. 16.
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Because of all these failures, determining the true extent of
the damage that was caused by the oil spill and thus the ade-
quacy of the compensation is impossible. In short, the govern-
ment's inaction in this case constitutes a clear violation of the
affected community members' right to effective remedies for vio-
lations of their human rights.
C. Recommendations
To the Bolivian State:
1. Engage in continued monitoring of the environmental
effects of the spill, through the Vice-Ministry of Sus-
tainable Development, Ministry of Health, and Prefec-
ture of Oruro. Specifically, monitoring should in-
clude:
- Thorough and regular tests of soil, water, and plants,
in areas where citizens have alleged that oil is still pre-
sent. In particular, we recommend testing of the soil
on the shores of Lake Poopo, to determine the nature
of the oil-like substance there.
- Autopsies and veterinary studies of the animals that
the affected communities claim are still dying or ex-
periencing health problems as a result of the spill.
- Medical studies of the continuing effect of the spill
on community members along the Desaguadero.
This monitoring should be conducted indepen-
dently of Transredes, to ensure transparency and im-
partiality. The monitoring process should be con-
ducted in a public manner, open to input from the
local population, and responsive to their concerns.
2. Provide health care and veterinary care to persons and
animals whose health may have been affected by the
spill.
3. Conduct studies of the quality of water in the Desagua-
dero River to determine its suitability for human con-
sumption in accordance with international health stan-
dards. Should the water be found unsuitable for
human consumption, take immediate measures for the
continued provision of sufficient water of an adequate
quality to the communities along the Desaguadero.
4. The Vice-Ministry of Environment should conduct an
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internal review of its actions, both with respect to pre-
vention of the oil spill and the response to the spill.
The Vice-Ministry's failure to conduct an immediate
investigation of the impact of the spill should be a par-
ticular focus of the review. Following the review, the
Vice-Ministry or other appropriate agency should es-
tablish procedures and mechanisms that will correct
the underlying problems. The Bolivian State should
ensure that such procedures and mechanisms are
properly funded, and that the persons charged with
implementing them receive proper training.
5. The Vice-Ministry for Indigenous Affairs should con-
duct a study of the impact of the oil spill on the way of
life of the Uru Moratos, and determine whether addi-
tional remedial measures should be taken to restore
the Uru Moratos' cultural integrity.
6. The Vice-Ministry for Indigenous Affairs should con-
duct an internal review of its procedures, to evaluate
its failure to intervene in this case, and correct under-
lying problems.
7. The Bolivian legislature, the Superintendency of Hy-
drocarbons, and the Vice-Ministry for the Environ-
ment should conduct a review of administrative fines
for environmental disasters, to determine their value
as deterrents.
8. The administrative fines available to the Superinten-
dency of Hydrocarbons should be increased.
9. The national office of the Defensoria del Pueblo
(Ombudsman's office) should conduct a review of the
compensation agreements signed by the affected com-
munities, to determine their legality under Bolivian
law. It should also review the compensation process as
a whole, to:
- Determine why the affected communities received lit-
tle or no independent legal advice.
- Analyze economic and other impediments to the af-
fected communities' access to the judicial system.
- Evaluate and propose measures that can be taken to
provide legal advice to people in similar situations, and
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to eliminate economic barriers to vulnerable popula-
tions' access to the judicial system.
10. Study the judicial system's functioning in civil cases,
and take measures to identify and to correct problems.
In particular, the following issues require examination:
- Unwarranted delays.
- Bias and potential corruption in the judiciary.
- The lack of expertise of judges with respect to envi-
ronmental cases, and cases raising issues of economic,
social, and cultural rights.
11. Ratify the Protocol of San Salvador and incorporate it
into domestic law.
To Transredes:
1. Provide funding for the State's continued monitoring
of the spill's impact, and for any remedial actions that
may be required.
2. Review internal procedures for response to environ-
mental crises in light of the events of this case.
3. Conduct an internal review to determine what actions
the company could have taken to prevent the spill. In
particular, the decision to continue pumping oil
through the pipeline, despite the danger of a spill, re-
quires close scrutiny. Reform internal procedures and
policies on the basis of this assessment.
4. Replace portions of its pipelines that are past their use-
ful life.
5. Stop any efforts currently underway to sue the Envi-
ronmental Auditors.
6. Make a commitment voluntarily to abide by the Draft
Norms for TNCs.
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III. THE "WATER WAR"
The "water war" took place in the early months of 2000, fol-
lowing the privatization of the water system in Cochabamba, Bo-
livia, and the passage of a new water law. The privatization and
new water law resulted in large increases in rates for water ser-
vices and raised concerns among farmers and owners of private
wells, who had never before paid for the use of natural water
sources, that they would now be charged for water. For several
months protestors took to the streets, demanding that rate in-
creases be rolled back, that the new water law be repealed, and
that Aguas del Tunari, the company that took over the city's
water system, leave the country. Social unrest became so wide-
spread that the government declared a national state of emer-
gency, finally repealing the water law and telling Aguas del
Tunari that the government could no longer protect it.
Although various advocates have described the events lead-
ing to the Cochabamba water war as a deprivation of Cocha-
bamba's citizens' right to water, because of the lack of specificity
in the legal definition of the right, determining whether and
when the right was violated is difficult. Nevertheless, there is no
doubt that the processes by which Cochabamba's water system
was privatized and the new water law passed lacked transparency
and public participation. With regard to the privatization nego-
tiation, few opportunities for public input were available and the
government made no effort to communicate to the public the
nature of the deal with AdT. Finally, in order to ratify its deal
with AdT, the government succeeded in passing a new water law
in a hurried and deceptive manner, again undermining public
participation.
Although this Part addresses the violation of substantive
ESC rights, we approach the water war primarily as an illustra-
tion of how a State's failure to respect rights of public participa-
tion may contribute to the violation of substantive rights, particu-
larly social, economic, and cultural rights. This Part begins with
an overview of the water war and the events that preceded it.
The next section explores possible violations of substantive
rights, primarily focusing on the right to water. The third sec-
tion analyzes possible violations of procedural rights, specifically
rights to transparent and participatory processes. The final sec-
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tion offers recommendations for addressing the violations dis-
cussed.
A. Facts
1. Background: Provision of Water in Cochabamba
The water system in Cochabamba, a city with a population
of 600,000, has been in need of improvement and expansion for
many years. Aquifers in the city and the surrounding areas are
overtaxed, residential access to water is incomplete, and an ine-
quality of access to water exists based on wealth. As a result,
water has becomes a contentious political issue. From 1967 to
1999, the water system in Cochabamba was run by a municipal
company, SEMAPA. As of 1997, SEMAPA served only 57% of
Cochabamba's population . The remaining population ob-
tained water from wells or private vendors, and as a result, paid
more for its water.354 The SEMAPA network was also highly inef-
ficient, experiencing losses of 50% of the water transported.355
Because of the limited availability of water in Cochabamba, water
was rationed, and in many parts of the city water was available
only once or twice a week.3 56 Not surprisingly, "[a] solution to
the serious water problems facing Cochabamba had been a vocif-
erous demand of its citizens for many years.
357
2. Initial Privatization Attempt
In the late 1990s, the World Bank approved a sector loan to
Bolivia to support improvements in the water systems of La Paz,
Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba. 358 According to the World Bank's
Senior Water Advisor, John Briscoe, the water system in Santa
Cruz was run through a cooperative system and functioned
well. 59 In contrast, the water systems in La Paz and Cocha-
bamba, which were run as public utilities, had been functioning
353. See Claudia Vargas & Andrew Nickson, The Limitations of Water Regulation: The
Failure of the Cochabamba Concession in Bolivia, 21 BULL. OF LATIN AM. REs. 99, 104-07
(2002).
354. Id. at 105.
355. See id. at 104-05.
356. Id. at 105.
357. Id.
358. See Interview with John Briscoe, Senior Water Advisor, at the World Bank, in
Washington D.C. (Aug. 21, 2003).
359. Id.
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poorly for decades. The Bank therefore withheld approval of
the loans to those cities, subject to a reform in these water sys-
tems that would allow for improvements. 6 In the view of the
World Bank, when no "credible provider" of water services exists,
as was the case in Cochabamba, privatization must be consid-
ered. 61 Subsequently, the government began to explore priva-
tization options for Cochabamba's water system.
In 1997, the government initiated a tender process for a
concession for water services in Cochabamba.362 At the time,
government officials were considering two options for increasing
the supply of water to the city: the Misicuni Multipurpose Pro-
ject ("MMP"), which "involved building a 120m dam, a reservoir
to regulate the 6.6 cu.m/sec. flow of raw water, a 19.4 km tunnel
and a hydroelectric power plant" at a cost of U.S. $300 mil-
lion,3 63 and the Corani Project, which involved the construction
of an 11 km tunnel to transport water to the city at a cost of U.S.
$90 million.364 The World Bank concluded that the MMP was
not feasible due to its high cost and advised Bolivia not to pursue
the project.36 The government therefore decided to link the
concession process with the Corani project.3 6 6 This call for
tender was cancelled, however, after a successful legal challenge
by the Municipality of Cochabamba on the ground of non-com-
pliance with the procurement law.3 67
According to some interviewees, Bolivia's President at the
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. See Vargas & Nickson, supra note 353, at 105-06.
363. Id. at 105-06.
364. Id. at 106 n.9.
365. Id. at 106. According to John Briscoe, the initial MMP presented to the
World Bank required the construction of a dam that would produce ten times more
water than the city needed, and would be very expensive; because there was a smaller
dam project that was cheaper, the Bank told the government of Bolivia that the MMP
made no sense. See Interview with John Briscoe, supra note 358; Armando de la Parra, a
former Congressman from Cochabamba, told us that he believed that the World Bank
opposed the MMP because it would require public investment and in the Bank's view
these sorts of projects should be funded through private investment. See Telephone
Interview with Armando de la Parra, former Congressman representing Cochabamba
(Sept. 23, 2003).
366. The tender documents provided that the concessionaire would have to sign a
"take or pay" contract with Corani S.A., i.e., the concessionaire would agree to purchase
a fixed amount of water from Corani S.A. at a fixed price, regardless of the concession-
aire's capacity to receive the water. See Vargas & Nickson, supra note 353, at 106.
367. See id.
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time, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, favored the Corani Project,
whereas Cochabamba's mayor, Manfred Reyes Villa, who be-
longed to the rival NFR party, favored the Misicuni Project.36
"[I] t was widely believed that the reason for the appeal was be-
cause the mayor supported the [Misicuni Project] and wanted to
exclude consideration of the Corani alternative."369 Some be-
lieve that Reyes Villa's support "reflected pressure from politi-
cally influential Bolivian engineering and construction compa-
nies, who expected lucrative contracts from the [Misicuni Pro-
ject] ."" However, much of the public also supported the MMP:
Former Cochabamba Congressman Armando de la Parra stated
that Cochabamba "as a whole decided to go with Misicuni.
Before the elections of 1997 there was a movement saying that it
had to be Misicuni."37 ' Bolivian journalist Luis Bredow observed
that "the Misicuni project has been on Cochabambinos' minds
for fifteen to twenty years; as a politician in Cochabamba you
have to say you will build Misicuni." 72
3. The Second Call for Tender
In 1997, Hugo Banzer, known for his violent dictatorship of
Bolivia in the 1970s, was elected President. Banzer's governing
coalition included the party of Cochabamba's mayor, Manfred
Reyes Villa, and Banzer himself had campaigned on the promise
of building the MMP. Thus, despite the high cost, in 1999, the
Bolivian government issued a second call for tender for a
368. See Interview with William Scarborough, U.S. Consul, in Cochabamba, Bolivia
(May 10, 2003). According to Mr. Scarborough, "Mayor Reyes Villa turned Misicuni...
into a political issue. Corani was Sanchez's project .... The two of them went on a
collision course and Manfred won." Id.
369. Vargas & Nickson, supra note 353, at 106 n.9.
370. Id. See also William Finnegan, Leasing the Rain, NEW YORKER, Apr. 8, 2002, at
43. Finnegan notes that:
some of [Reyes Villa's] main financial backers stood to profit fabulously from
the Misicuni Dam's construction. When the central government first tried to
lease Cochabamba's water system to foreign bidders, in 1997, and did not in-
clude Misicuni in the tender, Bomb6n [(Reyes Villa)] stopped it cold. It was
only the inclusion of the project in the Aguas del Tunari contract that got the
Mayor on board.
Id.
371. See Interview with Armando de la Parra, supra note 365. Mr. De la Parra also
notes that the Corani project was unattractive compared to Misicuni because Cocha-
bamba would be obligated to purchase water from Corani S.A. for twenty years, and the
price of water was too high. Id.
372. See Interview with Luis Bredow, La Paz, Bolivia (May 26, 2003).
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scheme that this time included the MMP instead of Corani 3
This call for tender failed in April 1999, attracting only one bid
and none that satisfied all the conditions of the call for
tender. 7 ' The sole bidder was Aguas del Tunari (AdT), a trans-
national corporation whose majority shareholder was Interna-
tional Water Limited, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the American
corporation Bechtel Enterprises. 75
Given the lack of other bidders, President Banzer author-
ized, via a Supreme Decree, the initiation of direct negotiations
with AdT.3 76  The Decree created a Negotiation Commission,
made up of the Vice-Minister of Investment and Privatization,
the Prefect of Cochabamba, the Mayor of Cochabamba, the Su-
perintendent of Water, the Superintendent of Electricity, the Ex-
ecutive President of Misicuni Enterprises, and the General Man-
ager of SEMAPA.3 77 Significantly, it included no community
leaders or representatives from stakeholder groups such as the
irrigators.
373. See Interview with Michael E. Curtin, Executive Consultant to International
Water Limited and former President of Aguas del Tunari ("AdT"), in Washington, D.C.
(Aug. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Interview with Michael Curtin].
374. See Decreto Supremo 25351 (Apr. 19, 1999). AdT officials have speculated
that the high costs of the MMP, combined with other costs in the terms of reference for
the bid, were unattractive to most potential bidders. See Interview with Michael E. Cur-
tin, supra note 373 (speculating that other companies probably did not place a bid, and
AdT submitted a non-compliant bid, because the government's terms of reference were
not attractive).
375. The majority of AdT - 55% - was owned by International Water Ltd.
(AIWL") and the remainder by the Spanish company Abengoa Servicios Urbanos
(25%) and four Bolivian companies (5% each). See Vargas & Nickson, supra note 353,
at 106 n. 10. At the time the Contract was signed, AdT was registered in the Cayman
Islands, and IWL was a U.K.-based company wholly owned by Bechtel Enterprises
("Bechtel"), a privately held firm in San Francisco, California. See id. In November
1999, Bechtel sold 50% of its interest in IWL to Edison S.p.A. ("Edison"), an Italian
company. See id. On December 8, 1999, International Water Holdings B.V. was estab-
lished in the Netherlands, with Edison and Bechtel having 50-50 shares in it, and IWL
being a 100% subsidiary of it. See id. The holding company had a post office box but
no office in the Netherlands. This change to IWL's status was approved by Luis Uzin,
Bolivia's Superintendent of Waters, on behalf of the Bolivian government. See id. See
also Interview with Michael Curtin, supra note 373. On this basis, AdT has subsequently
asserted that a bilateral investment treaty between Bolivia and the Netherlands applies
to its investment in Bolivia. See id.
376. Id.
377. See id. Vargas & Nickson, supra note 353, at 107 n.ll.
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4. Negotiations with AdT
The details of the government's negotiations with AdT are
not publicly known, and consequently are difficult to describe
with precision. Although AdT's President claims that the negoti-
ations were not particularly secretive, 8 one of the lawyers who
advised AdT told us that: "[n]egotiations were behind closed
doors. Even... [the] Bolivian lawyers had a small role. The real
negotiation was by [Geoffrey] Thorpe and the government's
technical team. It was done in a huge hurry, very hasty. Usually
we have three to four months for due diligence - they gave us
six weeks."3 79 Moreover, the concession agreement reached be-
tween the Negotiation Commission and Aguas del Tunari specif-
ically required confidentiality regarding all information that the
parties might "find out about, or have direct knowledge of in
virtue of their participation in [the] Contract and in the negotia-
tions."380 This obligation extended to all personnel working for
378. See Interview with Michael Curtin, supra note 373.
379. Interview with William Scarborough, supra note 368. At the time of the nego-
tiations over the water concession, and throughout the water war, Geoffrey Thorpe was
the President of AdT. See Interview with Michael Curtin, supra note 373.
380. See Contrato de Concesion de Aprovechamiento de Aguas y de Servicio Pub-
lico de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado en la Ciudad de Cochabamba, art. 24.3 (Sept. 3,
1999) [hereinafter Contrato de Concesion]. The confidentiality provision states in full:
24.3 Confidentiality
24.3.1. None of the Parties shall divulge to third parties any information regarding
which confidential character has been specified by the other party or about
which they know, find out about, or have direct knowledge of in virtue of
their participation in this Contract and in the negotiations that led to its
celebration. Said obligation to maintain confidentiality extends to all the
personnel in the service of the Parties, so the latter must adopt the
necessary measures so that said personnel satisfies the confidentiality norms
herein established. Both Parties must satisfy this clause unless they have the
authorization of the other party, a judicial order, or a requirement from
competent national or municipal authorities. For the effects of this clause,
the shareholders and final shareholders of the concessionaire, as well as the
water operator will not be considered third parties.
24.3.2 For purposes of the last paragraph, the following information is considered
confidential: all information obtained in the data room as part of the
bidding and negotiating process, including interviews with authorized
personnel and inspection visits to SEMAPA's installations. Similarly, all
information presented by the Concessionaire in relation to the process of
bidding and negotiation or by the Shareholders in connection with their
offer to sign the present Contract will be considered confidential.
24.3.3 The obligation to maintain confidentiality that each party assumes according
to Clause 24.3.1 will subsist for a period of five years after the termination
of the present Contract for any reason.
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either party, and would continue for five years after the termina-
tion of the contract, regardless of the reason.
Nonetheless, after the water war, some information about
the content of negotiations has been released by Aguas del
Tunari, as well as by government officials. According to Bech-
tel's Fact Sheet on the Water War:
Over the course of negotiations, the Negotiating Committee
insisted on a number of elements that could only be addressed
by raising tariffs:
- The municipality in particular insisted the Misicuni dam
be built during the first two years of Aguas del Tunari's con-
tract.
- The municipality wanted the consortium to repay
SEMAPA's previously accumulated debt and roll that cost
into the rate structure.
- The municipality also insisted that Aguas del Tunari sign
and execute a contract for construction of a treatment plant
that the consortium thought excessively expensive and un-
necessary.
- In addition, the State decided that Aguas del Tunari must
pay for using the tunnel under construction, and the munic-
ipality decided to charge the consortium for the existing
SEMAPA assets. 38 2
Bechtel's claim that the government pressed for completion
of the MMP in the first two years of AdT's contract has been
echoed by other sources. According to one source, the Banzer
government "wanted to finish Misicuni by 2002 when new elec-
tions would take place. 38 3 According to IWL's Bolivian counsel,
AdT proposed building Misicuni in eight years, rather than two,
but the "President said 'no, I promised this project would be
built within my administration'. . . so the 8 year project would
have to be compressed to 18-22 months. '3 84 Ultimately, how-
ever, the government agreed to leave AdT's obligation to com-
Id.
381. Id.
382. See Bechtel Fact Sheet, Cochabamba and the Aguas del Tunari Consortium,
available at http://www.bechtel.com/pdf/cochabambafacts.pdf (last visited Mar. 6,
2004) [hereinafter Bechtel Fact Sheet].
383. Interview with William Scarborough, supra note 368.
384. Interview with Ramiro Guevara, Partner, Valdis, Rodriguez, Miranda, Gutier-
rez & Guevara, in Bolivia (May 29, 2003).
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plete the MMP open, subject to AdT's ability to obtain "uncondi-
tional promises of financing, or financing not guaranteed by the
shareholders' assets, under conditions that are acceptable to the
concessionaire. "385 Moreover, the size of the dam that the com-
pany was required to build as part of the MMP was reduced from
120m to 95m, and the electricity the MMP was supposed to gen-
erate was reduced by two-thirds (from 120 Mw to 40 Mw).386
The final contract stated that the "final dimensions, specifica-
tions, and costs of said works will be determined by field investi-
gations, viability studies, and detailed design. 3 7
According to AdT's President, Michael Curtin, the initial
terms of reference for the bid provided for two 20% increases in
the water tariffs in Cochabamba, one prior to the awarding of
the concession and the other in 2002.388 IWL's lawyer reported
that the company told the government that obtaining loans to
finance Misicuni without a substantial tariff increase would be
difficult,389 and that if the government insisted that AdT assume
SEMAPA's preexisting loans, tariffs would have to be increased
even more.39 ° Michael Curtin said that he believed the cost of
building Misicuni and repaying the debt accounted for well over
70% of the tariff increases.39  Bechtel's Fact Sheet states that
"[h]alf the rate increase was necessitated by such government
requirements as paying down more than U.S. $30 million in debt
accumulated by the public utility that had previously operated
the system. Rate increases were also needed to finance proper
maintenance and expansion of the water system." 392 According
to Mr. Curtin, the government could have reduced the size of
the rate increases by taking over the debt of SEMAPA, but it re-
385. See Contrato de Concesion, art. 12.2.
386. See TOM KRUSE, LAs VICORIAS DE ABRIL: UNA HISTORIA BREVE Y BALANCE DE LA
"GUERRA DEL AGUA" (manuscript on file with authors). See also Interview with Michael
Curtin, supra note 373 (Aug. 21, 2003) ("during the negotiations, there were various
things that were changed: number one, the size of the dam, number two the amount of
electricity. They hadn't finished the tunnel... We were asked to ... take responsibility
for the tunnel, and we said no").
387. See Contrato de Concesion, art. 12.1.12.
388. See Interview with Michael Curtin, supra note 373.
389. Interview with Ramiro Guevara, supra note 384.
390. Id.
391. Interview with Michael Curtin, supra note 373 (Aug. 21, 2003).
392. Bechtel Perspective on the Aguas del Tunari water concession in Cocha-
bamba, Bolivia, available at http://www.bechtel.com/cochabambaresponse.html (last
visited Mar. 6, 2004).
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fused to do so on the grounds that if it assumed SEMAPA's debt,
it would have to do the same elsewhere.393 Moreover, according
to Mr. Curtin, the government did not offer to subsidize the
tariff increases. 39 4
Both the company and the government foresaw that rate in-
creases would be unpopular, and that they might generate pub-
lic protest. IWL's lawyer claims that the company warned the
government about the likelihood of social unrest due to tariff
increases, but "the government told the company very clearly,
from the outset, that's not your problem. Political problems
should be dealt with by the government not the company ....
The government accepted the political problems that would ar-
rive as a result of the contract. ' 3 5 According to AdT's president,
the government said: "Don't worry about it. We'll take care of
it.""96 AdT's President claims that, although in hindsight one
might view these assurances with skepticism, "in 1999, the track
record of privatizations and concessions in Bolivia was as good as
it's ever going to be in Latin America . . . so when the govern-
ment said 'don't worry, we'll take care of that, including a pub-
licity campaign before we took over the concession,' we tended
to believe them. 397
5. The Concession Agreement
The concession agreement was completed on September 3,
1999, and signed by Luis Uzin, the Superintendent of Waters,
and Aguas del Tunari's Chief Executive, Geoffrey Thorpe. 9 8
The agreement granted AdT a concession to operate the Cocha-
bamba water system for forty years. The area covered by the con-
cession encompassed the Municipality of Cochabamba, exclud-
ing areas above 2750 meters above sea level.399 The contract
gave AdT the exclusive right to implement the Misicuni Pro-
393. Interview with Michael Curtin, supra note 373.
394. Id.
395. Interview with Ramiro Guevara, supra note 384.
396. Interview with Michael Curtin, supra note 373.
397. Id.
398. See Contrato de Concesion; Contrato de Aprovchamiento de Aguas y de
Servicio Publico de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado en la Ciudad de Cochabamba (Sept.
3, 1999). The agreement was also approved by the President through a Supreme De-
cree on September 2nd. See Decreto Supremo 25501 (Sept. 2, 1999).
399. See Contracto de Concesion, ann. 4, art. 15.
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ject40 ° and obligated AdT to complete the Misicuni Project, sub-
ject to the company obtaining financing. 40 1 The contract also
gave AdT the exclusive right to provide water services in Cocha-
bamba and to require potential users to connect themselves to
AdT's water and sewage systems under applicable law.40 2 The
agreement required AdT to provide service to existing users and
to expand the water system as directed by the Superintendent of
Basic Sanitation.40 Under the contract, AdT had the right to
install meters to monitor the water consumption both of users
connected to the system and owners of private wells, and to
charge for that installation.40 4 The agreement obligated AdT to
be accessible, efficient, and fair when dealing with users and
405 Awremaintain information services for users, and warned that AdT
should not abuse its dominant position in providing water.40 6
The Superintendency of Basic Sanitation maintained its role
as supervisor of the water system and the Misicuni Project and, in
that role, had the authority to approve tariffs for water service
delivery.40 7 The tariff structure established in the contract fol-
lowed the principle of full cost recovery. In other words, all of
the services and projects (including the Misicuni Project) were
eventually to be funded out of the tariffs, without subsidies.40 8
Under the contract, AdT had the right to a rate of return on
investment of between 15% and 17%.4° 9
The contract established the conditions for its own termina-
410tion. It could be terminated by mutual agreement of the par-
400. See id. art. 5(ii).
401. See id. art. 12.2.
402. See id. arts. 14, 14.5.
403. See id. art. 18.3. AdT was required to provide service for all users within the
area of concession who received water service at the time the Contract was initiated. See
id. art. 18.3.1. It was also obligated to fulfill goals of expansion set by the Superinten-
dent every five years. See id. ann. 6, art. 18.3.2: Goals of Expansion. Despite this re-
quirement, the goals - financed by tariffs - could be rejected by AdT if they resulted
in tariff increases of more than 25%, in which case the Superintendent would have to
revise the expansion goals. See id. art. 18.3.2.
404. Id. ann. 5, art. 1.13.
405. Id. art. 18.5.
406. Id. art. 38.1.
407. Id. art. 17.1.
408. See KRUSE, supra note 386. See also Interview with Michael Curtin, supra note
373.
409. Contrato de Concesion, ann. 5, art. 4.2.
410. Id. art. 27.
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ties;411 at the request of AdT under specified circumstances; 412
by expiration of the term of the concession; 413 by a declaration
of caducity of the contract by the Superintendency of Waters in
certain specified circumstances; 414 and by impossibility.4 15 Im-
possibility was defined as "a fortuitous event or one of force
majeure, an action of the forces of nature ... or any other event,
action or omission of a third party, including public protests for
environmental, social, or political reasons... that are not caused
directly or indirectly by an action or omission of an Entity of the
Government."416 Impossibility could also be generated by "civil
commotion, acts of war.., or other failures of public security"
when this was "caused directly or indirectly by an action or omis-
sion of a Government Entity."4 1 7 In the event of impossibility,
certain rights and obligations affected by the concession agree-
ment could be suspended; 41 8 however, the concession agree-
ment would remain in effect for six months. 419 After six months,
if the circumstances had not been overcome, "either party
[could] declare the termination of the Contract through written
notice to the other party. 420
6. Water Law 2029
At the time the concession agreement between AdT and Bo-
livia was signed, the management of water resources in Bolivia
was governed by a law from 1906.421 This law gave private parties
property interests in the water that crossed their lands,42 2
granted them the right to dig wells to use underground water,42 3
and provided for a system of concessions in perpetuity to individ-
uals or groups to use public waters for irrigation.424
411. Id. art. 27.1.
412. See id. art. 27.3.
413. Id. art. 27.1.
414. Id art. 27.2.
415. Id. art. 42.
416. Id. art. 42.3.
417. Id. art. 42.4.
418. Id. art. 42.1.
419. Id. art. 42.10.
420. Id.
421. See Ley de Dominio y Aprovechamiento de Aguas de 1906 [hereinafter Law of
Control and Utilization of Waters of 1906 or "1906 Law"].
422. Id. arts. 1, 5.
423. Id, arts. 20-21.
424. Id. arts. 231, 233.
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Towards the end of the 1990s, a consensus emerged among
the government and groups studying water issues in Bolivia that
the 1906 water law was outdated and that a new law needed to be
passed.425 Despite this general consensus, the content of the
new law was controversial: "over the last decades there have
been over twenty versions of projects of a new law of waters. 4 2 6
Various groups from civil society, including indigenous and
peasant groups, became involved in negotiations over the new
law of waters, and even presented their own proposals.427 In par-
ticular, these groups were concerned about the prospect of
privatization of water, continued recognition of indigenous uses
and customs regarding water management, and the role of the
Superintendency of Waters in regulation.42 8
Notwithstanding this broad public interest in water reform,
shortly after the signing of the concession agreement between
Bolivia and AdT, in October 1999, the Bolivian Congress sud-
denly passed Law 2029 on Potable Water Services and Sanitary
Sewage ("Ley de Servicios de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado
Sanitario") 4 29 "without consulting civil society. '43 0 This law was
not the general law of waters that had been the subject of negoti-
ations with stakeholders, but ostensibly a law dealing only with
drinking water and sewage services. In fact, the law contained
several provisions regarding water management generally, in-
cluding controversial provisions allowing for privatization of
water sources. Indeed, some have charged that the government
425. See, e.g., Margarita Florez & Pablo Solon, The Water War: Hydraulic Re-
sources Strategy and Citizen Participation at the IDB in the Case of Bolivia (Mar. 2001),
available at http://bicusa.org/mdbs/idb/WaterWar.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2004)
http://www.funsolon.org/COMUNIDAD/AGUA/Inglaguabid.htm (last viewed Sept. 1,
2003). ("All the sectors of the State and civil society agree in that this law does not fit
within current legislation and reality.").
426. Id.
427. Id. ("The indigenous and peasant movements, and other sectors of civil soci-
ety, submitted fairly developed counterproposals, as is the case of the proposal of the
CSUTCB, the CSCB and the CIDOB from May of 1999."). See also Confederacion de
Pueblos Indigenas de Bolivia (CIDOB) et al, Declaracion Conjunta sobre el
Anteproyecto de Ley del Recurso Agua, available at http://www.aguabolivia.org (last
visited Feb. 27, 2004); Rene Orellana & Pablo Solon, La Polemica Del Agua, Primera
Parte: Derechos de Uso y Aprovechamiento, also available at http://www.aguabolivia
.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
428. Id.
429. Ley No. 2029, Ley de Servicios de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado Sanitario
(Oct. 29, 1999).
430. See Florez & Solon, supra note 425.
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attempted to forestall public protest against the general law of
waters by incorporating the main provisions of that law into Law
2029.431 The head of the Cochabamba Irrigators' Federation,
Omar Fernandez, told the delegation that the irrigators did not
realize that Law 2029 would affect them because it was supposed
to be a law about urban water services:
In 1999 we got to know the government was to approve the
water supply law. We didn't assign too much importance to
that. The project discusse[d] and affect[ed] the water supply
and we are irrigators ... [However, the] water supply law not
only treated topics of water supply but it was a general water
law in fact.
4 3 2
According to Professor Carlos Crespo, of the Centro de Es-
tudios Superiores Universitarios at the Universidad Mayor de
San Simon in Cochabamba, Law 2029 was passed as a result of an
agreement between the pro-government political parties and the
main opposition party, the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement
(MNR) and as part of a large package of laws, including the Law
of Municipalities and others.433 Armando de la Parra, who at the
time of the water war was a congressman for Cochabamba, ex-
plained that Law 2029 was passed because President Banzer
wanted to support the AdT concession agreement and respond
to pressure from the international financial institutions such as
the Inter-American Development Bank.43 4 Crespo and others
have argued that Law 2029 was passed for two reasons: first, to
provide a legal framework for the Aguas del Tunari concession;
431. See Interview with Ren6 Orellana, Sociologist, Center of Development and
Communication of Andean People, in Bolivia (May 19, 2003) ("Peasant organizations
and business organizations felt that a proposal by government to privatize, to make a
market for water and concession rights [was not good] .... There were.., first protests
against this law. So [the] government put these laws into the water supply law. It was
put in two or three articles and was not distinguishable from the rest.").
432. Interview with Omar Fernandez, Head of Cochabamba Irrigators' Federation,
in Bolivia (May 20, 2003).
433. See Carlos Crespo, Equity, Democracy and Accountability in Bolivian Water
Reforms 179 (unpublished manuscript on file with Crowley Program). The other laws
were: The Children and Adolescents Law (No. 2026); Civil Servant Statute Law (No.
2027), and Municipalities Law (No. 2028). Id. at 179 n.30.
434. Interview with Armando de la Parra, supra note 365. Professor Carlos Crespo
also notes that the government claimed that Law 2029 was passed quickly in response to
"pressure from international co-operation agencies to have a legal framework that
would enable the disbursement of funds for water supply projects." See Crespo, supra
note 433, at 178-79.
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and second, to establish the regulatory authority of the Superin-
tendency of Basic Sanitation.435
Whatever the precise motivation, Law 2029 was approved in
a forty-eight hour session of Congress, leaving groups from civil
society who opposed the law without time to react.43 6 No effort
was made to consult stakeholder groups at the time.4 37 One
source told us, legislators who "were negotiating did not know
the law even though they opposed it."4 38 Yet another person
echoed this remark: "many congress people did not even know
that the [law had been drafted] . . . . 3
Law 2029 created the Superintendency of Basic Sanita-
tion,4 4 0 and authorized it to regulate potable water and sewage
services, grant and revoke concessions and servitudes relating to
potable water and sewage, and monitor and publicize rates for
water services.44 1 The law allowed for private parties to partici-
pate in the provision of water and sewage services via conces-
sions.4 4 2 Moreover, the State would "foster the participation of
the private sector in the provision of Potable Water and Sanitary
Sewage Services." 443  The Law prioritized principles of "eco-
nomic efficiency" and "financial sufficiency" over others, such as
affordability and universal access, thereby requiring that tariffs
for water services be high enough to cover costs of operation and
expansion, and to create incentives for efficient use.4 4 4
435. See Florez & Solon, supra note 425. See also Crespo, supra note 433, at 179.
Professor Crespo argues that "because no agreement had been reached with social or-
ganizations in the debate on the Water Resources Law, the government saw its chance
of getting what it wanted through Law 2029." Id.
436. See id. See aso Florez & Solon, supra note 425.
437. See Crespo, supra note 433, at 179.
438. Interview with Ren6 Orellana, supra note 431.
439. Interview with Humberto Vargas Rivas, Centro de Estudio de la Realidad
Economica y Social, in Bolivia (May 19, 2003).
440. See Law 2029, art. 14.
441. See id. arts. 9, 15.
442. Id. art. 19.
443. Id.
444. According to Law 2029, several principles would govern the rate structure for
water and sewage services: economic efficiency, neutrality, solidarity, redistribution, fi-
nancial sufficiency, simplicity, and transparency. See id. art. 49. Of these, economic
efficiency and financial sufficiency took priority over the rest in cases where the princi-
ples conflicted. See id. art. 49(g). Economic efficiency meant that rates would "approxi-
mate the prices corresponding to a competitive market.., and the rate structure would
communicate to Users the scarcity of potable water resources, thereby creating incen-
tives for its efficient use." Id. art. 49(a). Financial sufficiency meant that the formulas
for establishing rates would "guarantee the recovery of the costs and expenses of opera-
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Law 2029 deemed all waters in the country the original
property of the State.445 Parties who wished to provide water or
sewage services could request a concession, which would grant
"exclusive use" of water sources to the concessionaire and could
have a duration of up to forty years.4 46 In areas covered by con-
cession agreements, Law 2029 further required occupants or
owners of buildings with the "corresponding infrastructure" to
"contract and connect with the Potable Water and Sanitary Sew-
age Services [and] pay current rates for the Potable Water and
Sanitary Sewage Services."44 7 However, "in exceptional cases...
when there is availability of water ... special treatment will be
allowed for industrial, mining or agricultural users to self-supply
for productive ends .... ,,448 After the passage of the law, such
users would have a limited time in which to regularize their situ-
ation.4 4 9
For areas with small or dispersed populations, concessions
could not be offered; rather, parties who wished to provide water
or sewage services had to request licenses, which would have a
duration of up to five years and would not grant exclusive use of
water sources.4 50 In these areas, communities would be allowed
to associate to participate in the arrangements for water ser-
vices.4 5 '
7. Aguas del Tunari's Operation of the Cochabamba
Water System
AdT began its operation of the Cochabamba water system
on November 1, 1999. According to Bechtel, in the first two
months of the concession contract: Aguas del Tunari increased
supply by 30% through repairs and technical enhancements; the
consortium engaged the community in a water conservation and
tion, including expansion, replacement, and maintenance, would allow remuneration
of the capital of shareholders in the same way in which an efficient enterprise in a
sector of comparable risk would have done, and would permit the use of technologies
and administrative systems that would guarantee the better quality, continuity, and se-
curity to Users." Id. art. 49(d).
445. See id. art. 28.
446. Id. arts. 29, 34.
447. Id. art. 72.
448. Id.
449. Id. art. 74.
450. Id. arts. 44-45.
451. Id. art. 73(a)(c).
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education program, and instituted internationally accepted best
practices in managing the system; many consumers expressed
their satisfaction, and Aguas del Tunari employees were develop-
ing a new mode of operation and pride in their work.4 5 2 In con-
trast, others claim that Aguas del Tunari did not make any invest-
ments in Cochabamba's water system, or in any case, that such
investments were not visible to Cochabamba's residents. 453
These claims are supported by the statements of AdT's presi-
dent, Michael Curtin, who conceded that the company did not
have the time to make any investments because the water war
started shortly after AdT took over the concession. 45 4
Neither the government nor AdT made much effort to in-
form the public about the changes that were to be implemented
in the Cochabamba water system, either with respect to rates or
improvements. According to Bechtel's "fact sheet" on the Co-
chabamba water war, in the negotiations "Aguas del Tunari
strongly recommended to the municipality that it launch an in-
formation campaign to inform the population of the changes
that were to be implemented. The municipality was to carry out
this action but never did. '455 The company itself did not con-
duct an information campaign either; IWL's lawyer in Bolivia
told us that the company simply did not have enough time to
start an information campaign before the social unrest began.456
Michael Curtin told us that he viewed the company's failure to
conduct such a campaign as one of its biggest mistakes but noted
that the company had relied on the government to do so, due to
its excellent track record with regard to privatizations.45 v
8. Complaints about the Concession and Water Law
In the first months of AdT's operation of the Cochabamba
water system, residents of Cochabamba and surrounding areas
452. See Bechtel Perspective on the Aguas del Tunari Water Concession in Cocha-
bamba, Bolivia (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.bechtel.com/newsarticles/65.asp
(last viewed Oct. 7, 2003); Cochabamba and the Aguas del Tunari Consortium 4, avail-
able at http://www.bechtel.com/newsarticles/65.asp (last viewed Oct. 7, 2003) [herein-
after Aguas del Tunari Consortium 4].
453. See, e.g., Interview with Hugo Galindo, former Prefect of Cochabamba, in Bo-
livia (May 20, 2003).
454. See Interview with Michael Curtin, supra note 373.
455. Bechtel Fact Sheet, supra note 382, at 3.
456. Interview with Ramiro Guevara, supra note 384.
457. Interview with Michael Curtin, supra note 373.
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began to express concerns about the concession agreement and
Law 2029. As described by Oscar Olivera, leader of the Coor-
dinadora Para La Defensa del Agua y de la Vida (the "Coordina-
tor for Defense of Water and Life" or "Coordinadora"), these
concerns revolved, for the most part, around three issues. First,
in the city, the people connected to the central water network
were affected by excessive rate increases.45 8 Second, people who
used water from private or cooperative wells feared that they
would lose their property under the new water law.4 59 And third,
peasants were concerned that under Law 2029 water would be-
come a commodity, and they would no longer be able to use
natural water sources according to their traditional uses and cus-
toms. 4 60 The following subsections discuss each of these sets of
concerns at greater length.
a. Tariff Increases
Although the Superintendency of Basic Sanitation had
agreed to an initial tariff increase of 35% on average for water
services,"' many people in Cochabamba insist that, in fact, rates
went up much more than that. One source states that, holding
consumption levels constant, charges in water bills went up by
43% for the poorest families, 40% for poor families, and over
200% for some customers.462 Moreover, copies of bills that the
Coordinadora and others possess indicate rate increases higher
than 35%, even for the poorest consumers.468
458. See Interview with Oscar Olivera, Leader of Coordinadora, in Bolivia (May 19,
2003).
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. See Vargas & Nickson, supra note 353, at 112.
462. These numbers come from a computer analysis of water rates run by
SEMAPA, see Bechtel vs. Bolivia: The Water Rate Hikes By Bechtel's Bolivian Company (Aguas
del Tunari). The Real Numbers, (The Democracy Center), available at the Democracy
Center's website: http://www.democracyctr.org/bechtel/waterbills/waterbills-
global.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
463. See Bechtel vs. Bolivia: Cochabamba's Water Bills from Bechtel, (The Democracy
Center), available at http://www.democracyctr.org/bechtel/waterbills (last visited Oct.
7, 2003). The Crowley Program also reviewed some water bills that the Coordinadora's
leaders kept, which appear to indicate a lack of consistency in rate increases. A few of
the water bills showed extreme rate increases for people in the R2 category - that of
the poorest users. For example, we reviewed the water bills for Mr. Cecilio Orellana for
September 1999 and for January 2000. Mr. Orellana appears to have been charged
68.50 bolivianos for his consumption of eighty-three cubic meters of water in Septem-
ber. Four months later, Aguas del Tunari appears to have charged him nearly three
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Bechtel has disputed this claim, arguing that the rates did
not increase that much, but that water bills increased because
expanded service resulted in greater consumption of water.4 64
Michael Curtin, President of AdT, also suggested that the hun-
dreds of copies of bills that the Coordinadora has in its offices,
indicating very sharp rate increases, may be "manufactured."46 5
In its Fact Sheet on the Water Wars, Bechtel includes a chart that
shows that, keeping consumption levels constant, rate increases
for water were very small for the poorest people: for consumers
in the R-2 Category (poor housing), who used between 1 and 12
cubic meters of water a month, the rates actually dropped by
1.6%.466
But Bechtel's chart on water consumption is misleading: it
addresses only the rate increases for water services, failing to
mention that the company also increased rates for sewage ser-
vices and bundled together those charges in consumers' bills.
Charts that Aguas del Tunari distributed in Cochabamba at the
time of the rate increases correspond to Bechtel's numbers with
respect to rate increases for water, but show much higher rate
increases for sewage services, even for Bolivia's poorest. 467 Thus,
for the R-2 Category of consumer, the rates for sewage services
went up by 42.2%.468 Charts that combine the rate increases for
water and sewage show that people in the R-2 category who con-
sumed up to 12 cubic meters of water a month would have seen
an overall rate increase of 21.6%.469 In fact, people in the R-2
category consumed on average sixteen cubic meters of water per
month. 470 At that level, they would have seen an overall rate in-
crease of 42.3%. 47'
times that amount, 240.60 bolivianos, for consumption of only forty-three cubic meters.
See Water Bills for Mr. Cecilio Orellana (on file with the Crowley Program).
464. See Bechtel Fact Sheet, supra note 382, at 4; Aguas del Tunari Consortium 4,
supra note 452.
465. Interview with Michael Curtin, supra note 373.
466. See Bechtel Fact Sheet, supra note 382, at 4; Aguas del Tunari Consortium 4,
supra note 452.
467. See Aguas del Tunari, Tarifas de los Servicios de Agua y Alcantarillado que
corresponden al 81.2% de nuestros clientes: Conozca su Factura (Cochabamba, Jan.
23, 2000). The Crowley Program obtained copies of these charts from the current head
of SEMAPA, Gonzalo Ugalde Canedo [hereinafter "SEMAPA Charts"].
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. See Crespo, supra note 433, at 175, table 18.
471. Id. See also SEMAPA Charts.
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Bechtel's Fact Sheet states that in negotiations over the con-
cession agreement, "l[t] he Negotiating Committee did eventually
accept one important Aguas del Tunari proposal: that the mu-
nicipality implement a tariff structure opposite that of SEMAPA
- one that would put no or smaller increases on the poorest
citizens and increase substantially the bill for larger users. "472
But the tariff structure that Aguas del Tunari ultimately applied
in Cochabamba indicates the opposite: keeping consumption
levels constant, the overall rate increases for the poorest consum-
ers are in many cases larger than they are for the higher-income
consumers. 473 For example, for people consuming up to twelve
cubic meters of water a month, the overall rate increases in the
R-2 category are 21.6%; in the R-3 category (economy residen-
tial), the increases are only 10%, and in the R-4 category (luxury
residential), they are 21%. 4 74 For people consuming 16 cubic
meters of water a month, people in the R-2 category saw an over-
all rate increase of 42.3%, whereas people in the R-3 category
only saw an overall rate increase of 28.8% and people in the R-4
category saw a rate increase of 36.6%. Although at higher
levels of consumption this trend is reversed (rate increases were
larger for the R-4 and R-3 categories than they were for the R-2
category), at lower levels of consumption the rate increases are
in fact regressive.476
An additional charge made by some Cochabamba residents
is that Aguas del Tunari not only increased rates excessively but
recategorized residents arbitrarily, placing them in a higher resi-
dential category for purposes of billing.477 People who were re-
categorized would have paid much higher rates than they had in
the past.
472. See Bechtel Fact Sheet, supra note 382, at 4; Aguas del Tunari Consortium 4,
supra note 452.
473. See SEMAPA Charts, supra note 467.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Note that this does not mean that the poorer categories of users paid more
per cubic meter of water than the wealthier categories. To the contrary, R-2 category
users already paid significantly less per cubic meter than R-3 or R-4 category users. The
point is that the increases in rates were higher for the poorer categories of users than
they were for the wealthier categories; in other words, poor people were paying propor-
tionately more, in comparison to what they paid in the past, than wealthy people were.
477. See Telephone Interview with Jim Shultz, Executive Director, The Democracy
Center, Cochabamba, Bolivia (Oct. 7, 2003). See also Crespo, supra note 433, at 174-75.
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b. Metering of Private and Cooperative Wells
Many people in Cochabamba obtain water through alterna-
tive water supply systems, some of which draw water through pri-
vate or cooperative wells. These people feared that Aguas del
Tunari would charge them for the water they drew from their
wells or require them to obtain their water exclusively from
AdT's network. Although none of the residents we interviewed
had had meters installed on their wells, some believed that AdT
planned to place meters on wells and simply had not yet done so
by the time the water war started.4 78
Bechtel has asserted that in the few months that it operated
the water system in Cochabamba, "Aguas del Tunari only
charged for water provided through the network it operated. It
did not charge for water from private or cooperative wells."47 9
According to Michael Curtin, meters were to be installed only to
measure water usage, so that the company could then charge
people for use of sewage services.48 ° These statements are sup-
ported by the assertions of at least one former government offi-
cial, who told us that AdT never tried to put meters on private
wells, and that people were just afraid that this was going to hap-
pen.
48 1
Nevertheless, Law 2029 and the concession agreement con-
tained provisions that suggest that AdT could charge for water
drawn from private wells, or in any case, could force people in
the concession area to stop using water from wells and instead
478. Franz Taquichiri, the leader of a junta vecinal [neighborhood board], told the
Crowley delegation that AdT representatives came to his neighborhood, "La Vertiente,"
towards the end of 1999, to count how many private wells there were so that the com-
pany could install meters. See Interview with Franz Taquichiri in Bolivia (May 19, 2003).
The neighborhood's residents did not let the AdT representatives come in, and the
women in the neighborhood ran them out with brooms. See id. According to Mr. Ta-
quichiri, the AdT representatives returned a week later with Jose Orellana, the Presi-
dent of the Federation of Neighborhood Boards of Cochabamba. See id. Mr. Orellana
tried to convince the people in this neighborhood that they should allow the AdT rep-
resentatives to come in, but the residents continued to resist because they did not un-
derstand how water could be turned into a commodity. See id. Mr. Taquichiri explained
that in this manner, several neighborhoods started to organize "to defend water in Co-
chabamba." See id.
479. Bechtel Fact Sheet, supra note 382; see also News Release, Bechtel Perspective
on the Aguas del Tunari Water Concession in Cochabamba, Bolivia, available at http://
www.bechtel.com/cochabambaresponse.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
480. Interview with Michael Curtin, supra note 373.
481. Interview with Hugo Galindo, supra note 453.
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connect to the AdT network. Both Law 2029 and the concession
agreement granted AdT "exclusive use" of water sources in the
area covered by the concession. The concession agreement
stated that AdT has the "right to obligate potential users to con-
nect themselves to the systems of potable water and sewage of
the concessionaire. 482 Similarly, Law 2029 stated that persons
who own or occupy buildings in a concession area must contract
with and connect to water services provided by the concession-
aire.4s3 The concession agreement also provided that six
months after the start of the concession, the use of alternative
sources of water in the concession area would be forbidden with-
out the approval of the company.48 4 Finally, the concession
agreement provided that AdT has the right to "install meters for
any user at any time, and to demand payment for the installa-
tion."485
In light of these provisions, at the very least, users of water
obtained from alternative water supply systems such as wells
would have been operating illegally. As stated by the analyst Car-
los Crespo:
The government ... applied the "natural monopoly" princi-
ple, seeing the co-existence of two water networks in the same
city to be undesirable. But [this] ignored the fact that there
are many social and private alternative systems of water supply
in Bolivia, in concession zones, and in Cochabamba these are
the most important. Under this rule, water co-operatives,
committees and associations, could be penalised, and, in
some cases, were at risk of being considered illegal. 48 6
Without knowing AdT's intentions regarding the enforce-
ment of its rights as concessionaire, users of alternative water
sources had legitimate reasons to be concerned.
c. The Concerns of the Irrigators
Several peasant groups in the vicinity of Cochabamba were
strongly opposed to Law 2029 because they felt that it did not
adequately protect their uses and customs. They feared that
under Law 2029 water would become a commodity, that they
482. Contrato de Concesion, art. 14.5.
483. See Law 2029, art. 72.
484. See Contrato de Concesion, at ann. 5, art. 1.3.
485. See Contrato de Concesion, at ann. 5, art. 1.1.
486. See Carlos Crespo, supra note 433, at 163-64.
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might have to pay for its use, or that they would simply lose the
ability to access water sources in accordance with their traditions.
Michael Curtin told us that AdT was not planning to pro-
vide water to peasants for irrigation, or to charge them for water,
claiming that the company knew not to "mess with farmers. "487
However, Law 2029 seemed to permit the concessionaire to
charge peasants who drew water in the area covered by the con-
cession. Indeed, the new law seemed to require that peasants
who used water for agriculture in areas covered by concession
agreements obtain their water through the concessionaire, ex-
cept in special circumstances to be determined by the govern-
ment.48 8 Moreover, if they did obtain their water through the
concessionaire, they would have to pay for the water.4 89 In areas
that were not covered by a concession agreement because popu-
lations were too small or dispersed (as is the case with many ar-
eas in which peasants live), groups of citizens or governmental
entities would have to obtain five-year, non-exclusive licenses for
water provision.490 As Professor Crespo notes, the process of
having to obtain licenses was itself a large burden to impose on
poor peasants living in rural areas.4 91 And the short length of
the licenses, in conjunction with their non-exclusivity, created a
sense of insecurity among peasants who felt that, in accordance
with their traditions, they had a property interest in the water
sources. Omar Fernandez explained the irrigators' feeling on
this issue: "[r] egarding water rights, the multinationals had a 40-
year concession and we irrigators who have lived always along
with water and the water is ours, the law only gave us a right to
487. Interview with Michael Curtin, supra note 373.
488. See Law 2029, art. 72.
489. Id. art. 72.
490. Id. arts. 44-45.
491. Professor Crespo points out that the licensing requirements presented two
problems:
Firstly, government bureaucracy would be hard pushed to meet the paperwork
demands involved in issuing such a large number of licenses every five years.
And secondly, although the license itself was to be free of charge, any addi-
tional costs were to be covered by peasants and indigenous organisations
(transport, lodging and lawyer's fees, for example) .... Bolivian history is full
of examples of how the State has excluded these sectors, not only by physical
violence, and cultural subjugation, but also by implementing institutional
measures and a culture of "procedures," that include bribery ("coimas"),
clientelism and corruption, resulting in loss of access to resources.
Crespo, supra note 433, at 168.
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use water for 5 years. '"492
9. The Conflict
The irrigators were the first to start organizing against the
concession and new water law, but eventually a coalition between
the peasants and city residents emerged to protest the conces-
sion and Law 2029. This organization was known as the "Coordi-
nator for Defense of Water and Life" ("Coordinadora Para la De-
fense del Agua y la Vida" or "Coordinadora").493
The Coordinadora started organizing strikes in January
2000 to protest the rate increases.494 On January 13th, the re-
gional government or Prefecture, reached an agreement with
the Coordinadora, according to which the government would re-
view the concession agreement and water law.4 9 Cochabamba's
Prefect Hugo Galindo, appointed by President Banzer, told us
that he explained to Banzer that the citizens were upset at the
rate increases because they did not perceive any positive gains
from the privatization. 49 6 Galindo proposed that rates be rolled
back until the company had made some visible improvements to
the water system; however, the President refused because "the
rate increases were going to finance the building of the Misicuni
project and he wanted the project completed during his
term."49 7 After that, Galindo reports that he was excluded from
the President's inner circle.4 98
When changes failed to materialize, the Coordinadora
called another protest for February 4th. The central govern-
ment sent in 1,000 armed soldiers and police, and two days of
492. Interview with Omar Fernandez, supra note 432.
493. See Interview with Oscar Olivera, supra note 458.
494. ASAMBLEA PERMANENTE DE DERECHOS HUMANOS DE COCHABAMBA, POR EL DER-
ECHO AL AGUA Y A LA VIDA: VIOLACIONES A LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS DURANTE LAS
MOVILIZACIONES DEL 4 Y 5 DE FEBRERO 2000, 2-3 (2000) [hereinafter POR EL DERECHO AL
AGUA V A LA VIDA]. In addition to peasants and other people who were affected by the
new water law and the concession agreement, participants appear to have included
other people who were upset at the Bolivian government for other reasons, and viewed
the water protests as a way to channel their dissatisfaction. See Interview with Luis
Bredow, supra note 372.
495. See Acuerdo Regional por la Dotacion de Agua, Defensa de la Economia Popular, La
Convivencia Pacifica, y el Respeto de los Derechos Humanos, in POR EL DERECHO AL AGUA V A
LA VIDA, supra note 494, at ann. 1.
496. See Interview with Hugo Galindo, supra note 453.
497. See id.
498. See id.
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conflict ensued. Approximately 178 people were wounded as a
result of the government's extensive use of tear gas, beatings,
and lead bullets.499 The protests ended with another agreement
among the national government, Cochabamba's Parliamentary
Brigade, and the Coordinadora to review Law 2029 and the con-
cession agreement.50 ° According to Bechtel, after this protest,
"[t]he higher rates didn't last long. Responding to public criti-
cism, the government rolled back rates in February. Customers
who had paid the higher rates were refunded the difference."501
This rollback was only temporary, however, with the higher rates
to be reinstated in six months, and thus failed to end the pro-
tests.
502
In a large poll conducted by the Coordinadora in March,
Cochabamba residents overwhelmingly opposed the tariff in-
creases and Law 2029 and supported cancellation of the contract
with AdT.50 3 An indefinite general strike was called for April to
demand the cancellation of the contract and the repeal of Water
Law 2029.04 The strike began on April 4th; on April 6th, the
regional and city governments began to negotiate with the Coor-
dinadora, until police interrupted the negotiations and arrested
the community leaders, alleging incitement to violence and sub-
version.50 5 On April 8th, the President declared a national state
of emergency. 50 6 During the conflict that day, a seventeen-year-
old student, Victor Hugo Daza, was shot and killed by a sniper
who later turned out to be an army officer in plainclothes.50 7
More than a hundred people were injured in confrontations be-
tween protestors and government forces.50 8
499. See generally POR EL DERECHO AL AGUA V A LA VIDA, supra note 494, at 10.
500. See Convenio Por Cochabamba, in POR EL DERECHO AL AGUA Y A LA VIDA, supra
note 494, at ann. 2.
501. See Bechtel Perspective on the Aguas del Tunari Water Concession in Cocha-
bamba, Bolivia, at http://www.bechtel.com/cochabambaresponse.htm (last visited
Mar. 1, 2004); Bechtel Fact Sheet, supra note 382.
502. See Jim Shultz, Bolivia's War over Water, The Democracy Center, available at
http://www.democracyctr.org/bechtel/index.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
503. See Interview with Father Luis Sanchez in Bolivia (May 19, 2003). According
to the Coordinadora, over 50,000 people were polled. Id. Father Sanchez is a member
of the Board of Directors of SEMAPA, elected as a representative from his neighbor-
hood.
504. See id.
505. See id. They were released within a few hours. Id.
506. See Shultz, supra note 502.
507. See id. See also Finnegan, supra note 370.
508. See id.
NO RECOURSE
Throughout the unrest, the national government made lit-
tle effort to reach an agreement with protesters, choosing in-
stead to use force to quell the protests. According to Galindo,
"this was a stubborn government who wanted to take the project
forward - enforce this contract and take it forward."5 °9
Humberto Vargas, a political analyst in Cochabamba who sup-
ported the Coordinadora, echoed this view, telling us that "the
national government was very uncooperative and wanted to keep
Aguas del Tunari in the country. Even when I was trying to pre-
sent my solution to the government, the police came in and took
me and others prisoner. Since we were never given the opportu-
nity to have a dialogue with the government, it was impossible to
arrive at any solution other than a cancellation of the con-
tract. ' 510 Similarly, AdT officials did not attempt to meet with
the protestors. The company claims that such a meeting would
have been pointless: Michael Curtin told us that the company
did not pursue discussions with the Coordinadora because it was
evident that Olivera did not want to reach an agreement.51 '
Others insist, however, that the company made no effort to re-
spond to the legitimate complaints of protestors. For example,
Hugo Galindo claims that he explained to Geoffrey Thorpe,
then President of AdT, that all the company had to do was "mar-
keting - small projects people can see and appreciate, but
[Thorpe] said no because 'there is a contract and it will be satis-
fied.' "512
On April 10th, the government announced that AdT offi-
cials had left the country and the contract was cancelled, and
released Coordinadora leaders. The municipal water company,
SEMAPA, resumed control of the water system. The next day,
Law 2029 was repealed; it was replaced by Law No. 2066, which
responded to several of the protestors' demands.
10. The Aftermath
a. Proceedings at ICSID
AdT applied for arbitration at the International Center for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") in November
509. Interview with Hugo Galindo, supra note 453.
510. Interview with Humberto Vargas Rivas, supra note 439.
511. See Interview with Michael Curtin, supra note 373.
512. Interview with Hugo Galindo, supra note 453.
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2001, seeking U.S. $25 million from the Bolivian State for the
recovery of its investments. 513 AdT argues that ICSID has juris-
diction over the dispute because of the Bolivia/Netherlands bi-
lateral investment treaty ("BIT"). The parties' filings in the arbi-
tration are not public; however, according to Michael Curtin,
AdT is arguing that Bolivia did not fulfill its obligations to AdT
under the Bolivia-Netherlands BIT.51 4 Julio Garrett, the General
Director of Industry in Bolivia's Ministry of Economic Develop-
ment, told us that Bolivia is challenging the jurisdiction of IC-
SID, and he expects the challenge to be successful. 51 5 He also
said that in his view, the social conflict of the water war
amounted to a reason of force majeure that triggered the impossi-
bility provision for terminating the contract. 516 Garrett acknowl-
edged that Bolivia's government had not fully complied with the
termination clause in that it wrote a letter to AdT terminating
the agreement before six months had elapsed since the occur-
rence of the impossibility. 51 7 Nevertheless, he insists that "writ-
ing the letter was a requirement for the end of the war. If they
had not sent the letter, revolution would have continued." '518
A group of Cochabamba residents and organizations, in-
cluding the Coordinadora and the Irrigators' Federation, filed a
petition to intervene in the ICSID proceeding in August 2002.519
They argued that any award by ICSID in favor of AdT would di-
rectly affect them because such an award would be paid by
SEMAPA, thereby reducing SEMAPA's resources and undermin-
ing efforts to protect water rights. 5 20 Moreover, the award would
undermine all Bolivians' interests "in ensuring that the Govern-
513. Bechtel Fact Sheet, supra note 382, at Statement of Facts. Michael Curtin,
President of AdT, stated that the investment costs include: the costs of investigating the
Cochabamba water system to determine its viability as an investment, the cost of bid-
ding and negotiating the concession, and U.S. $10 million that AdT was required to
have in its account in order to take over the Cochabamba water system (although not
all of that money was spent). See Interview with Michael Curtin, supra note 373.
514. Interview with Michael Curtin, supra note 373.
515. Interview with Julio Garrett, General Director of Industry, Bolivia Ministry of
Economic Development, in Bolivia (May 27, 2003).
516. See Interview with Julio Garrett, supra note 515.
517. As noted previously, the concession agreement provides for the termination
of a contract due to impossibility, after six months have passed since the occurrence of
the impossibility. See Contracto de Concesion, art. 42.10.
518. Interview with Julio Garrett, supra note 515.
519. Petition of La Coordinadora Para la Defensa del Agua y Vida, et al., to the
Arbitral Tribunal, Case No. ARB/02/03 (filed Aug. 29, 2002).
520. Id. at para. 18-20.
NO RECOURSE
ment of Bolivia can implement legitimate measures to maintain
public order and guarantee access to services and resources es-
sential to the lives of all Bolivians without fear of major financial
penalties for doing so. "521 On these grounds, they requested
standing to participate as parties in the proceedings before the
arbitral tribunal, or in the alternative, to participate as amici cu-
riae, with access to all submissions made to the Tribunal, and
with permission to attend all hearings of the Tribunal and make
submissions to the Tribunal.522 They also requested public dis-
closure of all submissions to the Tribunal, transcripts of hear-
ings, and other documents related to the case; that the Tribunal
open all hearings in the case to the public; that the Tribunal
conduct public hearings in Cochabamba, Bolivia, regarding the
facts underlying the claims; and that the Tribunal permit the Pe-
titioners to respond to arguments by any party to the case.523
The Tribunal denied this petition in January 2003, on the
grounds that "it is manifestly clear to the Tribunal that it does
not, absent the agreement of the Parties, have the power to join
a non-party to the proceedings; to provide access to hearings to
non-parties and, afortiori, to the public generally; or to make the
documents of the proceedings public. Second, the consent re-
quired of the Parties to grant the requests is not present ....
Third, the Tribunal is of the view that there is not at present a
need to call witnesses or seek supplementary non-party submis-
sions at the jurisdictional phase of its work. '5 24
According to Julio Garrett, the government did not oppose
the citizens' intervention: "Bolivia has no problem about being
transparent about this. It's Aguas del Tunari that's taking advan-
tage of the situation. '525 Ramiro Guevara, IWL's counsel in Bo-
livia, told us that the company opposed the citizens' petition be-
cause it is "not a problem of citizens." 526 Michael Curtin stated
that the company opposed the petition because of the additional
521. Id. at para. 21.
522. Id. at para. 3(i)-(ii).
523. Id. at para. 3(iii)-(vi).
524. Letter toJ. Martin Wagner from David D. Caron, President of the Tribunal, in
re Aguas del Tunari vs. The Republic of Bolivia, Jan. 29, 2003.
525. Interview withJulio Garrett, supra note 515. Nonetheless, the current head of
SEMAPA makes the point that "the government and the Superintendent have isolated
us from the ICSID arbitration." Interview with Gonzalo Ugalde Canedo, General Man-
ager of SEMAPA, in Bolivia (May 20, 2003).
526. Interview with Ramiro Guevara, supra note 384.
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costs that intervention would create for the company. 27 He also
asserted that he suspected the petition was not filed in good
faith, as the demands in the petition were so great that it was
certain to be denied.528
The case was still pending before ICSID at the time of publi-
cation of this Report.
b. Water in Cochabamba Today
In the wake of the water war, the adequate supply of water
remains a serious problem in Cochabamba. SEMAPA has re-
sumed control of the water system since the end of the conflict.
According to Oscar Olivera, the Coordinadora wants a water
company based on four principles: transparency in manage-
ment, efficiency, social participation, and social justice.529 In his
view, SEMAPA should be neither a private nor a public institu-
tion, but rather should be an entity subject to social control.
Thus, SEMAPA is currently run by a combination of officials
from the municipality and representatives from civil society.55 °
Regulations accompanying the new water law may also include
measures to increase social control of water systems.5 31 How-
ever, SEMAPA continues to suffer from serious problems, most
notably the lack of sufficient water to satisfy the population and
expand the service network.532
B. Human Rights Issues
The discourse of human rights is often used with respect to
the water wars; however, the specific arguments for finding
human rights violations in this case are rarely spelled out in any
detail. This section will discuss the economic, social, and cul-
tural rights at issue in the water war case, focusing on substantive
and procedural rights separately. Violations of civil and political
rights that occurred during the water wars are not discussed. Al-
though citizen' substantive rights to water and to property may
have been violated in this case, we conclude that the most seri-
ous ESC rights violations have to do with procedural rights; spe-
527. Interview with Michael Curtin, supra note 373.
528. Id.
529. See Interview with Oscar Olivera, supra note 458.
530. See Interview with Father Luis Sanchez, supra note 503.
531. Id.
532. Id.
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cifically, the failure of the Bolivian State to implement proce-
dures to inform the public and ensure effective public participa-
tion in decision-making about water.
1. Substantive Rights
The two substantive rights that are most directly at issue in
this case are the right to water and the right to property. The
following subsections discuss each in turn.
a. The Right to Water
As noted in the discussion of the Transredes oil spill, the
right to water can be inferred from the existence of other rights
in binding instruments to which Bolivia is a party; it may also be
a principle of customary international law. The ESCR Commit-
tee's recent General Comment No. 15 on the right to water pro-
vides a great deal of guidance with regard to the content of the
right to water. Nonetheless, the content of the right to water
remains in many respects unclear. The following subsections
present the various arguments for finding a violation of the right
to water in this case.
(1) Privatization as a violation of the Right to Water
In his reports on the water war, New Yorker journalist Wil-
liam Finnegan noted that peasants in Cochabamba charged AdT
with trying to "lease the rain," something inconceivable to the
farmers who were accustomed to free use of natural water
sources for irrigation.5 3 Under this view, one might regard
privatization itself as a per se violation of the right to water. We
do not take this position. Water is a scarce resource, and how
best to distribute water is controversial. Even the Coordinadora
leadership, although "vow[ing] to treat water as a 'human
right"' concedes that "it cannot be provided [for] free." 53 4
Opponents of privatization point out that global water cor-
porations are motivated by profit and cannot be trusted to fulfill
socially responsible objectives such as universal access to water
and sanitation.535 Proponents of privatization point to the fail-
ure of the public sector in many developing countries to provide
533. See Finnegan, supra note 370, at 43.
534. See id.
535. See Public Citizen, The Myth of Private Sector Financing: Global Water Corporations
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adequate access to water, and argue that the private sector is
stepping in to fill a critical need." 6 Although the ESCR Com-
mittee has stated that "[w]ater should be treated as a social and
cultural good, and not primarily as an economic good,"53 7 it has,
at the same time, left open the possibility of private sector in-
volvement in the provision of water services. 538
In our view, privatization should not be dismissed as a
means of progressively realizing the right to water, although its
value depends on the manner in which the privatization is car-
ried out. Thus, we conclude that the fact of privatization of Co-
chabamba's water system, standing alone, does not suffice to es-
tablish a violation of the right to water. Moreover, in the case of
Cochabamba, even before the AdT concession, Bolivia had
failed to meet its obligations with respect to water provision for
Cochabamba's citizens. At the time, nearly half the city's re-
sidents lacked access to safe and sufficient water, a situation that
had persisted for decades. In theory, the privatization of Cocha-
bamba's water supply might have expanded the availability of
water through increased production and greater efficiency while
maintaining a rate structure that protected the poorest consum-
ers.
Nonetheless, the circumstances surrounding this case of
privatization do raise concerns regarding the right to water of
Cochabamba's citizens. Three main problems relate to the af-
fordability of water, interference with customary or traditional
arrangements for water allocation, and the lack of public partici-
pation in decision-making processes regarding the right to
water.
(2) Affordability of Water
According to the ESCR Committee, governments are re-
quired to ensure that water is affordable.5 9 To this end, "States
Seek New Public Handouts, at 1, available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/mythof-
privatefincancing.pdf (last visited May 9, 2003).
536. See PETER H. GLEICK ET AL., THE NEW ECONOMY OF WATER: THE RISKS AND
BENEFITS OF GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF FRESH WATER 21 (2002); see also In-
terview with John Briscoe, supra note 358.
537. General Comment No. 15, supra note 296, para. 11.
538. There are several instances in which the ESCR Committee's General Com-
ment makes reference to the role of the private sector in water services. See, e.g., id.
paras. 27, 49.
539. See id. at para. 2.
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parties must adopt the necessary measures that may include, in-
ter alia: (a) use of a range of appropriate low-cost techniques
and technologies; (b) appropriate pricing policies such as free
or low-cost water; and (c) income supplements. Any payment
for water services has to be based on the principle of equity, en-
suring that these services, whether privately or publicly provided,
are affordable for all, including socially disadvantaged groups.
Equity demands that poorer households should not be dispro-
portionately burdened with water expenses as compared to
richer households. 540
The ESCR Committee's statement contains two distinct but
related principles. First, there is the principle of equity: a com-
parative standard that holds that poor households should not
bear a disproportionate burden of water expenses as compared
to rich households. And second, there is the principle of af-
fordability, which suggests the right to water sets an upper limit
on the cost of water in relation to people's ability to pay for it.
We apply each of these principles in turn.
In the case of the AdT concession, Bolivia's government and
AdT did not design the rate increases with the principle of eq-
uity in mind. Neither party proposed subsidies to mitigate the
impact of rate increases on the poor. Moreover, the rate in-
creases for the poorest people in Cochabamba were, at some
levels of consumption, proportionately higher than they were for
wealthier residents. 54 1 Thus, although the overall tariff structure
remained progressive, AdT's tariff structure was less equitable
than the previous one. Measured against the principle of equity,
therefore, the privatization of Cochabamba's water supply un-
dermined the progressive realization of the right to water by the
poorest consumers.
With respect to the concept of affordability, the ESCR Com-
mittee offers the following definition: "[t] he direct and indirect
costs and charges associated with securing water must be afforda-
ble, and must not compromise or threaten the realization of
other Covenant rights." Thus, for water to be regarded as afford-
able, individuals must be able to secure an adequate supply with-
out compromising other basic needs.5 42
540. Id. at para. 27.
541. See discussion, supra Part III.A.8.a.
542. Similarly, with respect to the right to housing, the ESCR Committee has
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The concession with AdT guaranteed a 16% rate of return
to Aguas del Tunari, included the expensive Misicuni project,
required AdT to assume SEMAPA's large debt, and incorporated
a policy of full cost recovery, even though the signatories knew
that this agreement would necessarily lead to substantial in-
creases in rates. Although the rate increases for water and sew-
age services varied in accordance with income level, the State did
not take any measures to mitigate the impact of the increases,
even for the most vulnerable citizens. As a result, the increases
put a tremendous strain on the budgets of Cochabamba's poor
and, at least in some cases, threatened the satisfaction of basic
needs or the fulfillment of other ESC rights. For example, Jim
Shultz relates the case of "Tanya Paredes, a mother of four who
supports her family knitting baby clothes, [who] saw her water
bill increased from U.S. $5 per month to nearly U.S. $20, a rise
equal to what it costs her to feed her family for a week and a half.
'What we pay for water comes out of what we have to pay for
food, clothes and the other things we need to buy for our chil-
dren,' she says."' 543 In that case, the rate increase threatened Ms.
Paredes' satisfaction of her family's basic needs, such as food and
possibly housing and health care.
To the extent that Cochabamba's poorest residents face in-
creases in tariffs sufficient to undermine their ability to meet
other basic needs, Bolivia violated their right to water.
(3) Interference with traditional arrangements for
water allocation
According to the ESCR Committee, "[t] he obligation to re-
spect [the right to water] requires that State parties refrain from
interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right
to water. The obligation includes, inter alia ... arbitrarily inter-
fering with customary or traditional arrangements for water allo-
cation .... "
Although AdT claims that it did not plan to sell water to
stated that the cost of housing "should be at such a level that the attainment and satis-
faction of other basic needs are not threatened or compromised." The right to adequate
housing (Art. 11(1) of the Covenant), ESCR Committee, 6th Sess., General Comment No.
4, at para. 8(c), U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (1991) (emphasis added) [hereinafter General
Comment No. 4].
543. See Shultz, supra note 502.
544. General Comment No. 15, supra note 296, at para. 21.
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peasants for irrigation, Law 2029 allowed the possibility of charg-
ing peasants who drew water in the area covered by the conces-
sion. Moreover, Law 2029 required that peasants obtain their
water through the concessionaire, except in special circum-
stances to be determined by the government. 545 In areas that
could not be covered by a concession, groups of citizens or gov-
ernmental entities would have to obtain five-year, non-exclusive
licenses for water provision.546 All of these requirements, in the
view of the peasants living around Cochabamba, affected their
traditional uses and customs with regard to water allocation.5 4 7
In particular, they feared that they might lose the ability to draw
water for irrigation without paying for it.
Assuming that these provisions did interfere to some extent
with customary arrangements for water allocation, such interfer-
ence constitutes a violation of the right to water only if it is arbi-
trary. As noted by Hugo Galindo, former Prefect of Cocha-
bamba, "not all uses and customs are good. Technology [has]
changed over time and if you can have a better life by changing
your uses and customs why not? In fact, that's why a big migra-
tion of peasants to the city has occurred-because uses and cus-
toms aren't working."548 For example, if requiring peasants to
obtain their water through the concessionaire would mean im-
proved access to water for them, then the interference with cus-
tomary arrangements would not have been arbitrary. Similarly,
if the belief that scarce water resources would be better managed
through a concessionaire motivated the decision, it might not
have been arbitrary.
Notwithstanding these qualifications, Law 2029 was passed
with little debate and was apparently intended simply to provide
a legal framework for the AdT concession and the operation of
the Superintendency of Basic Sanitation. To the extent that the
interference with "uses and customs" was merely a byproduct of
the deal structured to serve other purposes, the interference
may be deemed arbitrary and in violation of the right to water.
545. Law 2029, art. 72.
546. Id. arts. 44-45.
547. These uses and customs involved drawing water directly from natural water
sources, in accordance with a complex set of rules regarding who could draw water
when, so as to ensure equitable sharing of water, and so as to avoid overdrawing water.
See Interview with Omar Fernandez, supra note 432.
548. See Interview with Hugo Galindo, supra note 453.
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b. The Right to Property
Some residents of Cochabamba complained that the con-
tract allowed AdT to install meters on private and community-
owned wells and that, under Law 2029 and the concession agree-
ment, the company could require people to connect to the AdT
water service network. 49 People who obtained water through
wells they had built themselves feared that AdT would begin to
charge them for the water drawn from these wells, violating their
property rights.
Although the provisions in Law 2029 and the concession
agreement do seem to allow AdT to charge people for water
from wells they had built, that such charges would constitute a
violation of the right to property is less clear. The right to prop-
erty, though not explicitly recognized in the ICESCR or ICCPR,
is recognized in the American Convention on Human Rights,
550
which is binding on Bolivia, and in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. 551 The Universal Declaration provides that all
people have the right to own property, privately or in association
with others, and prohibits arbitrary deprivations of property.552
The American Convention on Human Rights provides more de-
tail and includes a right to compensation:
1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his
property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to
the interest of society.
2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon
payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or
social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms estab-
lished by law.553
The new water law and contract gave AdT control over all
water sources in the area during the period of the concession,
allowing the company to charge well owners for water. Never-
theless, given that the Bolivian Constitution provides that all wa-
ters in Bolivia belong to the State, AdT's charging for water can-
not properly be regarded as a deprivation of property in the
water itself. Alternatively, well owners might argue that insofar
549. See Contracto de Concesion, ann. 5, art. 1.1; Law 2029, art. 72.
550. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 17, art. 21.
551. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 336, art. 17.
552. See id.
553. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 17, art. 21(1)-(2).
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as the imposition of tariffs would deprive the wells of their value,
the granting to AdT of the concession and rights of water drawn
from the wells amounted to a deprivation of the owners' prop-
erty in the wells themselves. Yet this argument too depends on
an assumption that the well owners reasonably relied on the con-
tinued access to free water, an assumption undermined by the
State's ownership of all water resources.
2. Procedural Rights
a. The Rights to Participation and Information
The central problem in the process of privatization of Co-
chabamba's water system and a major cause of the water war was
the lack of transparency and public participation in the decision-
making process. Meaningful consultation with stakeholders dur-
ing the negotiation process might have led to substantive
changes in the contract. Indeed, many of the citizens' com-
plaints about the law and contract concerned provisions that
were relatively unimportant to the parties. For example, given
that AdT claims it did not intend to charge for water drawn from
private wells or used in irrigation, the contract could have simply
prohibited such charges, eliminating a major source of discon-
tent among the water warriors. Even without substantive
changes to the contract, consultation and a better campaign to
inform citizens of the terms contained in the new contract and
law might have generated wider public support and avoided the
conflict.
Although the ICESCR does not explicitly provide for a right
to participate in decision-making related to ESC rights or a right
to information, the ESCR Committee has recognized the exis-
tence of these rights and their importance to the protection and
fulfillment of various substantive ESC rights.5 5" In particular,
with regard to the right to water, the ESCR Committee has noted
that one of the State's core obligations is "[t] o adopt and imple-
ment a national water strategy and plan of action addressing the
554. For example, in its General Comment on the Right to Housing, the ESCR
Committee stated that "the full enjoyment of other rights - such as ... the right to
participate in public decision-making - is indispensable if the right to adequate hous-
ing is to be realized and maintained by all groups in society." General Comment No. 4,
supra note 542, at 9. In addition, the Committee emphasized that national housing
strategies "should reflect extensive consultation with, and participation by, all of those
affected[.]" Id. at 12.
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whole population; the strategy and plan of action should be de-
vised, and periodically reviewed, on the basis of a participatory
and transparent process."555 In a later paragraph, the General
Comment reiterates the importance of public participation in
decision-making about water, and public access to information
concerning water:
The formulation and implementation of national water strat-
egies and plans of action should respect, inter alia, the princi-
ples of non-discrimination and people's participation. The
right of individuals and groups to participate in decision-mak-
ing processes, that may affect their exercise of the right to
water, must be an integral part of any policy, programme or
strategy concerning water. Individuals and groups should be
given full and equal access to information concerning water,
water services and the environment, held by public authori-
ties or third parties.55 6
The participation of local and national representatives, al-
though perhaps sufficient to satisfy the ICCPR requirement that
citizens be permitted to participate in the conduct of public af-
fairs,557 falls short of the standard established in the ESCR's Gen-
eral Comment. The General Comment speaks of "the right of
individuals and groups to participate," suggesting that realiza-
tion of the right requires a more direct opportunity for partici-
pation in decisions affecting water than is afforded by ordinary
555. General Comment No. 15, supra note 296, at I 37(f) (emphasis added).
556. Id. at 48.
557. "The conduct of public affairs . . . is a broad concept which relates to the
exercise of political power .... The allocation of powers and the means by which
individual citizens exercise the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs...
should be established by the constitution and other laws...." See ICCPR General Com-
ment 25, The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights, and the Right of Equal Access
to Public Service, A/51/40, vol. I, ann. V, at 98-103, 7 5 (1996) [hereinafter ICCPR Gen-
eral Comment 25]. Under the ICCPR, citizens can participate directly in the conduct
of public affairs "when they exercise power as members of legislative bodies or by hold-
ing executive office, [or] when they choose or change their constitution or decide pub-
lic issues through referendum or other electoral process." Id. at 1 6. But citizens also
participate in the conduct of public affairs indirectly "through freely chosen representa-
tives" or "by exerting influence through public debate and dialogue with their repre-
sentatives or through their capacity to organize themselves. This participation is sup-
ported by ensuring freedom of expression, assembly and association." Id. at 1 7-8.
There is no indication that the right to participation under the ICCPR requires that
citizens be given opportunities for heightened participation in the context of certain
types of decisions.
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democratic processes.55 Finally, the Comment also refers to the
obligation of public authorities or third parties (such as AdT) to
provide information to individuals and groups, suggesting that
the representative role of public authorities is not sufficient to
satisfy the right to participate in decisions concerning water.559
International human rights law does not specify the precise
558. Rights to participation are also found in international law regarding indige-
nous peoples. In particular, indigenous peoples have the right to participate in deci-
sion-making that affects their cultural existence. The Draft Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples Rights affords indigenous peoples "the right to participate fully,
if they so choose, at all levels of decision-making in matters which may affect their
rights, lives and destinies .... ." Draft Declaration, art. 19. A similar provision is found
in ILO Convention 169. See ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 17 art. 7(1). Moreo-
ver, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has instructed States to "take
the measures necessary to ensure the meaningful and effective participation of indige-
nous representatives in the decision-making processes about development and other
issues which affect them and their cultural survival." See Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report on the
Situation of Human Rights Situation in Ecuador, ch. IX, OEA/Ser/L/V/II/96 (1997); see
also Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N.
GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc.A/RES/1803 (1962); Report of the UN Special
Rapporteur on Indigenous Populations (1983) (noting that in the absence of a negotiated
agreement with the indigenous groups who will be affected by mining, such activity is
prohibited on indigenous lands); Lansman et al. v. Finland, 9.6, Communication No.
511/1992, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992
(Committee of Human Rights) (concluding that quarrying did not deprive indigenous
peoples of the right to enjoy their culture because, in particular, the groups affected
were consulted during the process).
559. Similar requirements of a heightened degree of participation and provision
of information can be found in other international instruments dealing with particular
areas of law, such as the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe's Convention on Ac-
cess to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters. See Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Deci-
sion-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus 1998), June, 25, 1998,
available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
The Convention explicitly recognizes that, in the area of environment, "improved ac-
cess to information and public participation in decision-making enhance the quality
and the implementation of decisions, contribute to public awareness of environmental
issues, give the public the opportunity to express its concerns and enable public author-
ities to take due account of such concerns." Id. Moreover, as stated by U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan,
[allthough regional in scope, the significance of the Aarhus Convention is
global. It is by far the most impressive elaboration of principle 10 of the Rio
Declaration, which stresses the need for citizen's participation in environmen-
tal issues and for access to information on the environment held by public
authorities. As such it is the most ambitious venture in the area of 'environ-
mental democracy' so far undertaken under the auspices of the United Na-
tions.
See Statement by Kofi Annan, available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp (last visited
Apr. 9, 2004).
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form for heightened participation in matters concerning water
and other central ESC rights. Indeed, the appropriate form may
vary from State to State. Thus, our conclusion that the privatiza-
tion process failed to ensure adequate public participation does
not imply that the process itself had to take any particular form.
Rather, we conclude that, viewed as a whole, it failed to meet the
standard of a "participatory and transparent process" or even the
less burdensome standard of giving groups "full and equal access
to information" concerning access to water.
Part of the problem is structural: Bolivia lacks a legal mech-
anism through which stakeholders may participate in policy deci-
sions regarding ESC rights or even obtain information regarding
such decisions. Bolivia regulates the activities of corporations in
various sectors at the national level through Superintendencies.
In turn, the overall legal framework for this regulatory structure
is the Law for the System of Sectorial Regulation ("SIRESE
Law").6° This Law requires Superintendencies to hear and pro-
cess complaints presented by users, as well as by the regulated
companies and the government.561 Users may also challenge ad-
ministrative resolutions through a "revocation appeal" if they
can show that "they have been prejudiced in their legitimate in-
terests or rights."5 6 2 Bolivia also has a "Law of Popular Participa-
tion"563 that is designed to integrate indigenous, peasant and ur-
ban local communities into the legal and political life of the
country.564 It does so primarily by decentralizing administrative
authority, granting greater powers to municipal governments
and allowing for the creation of community groups ("base terri-
torial organizations") that through a "vigilance committee" have
an oversight role with respect to municipalities, particularly with
respect to budgeting issues.565
Neither of these alternatives offered an avenue for popular
participation in the privatization process in Cochabamba. Al-
though the SIRESE law provides a means of challenging deci-
560. Ley SIRESE, Ley No. 1600 (Oct. 28, 1994).
561. Id. art. 10(h).
562. Id. art. 22.
563. See Ley de Participacion Popular, Ley No. 1551 (Apr. 20, 1993).
564. Id. art. 1.
565. See id. arts. 7-10. See also Steven E. Hendrix, Advancing Toward Privatization,
Education Reform, Popular Participation and Decentralization: Bolivia's Innovation in Legal
and Economic Reform, 14 ARiz. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 679, 698-709 (1997).
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sions after the fact, it does nothing to ensure timely participation
in decision-making at the Superintendency level. The Law of
Popular Participation applies only at the municipal level, so it
would not have facilitated public access to information about ne-
gotiations over the concession agreement or Law 2029, which
were conducted by the national government. In short, as one
commentator noted, Bolivia has "no effective mechanism
through which the population can be consulted before decisions
are made by the Regulatory authority, on such vital issues as tar-
iffs, concessions, regulation taxes or charges.... 566
These structural problems were exacerbated in this case as
the contract negotiations were not open to the public, and many
details, such as the provision allowing AdT to install meters on
private wells, were not publicized at all. The confidentiality
clause in the concession agreement limited the public's access to
information even after the negotiations were completed. More-
over, no government or corporate official appears to have ex-
pressed any interest in making the process more open, in inte-
grating members of civil society in the negotiations, or in in-
forming the public of the content of negotiations. 67 To the
contrary, parties may have wanted secrecy precisely because they
knew that the public would oppose the agreement. The passage
of Law 2029 raises similar concerns. Although various interest
groups, including indigenous and irrigators' groups, had partici-
pated actively in negotiations over the proposed general law of
waters over a long period of time, Law 2029 was passed very
quickly, without any input from these groups. The fact that Law
2029 - ostensibly meant to address urban water services - also
dealt with issues that had been the subject of dispute in negotia-
tions over the general law of waters suggests that the passage of
Law 2029 may have been done in such a way as to avoid or mini-
mize public deliberation over its terms.
Our position is that this failure to provide a participatory
and transparent process is itself a violation of the procedural
rights of Cochabamba residents. At the same time, a better pro-
cess, both in connection with privatization and the passage of
Law 2029, might have reduced or eliminated threats to substan-
tive rights. For example, public participation might have re-
566. Crespo, supra note 433, at 185.
567. See discussion, supra Part III.A.4.
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sulted in changes to the agreement that in turn lessened the im-
pact on the city's poor. Yet, even if such changes had not re-
sulted, greater transparency and participation might have
legitimated the actual outcome of negotiations and the legisla-
tion in the eyes of the population, thereby preventing the water
wars.
In short, we conclude that Bolivia's failure to conduct its
negotiations and decision-making regarding water in a transpar-
ent and participatory manner was one of the central causes of
the water wars and may have contributed to the substantive viola-
tions of human rights discussed in the last section.
3. Aguas del Tunari's Responsibility
The Draft Norms for TNCs provide that " [w] ithin their re-
spective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corpora-
tions and other business enterprises have the obligation to pro-
mote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and
protect human rights recognized in international as well as na-
tional law, including the rights and interests of indigenous peo-
ples and other vulnerable groups." '568 Among other obligations,
the Draft Norms provide that "[t] ransnational corporations and
other business enterprises shall respect economic, social and cul-
tural rights as well as civil and political rights and contribute to
their realization, in particular the rights to development, ade-
quate food and drinking water, the highest attainable standard
of physical and mental health ... and shall refrain from actions
which obstruct or impede the realization of those rights. " "'
In the present case, Aguas del Tunari operated in concert
with the Bolivian government in imposing a concession agree-
ment that included several provisions and a tariff structure that
arguably violated the right to water of Cochabamba's residents.
The company designed the rate structure, and consequently was
fully aware of the severity of rate increases for poor residents of
Cochabamba. Insofar as those rate increases can be considered
violative of the rights of at least some Cochabamba residents,
Aguas del Tunari could be deemed responsible under the Draft
Norms for a failure to respect the right to "adequate drinking
water." Moreover, Aguas del Tunari engaged in negotiations
568. Draft Norms for TNCs, supra note 29, art. 1.
569. Id. art. 12.
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with the Bolivian government and conducted its operation in a
highly secretive manner, which included no participation from
members of civil society. The company did not make any signifi-
cant effort to open up the process of negotiations to consulta-
tion, or even to provide information to the public about its
plans. To the contrary, it included a confidentiality clause in the
contract, and refused to speak with Coordinadora representa-
tives during the water war. The fact that the company admits
that it was concerned about public opposition to the contract,
and that it trusted the government to "take care of it" evidences
a willingness on the part of the company to participate in the
imposition of a contract that was likely to be rejected by large
segments of the population. Although these actions may not
have violated national laws regarding transparency and account-
ability, AdT's failure to ensure that international law regarding
transparency and public participation was respected would con-
stitute a violation of the procedural guarantees of the Draft
Norms.
C. Recommendations
To the Bolivian State:
1. Establish formal procedures for stakeholder participa-
tion in decision-making related to ESC rights. These
procedures should include adequate notification of
stakeholders of the decision-making process, full provi-
sion of information regarding the process, and opportu-
nities for stakeholder input.
2. Establish procedures for the review of individual com-
plaints regarding violations of ESC rights, including vio-
lations resulting from the absence of adequate informa-
tion about or public participation in decision-making
regarding ESC rights.
3. Require that, in all decisions that might affect ESC
rights, the impact on vulnerable populations be consid-
ered and mitigated.
4. Improve and expand Cochabamba's water system, pay-
ing particular attention to the situation of persons who
are not currently connected to the network.
To Aguas del Tunari and its parent companies:
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1. Agree to release to the public all documentation filed in
the ICSID proceeding.
2. Require stakeholder participation in negotiations with
national governments over deals that might impact on
ESC rights.
3. Commit to abiding by the Draft Norms for TNCs.
IV. FINAL OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING ESC RIGHTS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD
The two cases discussed in this Report illustrate our initial
observation that the growth of TNC activities in developing
countries has increasingly affected the enjoyment of ESC rights
by people in those countries. The core problem presented by
these cases is not the absence of substantive norms but rather
the lack of enforcement. International law establishes a variety
of applicable principles with respect to the protection of the eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights implicated in the cases, and,
more recently, to the responsibilities of TNCs regarding ESC
rights. Yet, norms were simply not enforced. At a domestic
level, this lack of enforcement resulted from governmental in-
competence and insufficient resources, as well as pressure from
TNCs. At an international level, few mechanisms exist to en-
force ESC rights against governments, much less against TNCs,
and those few mechanisms are weak and inaccessible to people
who are most likely to need them.57 °
The lack of international enforcement mechanisms for ESC
rights against TNCs is particularly striking given the rapid devel-
opment of international legal mechanisms for the enforcement
of rights under private investment agreements. As illustrated by
Aguas del Tunari's invocation of the jurisdiction of ICSID based
on the BIT between Bolivia and the Netherlands, TNCs now
have at their disposal not only rules designed to guarantee in-
vestment security, but also tribunals empowered to enforce those
rules. 571 In contrast, for the violations of ESC rights described in
this Report, options for enforcement were extremely limited:
570. As stated by Beth Stephens in writing about corporate responsibility for
human rights violations, "[e]nforcement... remains 'the Achilles' heel' of the system."
Stephens, supra note 34, at 48.
571. Rulings by ICSID cannot be easily ignored by the countries involved. AsJohn
Briscoe noted with respect to the water wars case, although the International Develop-
ment Association of the World Bank and ICSID operate independently, if ICSID ruled
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the strongest course of action for individuals in either case
would have been to file a petition against Bolivia with the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights for the violations of
rights contained in the American Convention.572 Yet, the claim-
ants would have been able to do little with respect to the alleged
violations by the TNCs,5 7 3 or about violations of rights not con-
tained within the American Convention.574
In short, although private international law has experienced
remarkable development in recent years, international human
rights law, particularly with respect to ESC rights, has failed to
keep pace with globalization. In our view, this situation argues
strongly in favor of two things: first, the development of new
international enforcement mechanisms to address ESC rights,
including TNC responsibility for violations of such rights (or the
expansion of existing international enforcement mechanisms so
as to address these issues); and second, increased attention to
the design and effectiveness of domestic processes for the en-
forcement of ESC rights, particularly against TNCs. The former
is already the subject of much debate and scholarly attention
and is consequently only briefly addressed in the following
paragraphs. The latter, however, requires further elaboration
and is the focus of the remainder of this Report.
A. International Enforcement Mechanisms
The effort to develop better enforcement mechanisms at
the international level must take place along two fronts: the en-
forcement of human rights norms against TNCs, and improve-
ment of international enforcement of ESC rights generally. On
the first front, we consider the approval by the U.N. Subcommis-
sion on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights' of the
that the Bolivian government's actions towards AdT constituted an expropriation "that
won't help in requests for loans." Interview with John Briscoe, supra note 358.
572. These include potentially the right to property and the right to effective judi-
cial remedies. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 17, arts. 21, 25
(providing for the right to property and the right to judicial protection respectively).
573. The Inter-American Commission reviews only petitions regarding violations
committed by Member States of the OAS.
574. These would include, for example, the right to health, and the right to a
healthy environment. Cf Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 17, arts. 10-12 (rights to
health, and a healthy environment). As previously noted, Bolivia has not yet ratified the
Protocol of San Salvador, which addresses economic, social, and cultural rights. We
strongly recommend that Bolivia ratify this instrument.
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Draft Norms for TNCs, along with its request that the Working
Group on the Working Methods and Activities of TNCs tempora-
rily monitor the implementation of the Draft Norms, to be a
highly positive development. We recommend that the U.N.
Human Rights Commission approve the Draft Norms, and estab-
lish a permanent monitoring mechanism that can receive com-
plaints regarding TNC viorations of human rights, including ESC
rights. In addition, although voluntary codes of corporate con-
duct and the guidelines or principles for multinational enter-
prises developed by the OECD and ILO are welcome develop-
ments, associated reporting and monitoring mechanisms should
be strengthened.
Assessments of the impact of TNC activity on human rights
should also be incorporated into the work of existing human
rights monitoring bodies and tribunals. For example, the ESCR
Committee should address more systematically TNC violations of
ESC rights in its review of country reports. Similarly, regional
human rights systems should explore the possibility of address-
ing TNC responsibility for human rights violations. For exam-
ple, the Inter-American system might begin this process through
the development of specialized studies on TNC responsibility for
human rights violations in the region,575 and eventually develop
a regional legal framework applicable to TNCs.
On the second front, the establishment of an individual pe-
tition system in connection with the ICESCR576 would assist in
the definition of violations by generating more detailed and spe-
cific interpretations of the content of ESC rights. 7 7 Although
575. These might be similar to its recent reports on indigenous people's rights or
women's rights. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Sta-
tus of Women in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.100, Doc. 17 (Oct. 13, 1998); Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, The Human Rights Situation of Indigenous
People in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.108, Doc. 62 (Oct. 20, 2000).
576. The Protocol of San Salvador allows for individual petitions in limited cases.
See Protocol of San Salvador, art. 19(6). This system could be extended to violations of
other ESC rights as well.
577. Since 1990, the ESCR Committee has been contemplating the adoption of a
draft optional protocol to the ICESCR, which would grant the right of individuals or
groups to submit communications (complaints) to the ESCR Committee regarding
State failures to comply with the ICESCR. See Krrrv ARAMBULO, STRENGTHENING THE
SUPERVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS 173-346 (1999). At least one scholar has proposed a review process focused on
violations of the ICESCR, rather than on the "progressive realization" of ESC rights:
"The Committee does not and cannot assess progressive realization; if effective and
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the ESCR Committee has helped to clarify the content of various
rights through its General Comments, few examples exist of the
application of the rights to specific cases, and so in many re-
spects, the standards remain abstract. As a result, violations of
these rights can be difficult to identify with any degree of confi-
dence.578 We encountered this difficulty in both cases described
here. Through consideration of individual petitions, the ESCR
Committee could, for example, clarify the standard of care that
applies to violations of the right to water or health. Equally im-
portantly, a system for considering individual petitions would
create an avenue of recourse for individuals who have suffered
violations of ESC rights, and who have not been able to obtain
effective remedies from their own States.
B. Strengthening Procedural ESC Rights
Although effective international mechanisms for enforce-
ment of ESC rights and for the enforcement of human rights
norms against TNCs are important, the development of domes-
tic enforcement mechanisms will likely be more significant from
the standpoint of most victims. Domestic laws and institutions
are the primary mechanisms for realizing ESC rights and for reg-
ulating the conduct of TNCs. Indeed, although ESCR standards
have in recent years been receiving more detailed elaboration
from the ESCR Committee, to some extent their meaning must
be left broadly defined so that their specific meaning can be de-
termined by each state in context.579 Thus, with regard to many
systematic monitoring of economic, social, and cultural rights is to take place, then
nongovernmental organizations, governments, and human rights-monitoring bodies
need to reorient their work to identifying and rectifying violations." Audrey R. Chap-
man, A "Violations Approach "for Monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 23, 36 (1996).
578. This difficulty has contributed to NGOs' reluctance to report on violations of
ESC rights. For example, Human Rights Watch's policy on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights states that:
Human Rights Watch considers that economic, social, and cultural rights are
an integral part of the body of international human rights law, with the same
character and standing as civil and political rights. We conduct research and
advocacy on economic, social, and cultural rights using the same methodology
that we use with respect to civil and political rights and subject to the same crite-
ria, namely, the ability to identify a rights violation, a violator, and a remedy to address
the violation.
HRW Policy on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, available at http://
www.hrw.org/esc/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2004) (emphasis added).
579. "The question for the Committee is how to go about identifying the core
179120041
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rights in the Covenant, the ESCR Committee has opted for de-
manding that States parties establish benchmarks or indicators
to evaluate the enjoyment and progression of ESC rights in each
State, rather than setting out international ones that are applica-
ble across the board.58 And the ICESCR (as well as other inter-
national agreements regarding ESC rights) leaves open the
means that are to be used to realize the rights, stating only that
these must be "appropriate" and include "the adoption of legis-
lative measures."5"' Thus, although the text of the ICESCR and
the interpretations of the ESCR Committee impose some
outside constraints on what States can do (e.g., States must pay
particular attention to the situation of the most disadvantaged
entitlement flowing from each right recognized in the Covenant. In the first instance,
of course, the responsibility rests with the [S] rates parties themselves .... In this regard
the role of the Committee will be to encourage governments to undertake such efforts
as an integral part of the obligations they have undertaken." See Philip Alston, Out of the
Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, 9 HuM. RTs. Q. 333, 353 (1987).
580. Nonetheless, the ESCR Committee does not rely exclusively on national in-
dicators. As noted by Craven:
The necessity of utilizing national indicators, as opposed to international ones,
is justified primarily by the variety of social and economic contexts in which
the rights operate. However, although it may be appropriate for States to be
given a margin of discretion in determining the level at which a national
benchmark should be set, it may be questioned whether national standards
should be the sole criterion for assessment. To allow the indicators for assess-
ment to vary from country to country may undermine the universal nature of
the rights and may ultimately give States parties the power to decide the extent
of their own obligations.
With this in mind, the Committee explicitly stipulated that it 'cannot accept
their (States') national indicators as a general criterion for international as-
sessment.' In practice, it has questioned national qualitative and quantitative
data on the basis of that received from international and non-governmental
sources .... The success of this strategy, however, is crucially dependent upon
access to reliable alternative sources of information against which the State
reports may be balanced. In the absence of such information, the State
benchmarks may provide the only basis on which assessment may be made.
See CRAVEN, supra note 20, at 118-19 (1995).
581. ICESCR art. 2(1). In addition, the ICESCR does not dictate any particular
form of political or economic organization. As stated by the ESCR Committee, "the
undertaking 'to take steps... by all appropriate means including particularly the adop-
tion of legislative measures' neither requires nor precludes any particular form of gov-
ernment or economic system being used as a vehicle for the steps in question, provided
only that it is democratic and that all human rights are thereby respected .... The
rights recognized in the Covenant are susceptible of realization within the context of a
wide variety of economic and political systems." ESCR Committee, General Comment
No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (1990).
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members of society), for the most part, the method by which the
rights are realized is left up to each State.
But to the extent that international law leaves the content
and form of implementation of ESC rights open to different
States' interpretations and applications, the process whereby
States define, prioritize, and implement these rights gains cen-
tral importance. If water, health care, and housing are to be
treated as rights, then procedural safeguards must exist to en-
sure that States are taking into account the views of major stake-
holders in their decision-making, that States do not implement
policies in a discriminatory manner or in a manner that unduly
burdens vulnerable populations, and that citizens have recourse
for complaints about violations of these rights. In effect, such
procedural safeguards help to ensure the integrity of the State's
progressive realization of ESC rights. Insofar as those rights are
defined flexibly to allow States to establish priorities for the use
of scarce resources, procedural rights guarantee that the bearers
of those rights have a say in the establishment of those priorities.
In view of these considerations, we suggest that efforts to
improve the enforcement of ESC rights against both States and
TNCs should concentrate on the improvement of domestic
processes for enforcement. Along with developing substantive
standards, international institutions should emphasize States'
compliance with their obligations to provide effective remedies
for violations of ESC rights, and to develop transparent and par-
ticipatory decision-making processes with respect to ESC
rights. 582 International law and institutions should stress the
centrality of these obligations, put pressure on States to comply
with them, and, perhaps most importantly, provide guidance to
States regarding measures they can or should take to come into
compliance.
582. States' duty to protect ESC rights from third parties arguably entail additional
procedural obligations, such as effective regulation of TNCs to prevent violations from
occurring. This obligation is encompassed, along with the obligation to provide effec-
tive remedies, by the "due diligence test," which "says that a [S]tate must have taken
reasonable or serious steps to prevent or respond to an abuse by a private actor, includ-
ing investigating and providing a remedy such as compensation. It gauges the efforts
and willingness of a [S]tate to act." International Council on Human Rights Policy,
Beyond Voluntarism: Human Rights and the Developing International Legal Obliga-
tions of Companies 52 (2002), available at http://www.ichrp.org (last viewed May 19,
2004). The due diligence test was first articulated in the Velasquez Rodriguez case,
supra note 340.
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The need for greater emphasis on domestic process is borne
out by our two cases. In both, the most troubling and obvious
problems concerned the government's failure to satisfy its obli-
gations with respect to procedural rights - the rights to effec-
tive remedies, and to transparent and participatory decision-
making with respect to ESC rights. The water wars illustrate the
importance of mechanisms that ensure transparent and par-
ticipatory decision-making concerning basic ESC rights. Had
those mechanisms existed, the alleged violations of substantive
rights might have been avoided. And both cases illustrate the
importance of effective national remedies for violations of ESC
rights. In the water wars, given the clear danger that water
would become unaffordable for vulnerable individuals, the State
should have established a complaint procedure and monitoring
system. In the oil spill, the State's failure to intervene to ensure
that the damages were properly documented and remedied is
the single most important problem presented by the case. In-
deed, the State's abandonment of vulnerable populations may
well have converted the spill from an environmental incident
into a disaster with long-term human rights implications.
A separate point in favor of increasing attention to procedu-
ral rights is that such rights lend themselves to monitoring, both
at the level of progressive realization, and of identification of vio-
lations. Given that States' decision-making and enforcement
procedures are usually preset through legislation or rules, it is
possible, in advance, to criticize those procedures on their face
or to point to alternative procedures that are required to pro-
gressively realize ESC rights. Similarly, general problems in the
functioning of State institutions that might affect procedural
rights, such as lack of efficiency in the judicial system, are often
easy to identify even outside of the context of specific cases. For
example, in Bolivia, training of the judiciary in the area of envi-
ronmental protection is one of many measures that would con-
tribute to the progressive realization of ESC rights.
In turn, violations of procedural rights are often easy to
identify, at least in the grossest of cases. When States make im-
portant decisions regarding ESC rights in complete secrecy, or
refuse to enforce their own laws against third parties in cases
involving ESC rights, violations of procedural rights are evident.
Even in more complicated cases, such as those discussed in this
Report, it is often easy to sketch out the actions that the govern-
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ment reasonably should (or should not) have taken to satisfy its
obligations with respect to procedural rights. In contrast, as our
cases illustrate, establishing with certainty and precision a viola-
tion of the right to water or health can be quite difficult.
The need for international attention to procedural guaran-
tees of ESC rights is particularly strong in view of the increased
presence of TNCs in developing countries. As a result of the
internal and external pressures that States are under to attract
the foreign direct investment provided by TNCs, States may be
more likely to enter contracts or pass laws that provide inade-
quate protections for ESC rights or enforce laws unequally in
cases involving TNCs. They may also tend towards secrecy in de-
cision-making processes involving TNCs, as illustrated by the
water wars case.
2. Ways of Promoting Procedural Rights
There are several ways in which international institutions
can promote procedural rights associated with ESC rights.
First, international and regional human rights bodies
should further elaborate and formalize procedural rights. Al-
though the ESCR Committee has noted that States must provide
"effective remedies" and "transparent and participatory decision-
making processes," the Committee should provide additional
guidance regarding the implications of these rights."8 3 Indeed,
583. Thus, for example, "effective remedies" should be understood to include, as
described by the Maastricht Guidelines, "mechanisms to correct such violations, includ-
ing monitoring, investigation, prosecution, and remedies for victims." "Effective reme-
dies" should also be understood to require that barriers to access to these mechanisms
be eliminated. For example, in cases involving disadvantaged populations, free legal
advice should be provided by the State to the alleged victims. As suggested by the oil
spill case, the cost of lawsuits and the alleged victims' need for immediate economic
assistance to remedy the harm caused by a violation can become barriers to accessing
judicial remedies. States should find ways to avoid these types of problems - perhaps
by covering the costs of lawsuits, finding ways to mitigate the economic need of affected
individuals, or developing more efficient mechanisms for adjudication. Moreover, it
should be recognized that "effective remedies" could also be provided through non-
judicial mechanisms, and that several institutions outside the judiciary can contribute to
the provision of "effective remedies." See Scott Leckie, Another Step Towards Indivisibility:
Identifying the Key Features of Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20 HuM. RTs.
Q. 81, 120 (1998).
While judicial procedures geared towards the vindication of these rights are
critical, nonjudicial mechanisms of enforcement are seen as increasingly fun-
damental to ensuring respect for economic, social and cultural rights and
preventing their violation. Ombudsman institutions, national human rights
17952004]
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procedural aspects of ESC rights might be usefully addressed in
a separate international instrument. The UNECE Convention
on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Mak-
ing and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters is a useful
model in this respect.584
Second, international institutions concerned with ESC
rights and development should provide technical assistance to
countries regarding the design and implementation of participa-
tion and enforcement procedures. Fully guaranteeing procedu-
ral rights may require broad institutional reforms, for example
to combat corruption and increase access to the judicial system.
Given the magnitude of such an endeavor, States will require
assistance from a variety of international institutions other than
the ESCR Committee, which has limited resources and influ-
ence.5 85 In particular, regional human rights systems, such as
the Inter-American system for the protection of Human Rights,
should expand their scope to monitor and advise states on the
implementation of procedural ESC rights.5 8 6
It is worth noting that a significant overlap exists between
commissions, and truth commissions can play very crucial roles in drawing the
attention of public authorities to breaches of socioeconomic rights obliga-
tions.
Id.
In turn, "participation" and "information" rights sound very diffuse, and can raise
complicated questions: How much participation is enough? How should different par-
ticipants' views be taken into account and weighed? One would not want international
law answering all these questions in detail, because different answers may be right de-
pending on the domestic context. However, at a minimum, it could be said that in
important government decisions that directly affect ESC rights, a heightened form of
public participation and provision of information is required, such that all major stake-
holders are informed of the issues being discussed, and are given opportunities to di-
rectly voice their concerns. This standard would still be fairly malleable (although the
types of decisions to which the requirement applies, and the meaning of "stakeholders,"
bear further elaboration) and leaves States a margin of discretion to shape the
processes in a manner that makes sense in their context.
584. See UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in De-
cision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, supra note 559.
585. However, this should not be a reason for the ESCR Committee to shy away
from addressing these issues; after all, addressing procedural rights does not appear to
be significantly more difficult than analyzing complex data from States to determine
whether they are progressively realizing substantive ESC rights.
586. This could be done on the basis of the Protocol of San Salvador, which deals
with ESC rights. In addition, given that the American Convention on Human Rights
itself recognizes the right to effective judicial remedies for all violations of human rights
in that instrument (not merely ESC rights), the Convention itself provides an initial
basis for the Inter-American system to examine the quality of judicial remedies.
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the process concerns involved in ESCR protections, and the pro-
cess concerns associated with the protection of human rights
generally,587 and with the promotion of other goals such as de-
velopment and the elimination of poverty. Thus, all human
rights treaty monitoring bodies within the U.N. should reevalu-
ate their practices in terms of their effectiveness at encouraging
and aiding the development of good processes regarding ESC
rights. 5 88 Moreover, although the World Bank has resisted rec-
ognizing human rights promotion as within its mandate,589 it has
already taken a strong interest in judicial reform and anti-cor-
ruption measures, and has started to promote stakeholder par-
ticipation in its projects.590 Insofar as the protection of ESC
rights is intertwined with the issue of development, the World
Bank and other IFIs could refine their approach to institutional
reform so as to enhance ESC rights.
Third, international monitoring bodies and NGOs should
587. See Anne Gallagher, Making Human Rights Treaty Obligations a Reality: Working
with New Actors and Partners, in THE FUTURE OF U.N. HuMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING
201, 201-02 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).
Human rights are best protected in societies governed by the rule of law and
by a representative, accountable government. The protection of human rights
also presupposes an adequate standard of living for all persons; an impartial,
accessible and independent judiciary; efficient, professional and disciplined
law enforcement; a free and responsible press and a vigorous civil society.
Id.
588. As described by Anne Gallagher, there are a number of improvements that
can be made in this respect, such as improving the quality and specificity of their rec-
ommendations. Id. at 222. In addition,
while the treaty bodies are not in a position to fulfill all needs, they could with
some effort take the lead in ensuring that the required assistance is of suffi-
cient quality and is channeled in the right direction. The first target of the
treaty bodies' attention should be their institutional counterpart, the Techni-
cal Cooperation Programme run by the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights and which provides technical human rights-related advice and
assistance to governments which request it.
Id. at 223.
589. See Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the IMF, and Human Rights, 6 TRANS-
NAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 79 (1996)
590. See The World Bank Participation Sourcebook, available at http://
www.worldbank.org/wbi/sourcebook/sbOO02.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2004). The
World Bank has also issued guidelines for consultation with NGOs and civil society. See,
e.g., THE WORLD BANK, CONSULTATIONS WITH CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS: GENERAL
GUIDELINES FOR WORLD BANK STAFF (2000). Similarly, the Inter-American Development
Bank has also started to incorporate the goal of citizen participation into its operations.
See also INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING CITIZEN PARTICI-
PATION IN BANK ACTIVITIES (2002).
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begin investigating potential violations of procedural rights. We
have made the case that the identification of violations of proce-
dural aspects of ESC rights is not necessarily difficult. Moreover,
such a focus on procedure may provide an important avenue for
greater NGO participation in monitoring ESC rights because the
procedural aspects of those rights are more analogous to the
highly procedural domain of civil and political rights, which has
long been the subject of NGO scrutiny.
Finally, procedural rights should be incorporated into in-
struments and mechanisms that address the issue of TNC re-
sponsibilities with respect to human rights. For example, volun-
tary codes of corporate conduct and the Draft Norms on TNCs
should require that major stakeholders be given information
and the opportunity to participate in the decision-making pro-
cess.
The growth of TNC activity presents both opportunities and
challenges to the developing world. To a large extent, the citi-
zens of each State must measure the costs and benefits of such
activity according to their particular needs and priorities, a pro-
cess that, as recent events in Bolivia demonstrate, can be difficult
and divisive. At the same time, increased attention by interna-
tional bodies, NGOs and TNCs to the procedural aspects of ESC
rights can help to ensure both that the individuals most directly
affected by TNC activity will have the opportunity to take part in
that deliberation and that the most vulnerable citizens will not
bear a disproportionate share of the costs.
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ANNEX I Crowley Mission Itinerary
Monday, May 19, 2003: Cochabamba
TIME INTERVIEW
9 a.m. Oscar Olivera, Jose Gutierrez, and Gabriel Herbas,
Coordinadora para la Defensa del Agua y de la
Vida
11 a.m. Rene Orellana, Centro de Comunicaci6n y Desarrollo
Andino
GROUP A:
2:30 p.m. William Scarborough, U.S. Consul in Cochabamba
3:00 p.m. Humberto Vargas, Centro de Estudios de Realidad
Econ6mica y Social
GROUP B:
2:30 p.m. Franz Taquichiri, Las Vertientes Neighborhood
Association
5:00 p.m. Father Luis Sdnchez, SEMAPA board of directors
Raul Salvatierra, alternate member, SEMAPA board
of directors
Tuesday, May 20, 2003: Cochabamba
GROUP A:
9:00 a.m. Meeting at SEMAPA offices:
Rene Cardona, Oscar Flores, and Ebeth Claros, SEMAPA
workers
Gonzalo Ugalde, General Manager of SEMAPA
12:00 p.m. Marcelo Rojas, a.k.a. "Banderas", SEMAPA worker
2:30 p.m. Federico Diez de Medina
GROUP B:
9:00 a.m. Omar Fernandez, President of the Federation of
Irrigators of Cochabamba
2:30 p.m. Hugo Galindo, Prefect of Cochabamba 1999-2000
GROUP C:
9:00 a.m. Interviews in Neighborhood of Valle Hermoso
Father Luis Sanchez, SEMAPA board of directors
Raul Salvatierra, SEMAPA board of directors
Gladys Romero Gonzalez, auditor
Sonya Cosillo, auditor
Salvador Agustin Aricoma, President of
Neighborhood Water Committee
Gilberto Tomez Benai, Vice-President of
Neighborhood Water Committee Community
members
4:00 Jim Shultz, The Democracy Center
ALL GROUPS:
Evening: Reception with members of Cochabamba Bar
Association, offices of Voluntarios Bolivia
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Wednesday, May 21, 2003: Cochabamba and Oruro
7:30 a.m. Father Gregorio Iriarte
9:00 a.m. Travel to Oruro
4:00 p.m. Meeting with Oruro NGO and community
representatives in the offices of Centro de Ecologia
y Pueblos Andinos ("CEPA"):
Gilberto Pauwels, CEPA
Victor Alanes, CEPA
Norma Mollo, CEPA
Felipe Coronado, former President, FOBOMADE -
Oruro
Arturo Alessandri, Asamblea Permanente de
Derechos Humanos - Oruro
Clemente Paco, Pastoral Social
Carol Rocha, Pastoral Social
Catalina Ventura, Pastoral Social
Hans Moeller, Centro de Organizacion y Servicio
Social CISEP
Teodoro Blanco, Forestry Engineer and
Environmental Investigator
Ricardo Valente, Chuquifia community representative
Mercedes Luzco, Pata Pata community representative
Thursday, May 22, 2003: Oruro
GROUP A: Travel north of Oruro:
Ulloma community
Transredes pumping station in Sica-Sica
GROUP B:
9:00 a.m. Hans Moeller, CISEP
10:30 a.m. Daniel Solis, Oruro Prosecutor's Office
2:30 p.m. Felipe Coronado
GROUP C:
10:00 a.m. CARE - Oruro Offices:
Jorge Campero, Regional Administrator, CARE -
Oruro
Pietro Fiorilo, Project "Peace And Development"
CARE - Oruro
2:30 p.m. Arturo Alessandri, Asamblea Permanente de DDHH
Clemente Paco, Pastoral Social
GROUP D:
10:00 a.m. Juan Carlos Montoya, Departmental Director of
Natural Resources and the Environment, Oruro
Prefecture
3:00 p.m. Monsetior Braulio Saez, Bishop of Oruro
GROUPS B, C, and D:
4:00 p.m. Meeting with representatives from communities of
Toma-Toma, Choro-Choro, Chuquifia, El Choro
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Friday, May 23, 2003: Oruro and surrounding communities
6:00 a.m. Radio Interview in Quechua, Radio Bolivia
Community visits:
South Group:
Pufiaca Tinta Maria
Llapallapani
Lake Poopo
Center Group:
Santo Tomas
San Pedro de Chalacollo
El Choro
North Group
Pata-Pata
Eucaliptus
Chuquifia
Toma-Toma
Monday, May 26, 2003: La Paz
GROUP A:
10:00 a.m. Rogelio Mayta, attorney in Chuquifia lawsuit against
Transredes
11:30 a.m. Claude Bessett, Superintendente General
3:30 p.m. Carlos Villegas, CIDES-UMSA
5:30 p.m. Rene Gomez-Garcia Palau, Engineer
GROUP B:
11:30 a.m. Carlos Toranzo, ILDIS Foundation
2:30 p.m. Ramiro Guevara, attorney for International Water,
Ltd.
5:30 p.m. Carlos Miranda, former Superintendent of
Hydrocarbons
GROUP C:
4:00 Luis Bredow, journalist
ALL GROUPS:
Evening Reception in offices of Poder Ciudadano
Tuesday, May 27, 2003: La Paz
GROUP A:
9:00 a.m. Patricia Molina, Foro Boliviano de Medio Ambiente
y Desarrollo
11:00 a.m. Farit Rojas, Law School at Universidad Catolica
2:30 p.m. Andres Z7aratti, Anti-Corruption Secretariat of Bolivia
GROUP B:
10:30 a.m. Universidad Cat6lica meeting:
Gonzalo Chavez, Professor
Gover Barja, Professor
12:30 p.m. Jan Schollaert, Director of CARE-Bolivia
3:30 p.m. Julio Garrett, General Director of Industry in
Bolivia's Ministry of Economic Development
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GROUP C:
10:30 a.m. Enrique Mariaca, former Head of Yacimientos
Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos
12:30 p.m. Marianella Hidalgo, Attorney, Member of Auditing
Team
Wednesday, May 28, 2003: La Paz
GROUP A:
9:00 a.m. Tony Henshaw, Transredes
3:00 p.m. Ramiro Molina, Coordinator of Area in Indigenous
Peoples' Rights, Universidad de la Cordillera
4:30 p.m. Meeting with Representatives of the Ministry of
Indigenous Affairs:
Felipe Caballero
Jose Ramirez
GROUP B:
9:00 a.m. Maria Cristina Arellano, Vice-Ministry of
Environment and Natural Resources
11:00 a.m. Patricia Garcia, legal advisor, Ministry of Sustainable
Development
5:00 p.m. Freddy Heinrich, President, Liga de Defensa del
Medio Ambiente (LIDEMA)
GROUP C:
9:00 a.m. Dennis Grabel, Inter-American Development Bank
3:00 p.m. Superintendency of Basic Sanitation:
Johnny Cuellar, Superintendent of Basic Sanitation
Michael Roca, economic analyst
Thursday, May 29, 2003: La Paz
GROUP A:
9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. Meeting with Representatives from Transredes
Legal Department:
Fernando Gonzalez, Head of Transredes Legal
Department
Marita Landivar, Attorney
Jose, Attorney
Brigitte Herrera, Transredes employee, formerly from
CARE.
GROUP B:
11:30 a.m. Ramiro Cavero, former Minister of Sustainable
Development
5:00 p.m. Jaime Rios Chacon, Human Rights Commission of
Bolivian Congress
20041
Friday, May 30, 2003: La Pa
8:00 a.m.
GROUP A:
9:00 a.m.
GROUP B:
9:00 a.m.
GROUP C:
9:00 a.m.
4:00 p.m.
9:00 p.m.
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Z
Television Interview, Channel 4
Claudia Vargas
Visit to Unidad de Analisis de Politicas Sociales y
Economicas
Tom Kruse, Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo
Laboral y Agrario
Waldo Albarracin, President, Asamblea Permanente
de Derechos Humanos
Saul Apaza, representative from Japo community
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Annex 2: ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS
Maria McFarland Preliminary Trip to Bolivia, February 2003
Monday, February 3: Cochabamba
9:00 a.m. William Scarborough, U.S. Consul in Cochabamba
11:00 a.m. Richard Pol, Cochabamba Ombudsman
1:00 p.m. Tom Kruse, CEDLA
2:30 p.m. Rosario Leon, director, CERES
4:00 p.m. Dr. Eddy Fernandez, President Cochabamba Bar
Association
Tuesday, February 4: Cochabamba
9:00 a.m. Oscar Olivera and Jose Gutierrez, Coordinadora para
la Defensa del Agua y de la Vida
11:00 a.m. Gabriel Herbas, Foro Boliviano del Medio Ambiente
(Cochabamba).
4:00 p.m. Jim Shultz, the Democracy Center
Wednesday, February 5: La Paz
9:30 a.m. Rogelio Mayta, Milena Reque and Liliana Warmi,
attorneys for Chuquifia community
11:30 a.m. Peter Harding, David Wolfe and Ted Craig, U.S.
Embassy in Bolivia
3:00 p.m. George Gray Molina, director, Unidad de Analisis de
Politicas Sociales y Economicas, Bolivia
5:30 p.m. Waldo Albarracin and Monica Calasich, Asamblea
Permanente de Derechos Humanos
Thursday, February 6: LA PAZ
9:00 a.m. Meeting in Chuquifia lawyers' offices:
Rogelio Mayta
Liliana Warmi
Raul Rocha, Chuquifia leader
Luis Gomes, journalist
Rene Gomez Garcia, engineer
12:00 Martha Cecilia Villada, Poder Ciudadano
3:00 p.m. Carlos Miranda, former Superintendent of
Hidrocarbons
4:00 p.m. Horst Grebe Lopez, Instituto Prisma
5:00 p.m. United Nations Development Program in Bolivia:
Jairo Escobar
Jose Carlo Burga
Santiago Daroca Oller
Jesus Ortego Osa
Friday, February 7: La Paz
9:00 a.m. Fernando Rodriguez, Capitulo Boliviano, Plataforma
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos
10:30 a.m. Patricia Molina, Foro Boliviano de Medio Ambiente
y Desarrollo
2:00 p.m. Elizabeth Peredo, Fundacion Solon
3:30 p.m. Judge, I0ol o Juzgado en lo Civil.
NO RECOURSE
Maria McFarland Trip to Washington, D.C., August 21, 2003
John Briscoe, Senior Water Advisor, World Bank
Michael E. Curtin, President, Aguas del Tunari
May 27, 2003:
September 23, 2003:
September 31, 2003:
October 7, 2003:
Additional Interviews
Neisa Roca, former Vice-Minister of Environment
and Development (phone interview)
Armando de la Parra, former Congressman
representing Cochabamba (phone interview)
Jorge Reynolds, legal advisor, Superintendency of
Hydrocarbons (Crowley Program offices)
Carlos Crespo, Professor, Universidad Mayor de San
Simon (phone interview)
2004]
11:00 a.m
1:00 p.m.
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